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to individuals drawn from the same groups 3) the underlying ―deep structure‖ (supportive,
empathic, confiding relationship special setting with symbols of hope and healing special
rationale that explains health and illness and a special set of rituals and practices) is the
same 4) both serve the same common functions—improving the functioning and/or self-
esteem of the member or patient 5) they have similar cognitive and interactive styles, i.e.,
the way in which members/patients think about themselves or interact with others is
essentially the same and 6) both psychotherapy and the new religions tend to be referred
to by outsiders in a derogatory manner and are scapegoated.
Based on these presumed commonalities Kilbourne and Richardson reach the provocative
but oversimplified and fallacious conclusion that psychotherapy and the ―new religions‖ are
essentially the same. We believe there are profound differences in form, structure, process,
and outcome for psychotherapy as compared to the ―new religions‖.
Interestingly, we (Kriegman and Solomon, 1985 Kriegman, 1980) have also documented
some striking similarities between psychotherapy and religious cult groups, namely1, the
relationship of the patient/member to the therapist/leader/group and 2) the sense of relief
and positive change that accompanies the formation of the relationship with the
therapist/leader/group. However, we also clearly delineate major differences. We have
suggested that Kohut‘s ―self-psychology‖ and clinical perspectives (Kohut, 1971, 1977) can
serve to illuminate the ―psychosocial fit‖ between what cult groups promise and the
yearning for ―self-cohesion‖ on the part of the ―true believer‖ or potential recruit.
The parallels between the particular type of transference which develops during the clinical
treatment of narcissistic personality disorders and the idealization of the cult leader are so
striking that when one reads Kohut‘s descriptions of the ―idealizing transference‖ it seems
as though he might be describing the typical relationship between a cult member and his
leader (Kriegman and Solomon, 1985). The cult group‘s use of this type of transference or
bonding phenomenon, however, is markedly different from the manner in which the
therapist seeks to ―work through‖ and resolve this type of transference. In Kriegman &
Solomon (1985), we describe how a resolution leading to greater internal freedom and
personal autonomy is brought about in the therapeutic process. We believe that Kilbourne
and Richardson‘s conclusion that psychotherapy and religious cults are essentially the same
is unwarranted. Let us examine some of their arguments.
The Correlation In Time Fallacy
Kilbourne and Richardson (1984) state:
Both psychotherapy and new religions exist within the same sociohistorical
context, even though psychotherapeutic approaches gained impetus a few
decades earlier ...(p. 238)
They go on to list some of the characteristics of the current ―sociohistorical context,‖ with
the implication being that certain features of modern-day western society have led to the
appeal of both psychotherapy and the ―new religions,‖ which, it is concluded, serve similar
societal needs. While it may be true that certain features of modern society have led to
certain types of anxieties, to argue that these two ―solutions‖ are therefore functionally
equivalent is simply not logical. Raising a family and developing a productive fulfilling
career, on the one hand, and a life of crime and heroin addiction, on the other, are both, at
least in part, solutions to existential anxiety. Though they both may offer partial solutions to
the same problem, there is no reason to conclude that they are therefore essentially the
same. The correlation of two phenomena with a third cannot be used to argue that the
original two are related in any particular way. To do so would be a form of the
correlation/causation fallacy, for anything that comes into being within the same time period

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 5
can be said to have arisen in the same sociohistorical context. Thus, all current phenomena
are correlated. Are they, therefore, indistinguishable at their core?
Furthermore, one may question the assumption that the ―new‖ religions are unique to
today. The arguments presented in Kilbourne and Richardson (1984) are based upon this
presumption: if the new religions are unique to conditions present in modern-day society,
then they ought to be fundamentally related to psychotherapy which, they suggest, is also a
product of current conditions. They present no evidence to support this assumption.
Certainly new religions h,ave been arising throughout human history. We know of no culture
which exists without religion (Beals Hoijer, 1971 Bohannan, 1963). Therefore, it seems
reasonable to conclude that religion constantly ―arises‖ in whatever cultural context exists.
Are the ―new‖ religions of today in any fundamental way different from the ―new‖ religions
of the early 19OOs? From those of the 1800s? Or for that matter of the 1200s or of any
other time period? If one makes a claim that the ―new‖ religions are a manifestation of
present-day western society and therefore are in a fundamental sense related to another
modern-day phenomenon, psychotherapy, then one must also show that they are unique to
the present culture. In fact, we would suggest that the ―new‖ religions are essentially
identical, in their fundamental elements, to many early religions. Some will survive. Most
will fail. No case is presented to show that they are profoundly different from other religious
movements and, thus, that their unique modernness ought to make for some profound
connection to other 20th century phenomena.
The Misuse of Universal Group Phenomena to Conclude That Two Specific Groups Are
Equivalent Kilbourne and Richardson‘s fourth and fifth points, that psychotherapy and the
―new religions‖ have the same cognitive and interactive styles and that both are denigrated
by outsiders, again are points which cannot be used to argue for any essential similarity
between the two. Are they not simply describing universal group phenomena? All groups
tend to develop their own language, have some intragroup common interests, stereotype
outsiders in a common way, and explain things using their own unique philosophies (Toch,
1965 Austin &Worchel, 1979). Members of many groups tend to set themselves off from
outsiders using these intragroup commonalities (usually claiming some form of superiority).
Outsiders, who are excluded from membership, are likely to defensively denigrate such a
group, and to criticize its language, philosophy, and claims of superiority. Similarities and
commonalities of group life are important to describe and understand. However, it is a
mistake to use the similarities in group dynamics as indicators of functional equivalence.
While it is valuable to note the group processes and principles which govern, for example,
both a political rally and a violent mob action, to list only the similarities and suggest
essential sameness obscures the more important task of identifying the essential
differences. What leads to mob behavior? What distinguishes the euphoric political group
readying itself to do sublimated ―battle‖ with the ―enemy‖ (the other party), from a mob
readying itself to move beyond its individual members‘ sense of morality into ―acting out‖
mob violence?
Selfobject Support and Self-Affirmation
Let us now turn to the more important second, third, and fourth ―commonalities‖ which
Kilbourne and Richardson describe: cult groups and psychotherapy appeal to the same
people the underlying ―deep structures‖ are the same and both serve to enhance the
follower‘s/patient‘s self-esteem. Our understanding is that cults and psychotherapy appear
to offer something similar: they offer ―selfobject‖ support and self-affirmation (Kohut, 1971,
1977, 1982). A brief period of cult membership sometimes can lead to greater internal
stability and improved psychosocial functioning for some members. As Kilbourne and
Richardson suggest, they can act as a ―way-station‖ for some adolescents who are passing
through a period of instability and turmoil. Levine (1984), who also presents this
perspective, in addition emphasizes that all of these ―radical‖ religious groups have a