107
Luigi Corvaglia |The Price of Belief
on the radical libertarian idea of self-determination,
Block explains, “If I own something, I can sell it…If I
cannot sell it, then, in that sense, I do not really own it”
(p. 44). From this perspective, even personal freedom
is alienable, and prohibiting its sale would violate the
basis of individual freedom. As he says, “No law should
be enacted to prohibit or restrict in any way the right
of persons to alienate what they own” (p. 44). This
theoretical position invites a parallel with the defense
of cult advocates, who often argue that the exploitation,
abuse, and psychological enslavement of cult members
cannot be condemned if people have “freely chosen”
to belong to such groups. Just as Block ignores the
socio-economic and emotional constraints that might
invalidate a slave contract, cult apologists ignore the
manipulation and cognitive control that affect consent
in a cult environment. In both cases, submission is
presented as freedom, while the dynamics associated
with power asymmetry and persuasion are conveniently
erased.
As Block (2003, p.44) bluntly states, “Voluntary slavery
contracts are only about property rights over human
beings, not metaphysical issues.” However, the question
arises as to whether a legal, moral, or spiritual contract
can really be described as voluntary if a person’s
“choice” is characterized by a form of “influence with
the aim of exploitation” (44).
A Higher Compass of Liberty
This view reaches new heights when expressed by
representatives of Christian traditionalism of a more
or less “dominionist” nature, who can be found among
both paleolibertarians and cult apologists. A prime
example is Edmund A. Opitz (1955/2009, par. 2), a
leading exponent of Christian libertarianism, who
argued that:
Liberty rests upon the belief that all proper
authority for man’s relationships with his fellow
men comes from a source than man—from the
Creator. Liberty decrees that all men—subject
and ruler alike—are bound by this higher
authority, which is above and beyond man-
made law that each person has a relation to his
Maker with which no other person, not even the
ruler, has any right to interfere.
This view not only elevates personal conscience above
civil obligations but also sanctifies the rejection of
state interference, especially in matters of faith. By this
logic, the deregulation that TRE (ideally) and the cult
apologists (effectively) propose is not only functional
but also can be formulated as a moral imperative.
Moral Conservatism and Tactical Pluralism
The statements in the previous paragraph prompt
reflection on the fact that many proponents of
alternative religious movements, while advocating
radical pluralism, often hold a deeply conservative
moral vision that would theoretically clash with such
ecumenism. Personalities such as Massimo Introvigne
and Marco Respinti from the Centre for Studies on New
Religions (CESNUR) or Willy Fautrè from Human
Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF), for example,
are explicit representatives of ultra-conservative
views. Paradoxically, they also defend the rights of
groups that are far removed from their ideological
position, such as Satanists or tantric sex schools. This
apparent contradiction ceases to be such if pluralism
is understood not as a guiding principle but as a useful
tool. One of its possible benefits lies in a kind of mutual
protection. By resisting state interference in non-
mainstream movements, they indirectly protect their
interests on the principle of “dogs don’t eat dogs,” as the
saying goes. However, a more sophisticated argument is
linked precisely to the Theory of Religious Economy. In
a revealing passage, an author who ranks among both
religious economy theorists and scholars most sensitive
to the needs of new religious movements articulates
a Darwinian logic: in the spiritual market, the most
rigorous religious movements prevail—“among Jews,
the Orthodox in Islam, the fundamentalists and
among Catholics, the most intransigent movements
and communities” (Introvigne, 2005, p. 43).
In line with TRE’s economic dogma, he attributes this
result to the problem of “free riders,” i.e., individuals
who use the services of an organization without paying
the cost:
In the field of religion, less strict and rigorous
organisations that charge low admission
prices and discreetly check that members have
paid their dues, i.e. that they are sufficiently
committed, accept such a large number of free
riders that they offer a diluted and unsatisfactory
Luigi Corvaglia |The Price of Belief
on the radical libertarian idea of self-determination,
Block explains, “If I own something, I can sell it…If I
cannot sell it, then, in that sense, I do not really own it”
(p. 44). From this perspective, even personal freedom
is alienable, and prohibiting its sale would violate the
basis of individual freedom. As he says, “No law should
be enacted to prohibit or restrict in any way the right
of persons to alienate what they own” (p. 44). This
theoretical position invites a parallel with the defense
of cult advocates, who often argue that the exploitation,
abuse, and psychological enslavement of cult members
cannot be condemned if people have “freely chosen”
to belong to such groups. Just as Block ignores the
socio-economic and emotional constraints that might
invalidate a slave contract, cult apologists ignore the
manipulation and cognitive control that affect consent
in a cult environment. In both cases, submission is
presented as freedom, while the dynamics associated
with power asymmetry and persuasion are conveniently
erased.
As Block (2003, p.44) bluntly states, “Voluntary slavery
contracts are only about property rights over human
beings, not metaphysical issues.” However, the question
arises as to whether a legal, moral, or spiritual contract
can really be described as voluntary if a person’s
“choice” is characterized by a form of “influence with
the aim of exploitation” (44).
A Higher Compass of Liberty
This view reaches new heights when expressed by
representatives of Christian traditionalism of a more
or less “dominionist” nature, who can be found among
both paleolibertarians and cult apologists. A prime
example is Edmund A. Opitz (1955/2009, par. 2), a
leading exponent of Christian libertarianism, who
argued that:
Liberty rests upon the belief that all proper
authority for man’s relationships with his fellow
men comes from a source than man—from the
Creator. Liberty decrees that all men—subject
and ruler alike—are bound by this higher
authority, which is above and beyond man-
made law that each person has a relation to his
Maker with which no other person, not even the
ruler, has any right to interfere.
This view not only elevates personal conscience above
civil obligations but also sanctifies the rejection of
state interference, especially in matters of faith. By this
logic, the deregulation that TRE (ideally) and the cult
apologists (effectively) propose is not only functional
but also can be formulated as a moral imperative.
Moral Conservatism and Tactical Pluralism
The statements in the previous paragraph prompt
reflection on the fact that many proponents of
alternative religious movements, while advocating
radical pluralism, often hold a deeply conservative
moral vision that would theoretically clash with such
ecumenism. Personalities such as Massimo Introvigne
and Marco Respinti from the Centre for Studies on New
Religions (CESNUR) or Willy Fautrè from Human
Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF), for example,
are explicit representatives of ultra-conservative
views. Paradoxically, they also defend the rights of
groups that are far removed from their ideological
position, such as Satanists or tantric sex schools. This
apparent contradiction ceases to be such if pluralism
is understood not as a guiding principle but as a useful
tool. One of its possible benefits lies in a kind of mutual
protection. By resisting state interference in non-
mainstream movements, they indirectly protect their
interests on the principle of “dogs don’t eat dogs,” as the
saying goes. However, a more sophisticated argument is
linked precisely to the Theory of Religious Economy. In
a revealing passage, an author who ranks among both
religious economy theorists and scholars most sensitive
to the needs of new religious movements articulates
a Darwinian logic: in the spiritual market, the most
rigorous religious movements prevail—“among Jews,
the Orthodox in Islam, the fundamentalists and
among Catholics, the most intransigent movements
and communities” (Introvigne, 2005, p. 43).
In line with TRE’s economic dogma, he attributes this
result to the problem of “free riders,” i.e., individuals
who use the services of an organization without paying
the cost:
In the field of religion, less strict and rigorous
organisations that charge low admission
prices and discreetly check that members have
paid their dues, i.e. that they are sufficiently
committed, accept such a large number of free
riders that they offer a diluted and unsatisfactory
