Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2010, Page 37
disapproval of the surrounding world is often the sole criterion as to whether
a particular action is deemed a heroic deed or an act of madness. (Deutsch,
1938: 318)
Deutsch, in one of the earliest papers on the subject, interpreted the folie delusion as an
attempt to rescue the object:6
Freud considers the delusional ideas of the psychically ill person a ‗rebuilding
of the vanished object world‘. I believe that induction plays an important role
in this process. In folie à deux in psychotics, the common delusion appears to
be an important part of an attempt to rescue the object through identification
with it, or its delusional system. (Deutsch, 1938: 317)
Fliess (1953) showed the mutuality of the identification in folie. In this case, we should no
longer talk of an inducer who pushes the other to accept delusions as truth, but rather of a
complex interplay of identifications. Other psychoanalysts emphasized the belief that this
identification is repetitive of an earlier one, and they emphasized the intense attachment of
the secondary partner, who seeks to preserve the relationship because of the threat of the
loss. From this perspective, delusions function as psychotic defence7 against separation
anxieties. In folie, the mutual acceptance of bizarre contents enables the inducer to stay in
contact with at least one other person despite loss of contact with reality. Reciprocally, the
more dependent recipient is willing to accept delusions at the price of preserving the
connection. The relationship established is then one of ambivalence, but the connection
protects the recipient from his internal conflicts. The recipient uses psychotic defences and
shares the delusion to maintain the link.
Additionally, the earliest mother-child bond, itself characterized by projective identification,
offers a template for understanding later folie-type relationships. psychoanalyst Melanie
Klein introduced the term ―projective identification,‖ which refers to an unconscious psychic
mechanism revealed in fantasies in which the subject inserts his self, or part of it, into the
object in order to control, possess, or harm it (Laplanche &Pontalis, 1973: 356). Post-
Kleinian theorists observed that projective identification is a form of unconscious
communication whereby one gets to know something about the other‘s experience by
experiencing one‘s own feelings in response in a broader sense, it is often thought of as a
form of empathy. In my clinical experience, both in cult dynamics and the folie à deux,
projective identification tends to be intrusive and violent, penetrating the inner world of the
member and transforming him/her into a thing, annulling differences, and altering the
subjectivity of the members, who are then left at the mercy of an all-embracing and
depersonalizing discourse.
Some writers on the cult phenomenon have seen parallels between hypnotic processes8 and
cultic relationships. Mason (1994) noted that many psychoanalytic observers support the
idea that hypnosis is a form of folie caused by mutual projective identification between two
people, and that in a less dramatic form this condition commonly occurs in normal
development. In Grotstein‘s (1994) terms, ―it is one of the basic characteristics of the
primitive employment of projective identification to assign (projectively and identificatorily)
self-sameness to the otherness of the object in order to erase its separateness‖ (Grotstein,
1994: 739).
Clinical Presentation
The Participants: An Overview
Eight years ago, I was approached by four different families who came to me after one of
them met a young man on the street who described some extreme experiences he and
others had in connection with their music Teacher. (Editor‘s note: It is Perlado‘s clinical
work with this young man that Wehle discusses in the next article in this issue, where he is
disapproval of the surrounding world is often the sole criterion as to whether
a particular action is deemed a heroic deed or an act of madness. (Deutsch,
1938: 318)
Deutsch, in one of the earliest papers on the subject, interpreted the folie delusion as an
attempt to rescue the object:6
Freud considers the delusional ideas of the psychically ill person a ‗rebuilding
of the vanished object world‘. I believe that induction plays an important role
in this process. In folie à deux in psychotics, the common delusion appears to
be an important part of an attempt to rescue the object through identification
with it, or its delusional system. (Deutsch, 1938: 317)
Fliess (1953) showed the mutuality of the identification in folie. In this case, we should no
longer talk of an inducer who pushes the other to accept delusions as truth, but rather of a
complex interplay of identifications. Other psychoanalysts emphasized the belief that this
identification is repetitive of an earlier one, and they emphasized the intense attachment of
the secondary partner, who seeks to preserve the relationship because of the threat of the
loss. From this perspective, delusions function as psychotic defence7 against separation
anxieties. In folie, the mutual acceptance of bizarre contents enables the inducer to stay in
contact with at least one other person despite loss of contact with reality. Reciprocally, the
more dependent recipient is willing to accept delusions at the price of preserving the
connection. The relationship established is then one of ambivalence, but the connection
protects the recipient from his internal conflicts. The recipient uses psychotic defences and
shares the delusion to maintain the link.
Additionally, the earliest mother-child bond, itself characterized by projective identification,
offers a template for understanding later folie-type relationships. psychoanalyst Melanie
Klein introduced the term ―projective identification,‖ which refers to an unconscious psychic
mechanism revealed in fantasies in which the subject inserts his self, or part of it, into the
object in order to control, possess, or harm it (Laplanche &Pontalis, 1973: 356). Post-
Kleinian theorists observed that projective identification is a form of unconscious
communication whereby one gets to know something about the other‘s experience by
experiencing one‘s own feelings in response in a broader sense, it is often thought of as a
form of empathy. In my clinical experience, both in cult dynamics and the folie à deux,
projective identification tends to be intrusive and violent, penetrating the inner world of the
member and transforming him/her into a thing, annulling differences, and altering the
subjectivity of the members, who are then left at the mercy of an all-embracing and
depersonalizing discourse.
Some writers on the cult phenomenon have seen parallels between hypnotic processes8 and
cultic relationships. Mason (1994) noted that many psychoanalytic observers support the
idea that hypnosis is a form of folie caused by mutual projective identification between two
people, and that in a less dramatic form this condition commonly occurs in normal
development. In Grotstein‘s (1994) terms, ―it is one of the basic characteristics of the
primitive employment of projective identification to assign (projectively and identificatorily)
self-sameness to the otherness of the object in order to erase its separateness‖ (Grotstein,
1994: 739).
Clinical Presentation
The Participants: An Overview
Eight years ago, I was approached by four different families who came to me after one of
them met a young man on the street who described some extreme experiences he and
others had in connection with their music Teacher. (Editor‘s note: It is Perlado‘s clinical
work with this young man that Wehle discusses in the next article in this issue, where he is
