Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 17
All panelists agreed that the use of mind control without conscious consent of members,
approval of violence against enemies, and abuse of members who stray from the group
were very destructive. These practices were rated dangerous in almost all circumstances. In
contrast, the panelists on average rated the following practices below 3, ―mildly
destructive‖ ―The group advocates a new religion!‘ (2-32) ―the group proselytizes
members of my church‖ (2.70) ―the group uses its own version of the Bible‖ (2.74) and
―new members exhibit a marked change in personality‖ (2.84). These practices were seen
as potentially dangerous in only a few or some circumstances.
Discussion
Our panelists were able to distinguish between different levels of destructive actions. They
rated the practices of certain new religions very dangerous not because they represented a
rival religion or competing psychotherapy, but because these groups manipulated, abused,
coerced, threatened, enslaved and neglected their members and because they proposed a
totalitarian world view. Not all new religions employ these practices. Yet when one considers
the documented record of many of these groups slander, blackmail, deception, theft of
government property, emotional and psychological abuse it is difficult to dismiss these
activities as mere allegations or the products of propaganda in the ―guildlike skirmishes
between the new religions and the psychotherapies‖ (Kilbourne &Richardson, p. 248).
In contrast to new religions, the general trend in psychotherapy is toward greater
accountability to the public (Theaman, 1984) and increased concern with ethical practice
(Smith, 1981). Kilbourne and Richardson acknowledge that psychotherapy practices have
come under considerable scrutiny. We also wish to add that credentialed psychotherapists
subscribe to written codes of ethics, accept responsibility for the welfare of their clients, are
accountable in financial matters, are open about the goals of treatment and its costs, and
avoid influencing political, religious, and financial decisions of clients.
Psychology as a body of knowledge and psychotherapy as a profession are fundamentally
open systems many of the new religions are not. Kilbourne and Richardson note that,
contrary to the actions Implied by the label ―nondirective therapy,‖ two studies found that
Carl Rogers systematically influenced his clients‘ verbal behaviors. Thus, they note,
psychotherapists are as ―guilty‖ as new religionists of manipulating their target populations.
Moreover, they further imply that psychotherapists do not acknowledge their own
manipulations. However, we note that the level of manipulation is nothing like that to be
found in many cults. Moreover, Rogers modified his theories based on the findings of the
above studies, and he replaced the term ―nondirective therapy‖ with the more accurate
term ―client-centered therapy.‖ This is but one example demonstrating the essential
openness of psychotherapy. To our knowledge, none of the major leaders in psychotherapy
theory, research, or practice has appointed him or herself a messiah. Nor do reputable
counselors ask their clients to devote their entire lives and fortunes to the needs of the
counselor.
Kilbourne and Richardson are correctly critical of the methodology of some research on new
religions. We submit that the resistance of some of these groups to free inquiry and the
seduction of investigators through subsidy or conference and lecture fees (Dole &Dubrow
Eichel, 1981 Horowitz, 1978) hardly contribute to scholarly impartiality. Whereas there are
over 500 published studies on psychotherapy outcomes that establish treatment as effective
and beneficial (Garfield, 1981 Landman &Dawes, 1982 Smith &Glass, 1977), Kilbourne
and Richardson draw their conclusions (prematurely, we believe) from only a handful of
studies concerned with the effects of new religions. Moreover, when contending that some
new religions are as therapeutically beneficial as psychotherapy, Kilbourne and Richardson
almost always refer to these studies as ―empirical evidence.‖ As one example of the
questionable use of the ―empirical‖ label with regard to these studies, they do not state if
Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 18
instruments other than nonstandardized self-report measures were utilized in the
assessment of these so-called therapeutic outcomes. Nonstandardized self-report -
instruments are no longer considered reliable or valid as the sole measures of outcome in
therapy outcome research, yet at least some of the studies they cite (e.g., Galanter, 1980,
Galanter &Buckley, 1983) base their conclusions solely on responses to these kinds of
measures.
Without control groups, pre-post measures, or dispassionate researchers (all of which are
readily found in those psychotherapy outcome studies recognized as most comprehensive
and valid), these scant findings are questionable. That leaves us with personal testimony.
The critics of new religions most often cited by Kilbourne and Richardson, have by their own
estimates, worked with over 2,000 new religionists and their families (Clark, Singer,
Langone &West, 1985). To this sample one can add the hundreds more seen by other
clinicians in this field (cf. Goldberg &Goldberg, 1982 Dubrow Eichel, Dubrow Eichel, &
Eisenberg, 1984, as examples). This sample is admittedly clinical and therefore biased. Do
Kilboume and Richardson wish to imply, however, that many of the samples they cite (e.g.,
119 ―premies‖ at a Divine Light Mission festival) are unbiased?
While it may be useful to compare the structures and functions of both new religions and
psychotherapies, Kilbourne and Richardson are guilty of the logical ―fallacy of the
undistributed middle‖ (Sherwood, 1960 Flew 1975). Because some of the new religions
may perform social functions similar to those performed by some psychotherapies, the two
are not therefore equivalent. Most of Kilbourne and Richardson‘s criteria for comparing new
religions and psychotherapy, for example, are applicable to both prisons and public schools,
and to both organized crime syndicates and the Catholic Church. Asking oneself where one
would rather send his or her children and by which group one would rather be employed
might provide two ―gut‖ examples of the differences between these groups.
We believe that dangerousness, or destructiveness, is a dimension that clearly distinguishes
psychotherapy from some new religions. Although there are many other problems with
Kilbourne and Richardson‘s comparison between psychotherapy and new religions, these
seem to pale when we consider that they have not adequately considered the dimension of
dangerousness. There is a vast literature that documents those systematically planned and
executed activities that are destructive to a new religion‘s membership and/or to the society
at large. This literature needs to be incorporated into, rather than casually dismissed by,
any theoretical model that claims to compare psychology to some of the new religions.
References
Boettcher, R., &Freedman, G. (1980). Gifts of deceit. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Borg, W., &Gail M. (1983). Educational research. New York: Longman.
Clark, J., Singer, M., Langone, M., &West, L. (1985, January). Experts criticize ―one-
sided‖ view (reprint of edited letter that first appeared in the October 1984 issue of
Psychology Today. The Cult Observer, p. 11.
Dole, A., &Dubrow Eichel, 5.(1981). Moon over academe. Journal of Religion and Health,
20, 35-40.
Dubrow Eichel, S., Dubrow Eichel, L., &Eisenberg, R. (1984). Mental health interventions in
cult-related cases: Preliminary investigations of outcomes. Cultic Studies Journal, 1,
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Flew, A.TI975). Thinking straight. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus. Galanter, M. (1980).
Psychological induction into the large group: Findings from a modem religious sect.
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