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syndromes will differ in that the borderline will vacillate between idealization of
authority/devaluation of self and devaluation of authority/idealization of self, the cultist will
tend to get stuck on the idealization of authority/devaluation of self, and the narcissist will
demonstrate the converse (cf. Grotstein, 1981, pp. 182-183 Masterson, 1981, p. 30). More
will be said about the handling of this transferential idealization of the therapist as an
authority figure in a subsequent article.
The literature Is silent on what occurs to the ex-cultists‘ view of authority when the
reemergence of the pre-cult personality during stage two brings an increase in self-
confidence (i.e., ego strength). A reduction in the idealization of, and passive receptivity to,
such figures may obviously be assumed. But an immediate resumption of a realistic view of
authority should not be so easily taken for granted. Complicating this path toward reality
testing and perception are the factors of stage two anger and the reemergence of pre-cult
personality tendencies.
Anger felt toward the cult leaders, the parents, and even toward deprogrammers may be
transferred onto the therapist during stage two. The author has found in his own ex-cultist
rehabilitation counseling experience that this transference is particularly intense if the client
came out of a dysfunctional family system (cf. Zerin, 1982) or encountered an unethical)
manipulative deprogrammer.
Negative transference coming from pre-cult dysfunctions family systems may be related to
the reemergence of pre-cult individual psychopathology and/or the reemergence of anger
regarding family conflicts or problems. Anger which the cult helped to channel and control
(cf. Salzman, 1966 pp. 17-19 Pruyer, 1977, pp. 345-347 or see the role of guilt in cult
conversion as ―anger turned inward,‖ Ash, 1983, pp 68-69) is no longer being displaced so
effectively, and the therapist is a much safer replacement for channeling than the family.
Furthermore, Clark (1977) reported that 58% of cultists suffered from previous emotional or
personality disorders, Galanter et al. (1979) reported that 39% had previous serious
psychopathology, and most recently Sullivar (1984) reported 44% having prior emotional
troubles or crises (pp. 96, 97). Furthermore, Doress and Porter (1978), Levine (1980), and
West and Singer (1980) have all suggested that leaving the cult does precipitate the return
of any such pre-cult conflicts and problems.
Family problems. The ex-cultist has to deal with previous familial conflicts he avoided
through cult conversion and a new set of problems related more specifically to his cult
conversion. Schwartz and Kaslow (1979), for example, have suggested that parents receive
their returning children with a mixture of joy and anger, or confusion regarding the sense of
rejection precipitated by their offspring‘s preference for the cult family. These parents also
tend to revert toward overprotectiveness the ―caretaker urge‖ (AFF, p. 77) to reassure
themselves that their offspring will not return to the cult. Singer (1984, p. 80) labeled the
resulting feeling of constantly being watched by family and friends the ―fishbowl effect.‖
Concluding Diagnostic Comments
Atypical Dissociative Disorder
Those suffering from cult-induced dissociation, i.e., those still mental members (or captives)
of extremist cults, should, with few exceptions, receive a DSM-III diagnosis of atypical
dissociative disorder (300.15). This would include those individuals who have physically left
those totalitarian group but still retain the same mind set that they had while in the group,
e.g., rigid defense of its doctrines, beliefs, and practices and/or continuation of its practices
(such as extensive chanting).
Multiple personality. In a myriad of ways the cultist dissociative disorder resembles the
multiple, or split, personality (DSM-III #300.14). While such a comparison and differential

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 43
diagnosis should be the topic of extensive research in itself, some shorter observations are
definitely in order.
First, many similarities can be seen in the etiology of the two disorders. Of the ―many roads
to a split personality‖ which Beahrs (1982, pp. 98-99) lists, only the childhood history of
having had ―imaginary playmates‖ would appear to be ruled out, and even then a common
denominator would be a heightened ability to enter hypnosis. Like the split personality, the
road to the cult personality disorder often occurs through or involves ―avoiding mental
friction‖ and ―escape from responsibility‖ (cf. Anthony, Robbins &McCarthy, 1980 Conway
&Siegelman, 1978 Cox in Hopkins, 1978 Enroth, 1979a Furlong, 1981 Hunt, 1980 Isser
&Schwartz, 1980 Lasch, 1979 Levine &Salter, 1979 Maleson, 1981 Roche, 1979
Salzman, 1966 Schwartz, 1979, 1981 Spero, 1977, 1980), ―amnesia and abdication of
control‖ (regarding the latter cf. Ash‘s analysis of the ―ego regression theory‖ of cult
conversion 1983, pp. 63-71), ―hypnotic negation of sense of self‖ (cf. Lifton‘s ―logical
dishonoring of self, 1961, pp. 76-79), and ―environmental factors and developmental
history‖ (i.e., double-bind communication used by both cult-vulnerable family systems and
extremist cults as well cf. ―Personal Vulnerability‖ family factors above).
Beahrs has postulated that everyone has simultaneous multilevels of consciousness with
corresponding ego-states, although all but one usually stay hidden, i.e., unconscious. In a
healthy person the conscious part-self is like the executive or conductor of a finely tuned
orchestra (p. 7), gently guiding his many subordinate part-selves. In someone with a
dissociative disorder, the orchestra Is in disarray. The ego-states battle for executive
control. The boundaries between them become more rigid, exhibiting a more restricted flow
of inter-part information (pp. 8, 67). The cult dissociative disorder would fit this model in
that the cult may lure out one previously latent child ego-state (cf. pp. 134, 138) and,
through an alliance with this ego-state, overthrow the prevailing executive (adult) ego-state
in a coup d‘etat. What emerges is a dictatorial control with rigid amnesic barriers which
limit, rather than enhance, the individual‘s power for action (i.e., dysfunctional splitting that
is a symptom, not a skill pp. 67, 81).
The two primary differences between the cult dissociative disorder and the multiple
personality center upon extension and sudden shifts in executive control. While the cult
personality disorder is a pathology of dissociation and extension/dedifferentiation (especially
between self and others), the split personality generally reflects no ego deficit in
differentiation. And while the multiple always demonstrates ―sudden shifts in executive
control among personalities‖ (p. 86), the cultist‘s (child ego-state) executor remains firmly
in control, reinforced through symbiotic extension with the cult outside. However, this
―control‖ is actually dubious, since the price for this alien reinforcement of power is always
deference to the cult leaders.
Figure 4 visually summarizes the differences between the mystical experience, the cult
dissociative disorder, the multiple personality, and the borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders.