Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 22
not necessarily the same as ―psychological well-being‖. Galanter says that the relief effect
comes from the perception of availability of social support and cognitive guidance in
mastering stress (p. 1201). Even if this were true, it still does not rule out the presence of
psychopathological defense mechanisms, which aid in bringing about this perception of well-
being, through denial and dissociation. Moreover, Galanter cannot deny that self-report
questionnaires, such as the General Well-Being Schedule and Neurotic Distress Scale, are
dreadfully easy to fake, thereby making both conscious and unconscious forms of denial
possible sources of error here.
In using the more powerful Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Ross (1983)
and Ungerleider and Wellisch (1979b) both found support for the notion that cultists tend to
―fake good‖ via elevations on certain validity scales (Ungerleider and Wellisch found L high,
Ross found K high). Therefore, the lack of elevation on the MMPI clinical scales for the
cultists in these two studies cannot be taken as proof of the absence of psychopathology,
for as Ungerleider and Wellisch themselves noted, ―it is likely that many of the in-group‘s
(scales) would have been elevated had they not consciously skewed their responses‖ (p.
281).
Finally, dissociative disorders, of which the author believes the cultic personality to be a
type, quite often do show ―normality‖ on objective tests such as the MMPI, while also
exhibiting psychopathology on projective tests such as the Rorschach, TAT, or drawings,
e.g., borderline personality disorder (Gunderson &Singer, 1975 Stone, 1980, pp. 264-270
Tibe, 1979, pp. 14-15 18-20, 29-33 Weinger, 1966, pp. 404-405). Therefore, it should
come as no surprise that the only two studies which did use projectives did find
psychopathology in cult devotees (Deutsch &Miller, 1983 Spero, 1982). Furthermore,
Spero specifically found much evidence of ―frank borderline-type (dissociative) phenomena‖
(p. 335) operating in the ego defenses of 37% of his cult devotees.
In conclusion, the egalitarians‘ use of the actuarial studies of cult devotees to ―prove‖ an
absence of psychopathology is highly questionable: the studies reflected the cultists‘
tendency to avoid acknowledgement of psychological problems the self-report
questionnaires employed in the studies were easily ―fakeable‖ (General Well-Being Schedule
&Neurotic Distress Scale) or had questionable validity due to the faking response set
(MMPI) and the studies under consideration ignored two other studies which used
projective testing and did show evidence of psychopathology.
Regarding the presence of problems in ex-cultists, egalitarians declare that the vast
majority left voluntarily, Implying that these individuals suffer no, or at least fewer,
problems. Additionally, they call cult critics to task for the lack of statistical data supporting
the prevalence of ex-cultist problems (e.g., Saliba, 1985, p. 44). Nonetheless, much clinical
evidence, such as that which will be presented in this paper, ―suggests that the prevalence
of harm is substantial, although not necessarily normative or the same from group to
group‖ (Langone, 1984, p. 66). In fact, the only available study which examined the
prevalence of harm (Galanter, 1983b) found 36% of ex-Moonies (71% of whom had clearly
departed voluntarily) experienced ―serious emotional problems after leaving,‖ problems that
continued for an average of 3.8 years (p. 984). Furthermore, the General Well-Being
Schedule used in this study (the Neurotic Distress Scale was not employed) is not able to
detect emotional problems not labeled ―serious‖ by this self-report method. Therefore,
actual prevalence of psychological problems as measured by more powerful psychological
assessment techniques could conceivably result in an even higher prevalence rate.
Lately, egalitarians have begun to concede that there are (or can be) problems which
surface when individuals leave the newer cult groups, but they also insist that these
problems are ―cult-related,‖ not cult caused (Robbins, 1984 Saliba, 1985), and they usually
relegate them to problems of adjustment akin to the culture shock missionaries experience

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 1985, Page 23
when they return to the States after an extended absence (cf, Levine, 1984). This paper
will argue against these positions as well.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to synthesize the available literature into a theoretical overview
of the psychopathology resulting from membership in extremist cults. A subsequent paper
will provide an overview of psychotherapeutic treatment issues and guidelines. The intent is
to provide a conceptual framework for a more comprehensive view of this psychological
impairment and its treatment. Future research may add, delete, or revise various parts of
this conceptualization according to our ever-expanding knowledge. Nothing said here is
intended to be the final word.
In certain ways this paper was meant to be a revision of the only available prior attempt to
provide such a synthesis, the American Family Foundation‘s work, Destructive cult
conversion: Theory, research, and treatment (Clark, Langone, Schecter, &Daly, 1981
hereafter referred to as ―AFF‖). While the etiological aspects of the problem, assumed to be
the cult conversion process itself, are only summarized here (cf. Ash, 1983, pp. 46-103 for
a more systematic view), this paper still transcends the AFF work by providing: 1) a
delineation of the individual personality factors during the cult conversion process and its
resulting pathology, and 2) the utilization of stages of cult departure and cult recovery,
which provide a framework upon which clinical picture and treatment issues may be placed.
The comprehensive picture which will be portrayed is that of individuals who have been
psychologically impaired by their participation in an extremist cult. It should be
remembered, however, that not all individuals will experience all the problems described.
Nevertheless, the more extremist the cult the greater the liklihood that the specific clinical
pathology of a cult-induced dissociative disorder and post-cult readjustment problems will
result. In other words, extremism or a lack of balance in groups will undoubtedly result in a
lack of balance in its members. Group pathology will generate individual psychopathology.
In earlier papers (1983, 1984a), I proposed detailed criteria for evaluating the level of
extremism in groups. I suggested that cultic extremism is a function of two main categories
of factors: 1) an exclusive, ultra-authoritarian (or totalitarian) closed ―family‖ system that
has rigid boundaries and promotes deep emotional dependency, blind obedience,
unquestioning compliance, and conformity to its leadership and 2) the deceptive use of
mind-manipulating, dissociation-inducing techniques during the recruitment, conversion,
and retention of its members. The psychopathology which will be portrayed in this paper
results from participation in groups which would fit or approximate this definition of an
extremist cult.
Not all individuals involved in cults will suffer psychological impairment in the sense of
inability to cope with life apart from the group. The author believes that those who don‘t
show such impairment are most likely either very healthy individuals who were not in any
transition or crisis at the time of the conversion process or are psychopathic or narcissistic
personality types (see ―Diagnostic Comments‖ section below). Nonetheless, with the
exception of the latter (and possibly the very healthy) the ―poison‖ of the extremist cult
conversion process will affect all participants to some degree. At the very least, all those
leaving extremist cults are forced to deal with both the external realities of day-to-day life
outside the cult and the shock of having to use their minds again without the cult‘s
direction. just a,,, freedom from emotional distress while in the group had its price tag of
relinquishing personal control, regaining personal autonomy has its price tag too.