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These considerations are particularly relevant when
studying high-demand religious groups where
emotionality and conformity are strongly elicited. In
such contexts, the concept of the rational actor is not
only inadequate but also misleading.
Ultimately, TRE stands on shaky ground in many
respects. By ignoring the realities of manipulation,
emotional involvement, cultural framing, and social
pressure, it loses its claim to neutrality. Although it
dresses itself up in a language of science, TRE represents
a clearly ideological position, closely aligned with the
deregulation claim and based on a rather romanticized
notion of individual autonomy.
Ideological Underpinning: Paleo-Libertarianism,
Cult Apologetics, and Soft Power
Libertarianism is a political philosophy centered on
the idea of individual freedom, minimal interference
by the state up to and including its complete abolition
(in this case, anarcho-capitalism), and the primacy of
the free market. In practice, it assumes that free market
transactions can replace the state in the provision of
all services, including security and the legal system
(Cooper, Binder, Kidder, 2024 Rothbard, 1982
Friedman, 1973 Slobodian, 2025). Broadly speaking,
there are two main variants: left-libertarianism, which
focuses on personal freedoms, such as free speech, sexual
autonomy, and civil liberties, and right-libertarianism,
which is predominantly economic in orientation and
emphasizes property rights and deregulation. The term
“paleo-libertarianism,” introduced by Lew Rockwell
in 1990, marks a significant shift within American
libertarian thought. It is a right-wing variant that
combines radical trust in the free market with a deep
commitment to traditional moral values. This school of
thought thus breaks away from cultural liberalism and
instead adheres to religious and familial values rooted
in pre-modern Christian doctrine. Influential figures
such as Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard laid
the intellectual foundations for this current belief
by advocating a form of praxeological rationalism,
summarized in von Mises’s statement, “Human action
is always rational” (1949).
The Theory of Religious Economy (TRE) fits
perfectly with the paleo-libertarian assumptions. Both
approaches are based on a view of social life that sees
the state as an inappropriate constraint that prevents
the full development of human transactions. For both
views, individual decisions are inherently rational
and state intervention inherently suspect. From
this perspective, it is a logical conclusion for paleo-
libertarians that religion is a commodity and that even
coercive or abusive religious environments can be seen
as legitimate offerings that are not imposed but available
on the shelves of the spiritual supermarket. It seems
increasingly clear that this convergence is not limited
to a mirror image on the issue of religious freedom
that happens to morph into ideological support for the
actions of cult defenders, but often appears to be a kind
of intentional and pragmatic cultural alignment. The
conceptual and strategic parallels that link these two
areas are explained below.
A Shared Belief in Rational Action
Principle of Non-Aggression
The basis of libertarianism is the “principle of non-
aggression.” Based on the assumption shared by
libertarians and TRE theorists that individuals are
sovereign actors capable of making rational choices,
any individual or collective action that conflicts with
individual choices is aggression. Rothbard (1982)
asserts that an individual is his own master and that
any coercion—especially by the state—is illegitimate.
Similarly, cult apologists such as Richardson (1993) or
Zeller (2017), and quasi-cult apologists like Stark and
Finke (2000), tend to reject notions of undue influence
or coercive persuasion on the basis of individual
sovereignty and a notion of rationality that fits with
the libertarian idea of “praxeology.” The notion echoes
Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s concept of a “community of
alliance,” in which individuals are assumed to freely
choose their moral and social environment, regardless
of how hierarchical, exclusive, or totalitarian it may be.
Voluntary Slavery
The parallel between radical, conservative
libertarianism and the defense of cults becomes
complete and even clearer when we move from
the legitimacy of religious worship to the ethical
evaluation of the follower’s alienation. This is the issue
of “voluntary slavery.” Walter Block (2003) argues that
voluntary slavery should be legally permissible if it is
based on a consensual contract between adults. Based

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Luigi Corvaglia |The Price of Belief
on the radical libertarian idea of self-determination,
Block explains, “If I own something, I can sell it…If I
cannot sell it, then, in that sense, I do not really own it”
(p. 44). From this perspective, even personal freedom
is alienable, and prohibiting its sale would violate the
basis of individual freedom. As he says, “No law should
be enacted to prohibit or restrict in any way the right
of persons to alienate what they own” (p. 44). This
theoretical position invites a parallel with the defense
of cult advocates, who often argue that the exploitation,
abuse, and psychological enslavement of cult members
cannot be condemned if people have “freely chosen”
to belong to such groups. Just as Block ignores the
socio-economic and emotional constraints that might
invalidate a slave contract, cult apologists ignore the
manipulation and cognitive control that affect consent
in a cult environment. In both cases, submission is
presented as freedom, while the dynamics associated
with power asymmetry and persuasion are conveniently
erased.
As Block (2003, p.44) bluntly states, “Voluntary slavery
contracts are only about property rights over human
beings, not metaphysical issues.” However, the question
arises as to whether a legal, moral, or spiritual contract
can really be described as voluntary if a person’s
“choice” is characterized by a form of “influence with
the aim of exploitation” (44).
A Higher Compass of Liberty
This view reaches new heights when expressed by
representatives of Christian traditionalism of a more
or less “dominionist” nature, who can be found among
both paleolibertarians and cult apologists. A prime
example is Edmund A. Opitz (1955/2009, par. 2), a
leading exponent of Christian libertarianism, who
argued that:
Liberty rests upon the belief that all proper
authority for man’s relationships with his fellow
men comes from a source than man—from the
Creator. Liberty decrees that all men—subject
and ruler alike—are bound by this higher
authority, which is above and beyond man-
made law that each person has a relation to his
Maker with which no other person, not even the
ruler, has any right to interfere.
This view not only elevates personal conscience above
civil obligations but also sanctifies the rejection of
state interference, especially in matters of faith. By this
logic, the deregulation that TRE (ideally) and the cult
apologists (effectively) propose is not only functional
but also can be formulated as a moral imperative.
Moral Conservatism and Tactical Pluralism
The statements in the previous paragraph prompt
reflection on the fact that many proponents of
alternative religious movements, while advocating
radical pluralism, often hold a deeply conservative
moral vision that would theoretically clash with such
ecumenism. Personalities such as Massimo Introvigne
and Marco Respinti from the Centre for Studies on New
Religions (CESNUR) or Willy Fautrè from Human
Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF), for example,
are explicit representatives of ultra-conservative
views. Paradoxically, they also defend the rights of
groups that are far removed from their ideological
position, such as Satanists or tantric sex schools. This
apparent contradiction ceases to be such if pluralism
is understood not as a guiding principle but as a useful
tool. One of its possible benefits lies in a kind of mutual
protection. By resisting state interference in non-
mainstream movements, they indirectly protect their
interests on the principle of “dogs don’t eat dogs,” as the
saying goes. However, a more sophisticated argument is
linked precisely to the Theory of Religious Economy. In
a revealing passage, an author who ranks among both
religious economy theorists and scholars most sensitive
to the needs of new religious movements articulates
a Darwinian logic: in the spiritual market, the most
rigorous religious movements prevail—“among Jews,
the Orthodox in Islam, the fundamentalists and
among Catholics, the most intransigent movements
and communities” (Introvigne, 2005, p. 43).
In line with TRE’s economic dogma, he attributes this
result to the problem of “free riders,” i.e., individuals
who use the services of an organization without paying
the cost:
In the field of religion, less strict and rigorous
organisations that charge low admission
prices and discreetly check that members have
paid their dues, i.e. that they are sufficiently
committed, accept such a large number of free
riders that they offer a diluted and unsatisfactory