International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation Volume 9 2026 104
from the many offerings of competing businesses, i.e.,
the various spiritual offerings. Belonging to a religion
would thus be a decision calculated according to the
cost-benefit ratio in a competitive spiritual market.
This article highlights the internal tensions of TRE
and its ideological alignment with paleolibertarian
thought, concluding that TRE functions—consciously
or unconsciously—as a narrative that lends legitimacy
to controversial religious groups.
Methodological and Theoretical Framework
This study adopts an interdisciplinary perspective that
draws on the sociology of religion, political theory,
and epistemology to explore the ideological roots that
underlie the actions of so-called cult apologists. The
basis for this is the Theory of Religious Economy (TRE),
a conceptual model that, as mentioned earlier, views
religious affiliation as a form of rational behavior based
on the examination of costs and benefits according to
market logic (McBride, 2016 Pfaff &Corcoran, 2018
Salter, 2024 Stark, 2004). In the author’s opinion, the
use of this conceptual framework is a natural step,
as it provides an ideological basis for the prejudicial
defense of certain controversial cults. Moreover, there
are similarities and overlaps between the intellectual
environment of those who are colloquially referred to
as “cult apologists” and the market view of religion,
elements that have not yet been fully recognized by
the general public. This article aims to highlight these
similarities.
Although TRE presents itself as a value-free
explanation of religious dynamics, this research argues
that it is, in fact, part of a specific ideological landscape
characterized by a libertarian skepticism towards state
regulation precisely because it strongly emphasizes
individual choice. This has far-reaching political
implications, as the model tends to mask—and thus
shield—fundamental problems such as manipulation,
power imbalance, and systemic abuse in high-demand
religious contexts. The analysis presented here is based
on a careful and critical reading of key TRE theorists
as well as influential New Religious Movement (NRM)
scholars, which not coincidentally sometimes overlap,
with the aim of uncovering the normative logic
that often lies behind seemingly neutral and purely
descriptive statements.
Rational Choice Theory and the Religious
Marketplace
Rational choice theory (RCT) states that individuals
make decisions based on maximizing their utility
within the constraints imposed by the given conditions
(Becker, 1968 Homans, 1974 Coleman, 1986 Scott,
2000). As mentioned earlier, this perspective, when
extended to the religious sphere, forms the basis for
the Theory of Religious Economy (TRE), a model in
which believers are viewed as rational actors choosing
between competing religious “products” offered by
different “firms,” i.e., religious institutions (Stark &
Iannaccone, 1994).
As one would expect from any form of market, TRE
proponents argue that competition benefits consumers
in the religious market. They argue that deregulated
and pluralistic religious markets tend to lead to greater
overall participation. On the contrary, as Stark and
Iannaccone (1994) note, “When a religious economy is
monopolised by one or two state-supported enterprises,
overall levels of participation tends to be low” (p. 233).
According to Introvigne (2005), this scenario can
occur when the state denies access to new or marginal
groups that are labeled as cults or perceived as a threat
to national identity. In other words, where the market
is free, the consumer chooses, and therefore there are
no movements labeled as “cults” or “sects” where the
market is not free, the state declares certain movements
to be “cults.” At first glance, this appears to be a “liberal”
view that values democracy. In the author’s view, this
superficial assessment can be dismantled from both a
scientific and ideological perspective.
Religious market theory is based on Robinsonian
economics, i.e., the neoclassical concept of homo
oeconomicus, an individual who is assumed to make
rational decisions based on incentives. According to
this logic, issues of manipulation or coercion are not
only downplayed but considered irrelevant to the
analysis. This logic is also reflected in the narrative of
New Religious Movements (NRMs). Benjamin Zeller
(2014, p. 9) writes about the suicides of the Heaven’s
Gate group:
Do I believe that members had choices? Yes, I
do.... In the ‘exit videos,’ nearly every member
looked at the camera and declared that they
had freely chosen to lay down their earthly

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Luigi Corvaglia |The Price of Belief
If you apply rational choice theory uncritically to
religion, it does not just describe beliefs and behaviors.
It also runs the risk of naturalizing even the most
coercive dynamics by reinterpreting dependence as
autonomy and abuse as free consent. So let us begin by
examining the scientific soundness of this seemingly
ecumenical and free-trade view.
Empirical and logical critiques of TRE
The premise underlying the Theory of Religious
Economy (TRE) is empirically weak, to say the least.
The idea of applying economic rationality outside
its natural domain has already been questioned by
Herbert Simon (1955) and Paul Diesing (1973).
Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality”—the idea
that humans settle for sub-optimal solutions due to
the computational limits of our brains—casts doubt
on the credibility of TRE. In Simon’s words, “decision
making under uncertainty rarely conforms to the ideal
of complete rationality” (Simon, 1955, p. 103).
The fact that human decisions are not rational has
even been confirmed by the Nobel Prize winner,
Daniel Kahneman. He even created a discipline
known as behavioral economics, which highlights
the economic illogicality of human decisions. Indeed,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that human
decisions are characterized by mental shortcuts and
bias rather than systematic calculation. Kahneman’s
distinction between “System 1” (quick and intuitive)
and “System 2” (slow and deliberate) also undermines
the notion that humans are capable of consistently
and comprehensively evaluating and weighing long-
term benefits of their decisions (Kahneman, 2011).
George Ainslie (2001) shows that people often make
short-sighted decisions even when they are aware
of their counterproductive nature. This is due to the
phenomenon of “hyperbolic discounting,” i.e., the
process of valuing immediate rewards over long-term
benefits.
Antonio Damasio (1994) backs up this indisputable
data by showing that emotions are not just a peripheral
lives.... Members of Heaven’s Gate allowed
themselves to be conditioned in a different
way, but that does not make them any more
or less brainwashed than everyone else.
disturbance, but a central element of thinking that is
actively involved in decision-making—a realization
that fundamentally challenges the cold and calculating
action that TRE assumes. It should not be overlooked
that religious commitment often arises not from a
comparative judgement between faiths, but from
emotional experiences, existential emergencies, or
personal crises. It should also be borne in mind that
the emotional element not only supports decisions, but
also, in some cases, can deprive them of any coherence
because, as George Loewenstein (1996) emphasizes,
visceral impulses—desire, fear, emotional urgency—
can gain the upper hand over any form of utility
calculation.
To conclude the analysis of the cognitive aspects, it
should be noted that autonomous decision-making
and manipulation are not mutually exclusive but can
coexist. The writer proposed a model that shows that
a gradual decision to adopt a certain behavior can
lead to an outcome that the individual would have
never accepted if it had been suggested to them in
the first place. If this outcome involves exploitation
by the persuader, one can speak of a manipulative
process (Corvaglia, 2025). In this light, the rationalist
assumptions of TRE appear detached from the way
belief and belonging actually develop.
The internal logic of the model is also problematic.
At the level of comparative choice alone, it is obvious
to everyone that a belief is not a car. The latter can
change their models and vary their accessories to
better satisfy consumers, but it is unlikely that a belief
can do the same to survive in the market. The mistake
of treating beliefs as commodities robs them of their
epistemic dimension, by reducing them to superficial
consumption models, the fundamental cultural
dimension is lost, as beliefs are often formed through
intense socialization and emotional immersion
rather than free choice (Henrik Lagerlund, 2018).
Furthermore, the preferences expressed by consumers
in the religious market are inferred from behavior,
while behavior is in turn explained by preferences—a
circular argument, as Steve Bruce (1999, p. 21) noted:
If we explain the choice of a religion by the fact
that it satisfies one’s preferences, but we only
know what one’s preferences are by observing
the choice, we are not saying anything.