Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 8
 explicit or implicit standards of ethical influence (e.g., lying to people in order to
persuade them to come to a group-sponsored event)
 infiltration of government organizations
 tax-evasion
 abuse of the legal system through spurious lawsuits
 pursuit of political goals while operating under the rubric of a nonpolitical, charitable, or
religious organization
 deceptive fund-raising and sales practices
 unlawful pressuring of employees to participate in cultic ―educational‖ programs
 misuse of charitable status in order to secure money for business and other
noncharitable purposes
 unfair competition through the use of underpaid labor or ―recycled salaries‖
 medical, psychological, and educational neglect and/or abuse of children
 Misuse of school or college facilities
In societies that cherish religious freedom, the balancing of religious freedom and law
enforcement may sometimes be difficult to achieve or to gain consensus on. Two sessions
in this conference will examine how the legal and governmental systems in the U.S. and
Europe have responded to cult issues. The Saturday evening discussion program is also
likely to address this question of balance.
Theological Concerns
If one accepts the notion that beliefs have consequences, then one is likely to conclude that
theological analyses may shed light on the psychological, ethical, and social implications of
the cult phenomenon.
During the Waco standoff, for example, some observers criticized the FBI for not addressing
the thought reform dimension of Waco. Others criticized the FBI for not considering the
theological beliefs of David Koresh. Herb Rosedale and I wrote an essay at the time in which
we argued that both perspectives should have been considered (citation):
I believe that theological analyses can contribute to the understanding of cult-related
phenomena. Professor Roger Olsen of Bethel Seminary was to have spoken on this issue at
this conference, but his circumstances changed and he could not make the conference.
Theological issues may arise in our discussion of changes in ISKCON. How, for example, can
reformers justify changes that, at least on the surface, appear to conflict with the belief
system set down by the movement‘s founder? If they can make compelling justifications for
these changes within ISKCON‘s theological belief system, the reformers are likely to run into
less resistance on practices that have elicited considerable social concern.
Those who offer theological analyses should be careful to recognize that modern democratic
societies place a protective wall around belief --and for good reason. One can believe bad
things without acting badly. The tragedy in Littleton, Colorado demonstrates this point. As
commentators try to ―explain‖ why the young men went on a killing spree, they point to a
host of possible causes: they revered Adolph Hitler they hated ―jocks‖ they were racist
etc. But thousands of people who do not murder others share these beliefs. If we locked
people up for their beliefs, our prisons would burst.
Nevertheless, critical analysis of potentially destructive belief systems may lessen the
probability that some people will act upon those beliefs, in part by decreasing the probability
that some may be persuaded to adopt them in the first place. That is why AFF has worked
with certain individuals and organizations who focus on theological analyses of cultic groups.
To the extent they can help people think more discerningly, they can lessen the probability
that people will get caught up in destructive systems.

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 9
Of course, some think that all religions are hogwash, that the Heaven‘s Gate philosophy is
no more irrational than that of Christianity or Judaism. I believe these people are wrong.
Although all religions rest on assumptions about a transcendental reality that can‘t be
accessed scientifically, conceptual structures built on these assumptions can vary greatly
with regard to internal logical coherence and the degree to which they respond
constructively to human needs that are common across cultures.
Some theological critics might argue that cultic conceptual structures will undermine
attempts at reform because they lack logical coherence and don‘t adequately meet human
needs. Sometimes, the theology of a particular group may be so inconsistent and contrary
to human needs that adaptation to society will be impossible. As a psychologist, however, I
have come to have great faith in the human capacity to creatively rationalize contradictory
beliefs and behaviors, so I am more optimistic about reform for many groups, at least in the
short run. In the long run, however, reality always wins. So I advise against dismissing out
of hand theological critiques of groups‘ conceptual structures.
Important Not to Mix Up Concerns
People sometimes act as though a valid criticism in one of the four major areas of concern -
-psychological, ethical, legal, and theological --necessarily implies that potential concerns
in the other three areas must also be valid. If, for example, a group has an unorthodox
belief system (e.g., it follows an Indian guru), the group may be ―presumed‖ to be
psychologically harmful, unethical, and legally suspect. Drawing such conclusions, however,
is an unwarranted conceptual leap, the kind of false inference that encourages unthinking
polarization, rather than thoughtful dialogue. Although it may be the case that the socially
deviant group violates the law, behaves unethically, and harms people, it is not necessarily,
nor even probably the case. Evidence, not presumption, should rule.
Conclusion
In closing, let me reiterate the proposition that I believe is central to the cult issue: Some
groups may harm some people sometimes, and some groups may be more likely to
harm people than other groups.
The so-called pro-cult-anti-cult debate really revolves around different judgment calls
people make with regard to how many groups are at risk for harm, how much harm they
contribute to, what causes the harm, and what should be done about it. We must make
judgment calls about such questions because we lack sufficient empirical data to resolve the
disputes.
If we are to avoid replacing the closed-mindedness of high control groups with another form
of closed-mindedness in which we treat our opinions as facts, people on both sides of the
cult dispute must acknowledge the following:
 Despite the commendable scientific research that has been conducted, much, maybe
most, of what we think we know is opinion (however informed and reasonable it may
be), not scientific fact.
 If we are to increase our scientific understanding of this phenomenon, we must put
substantial resources into studying it scientifically in a coordinated way, not the usual
academic route of each researcher working independently, chasing whatever question
happens to grab his or her fancy.
 We must be willing to change our opinions as scientific knowledge increases.
As we struggle to increase our scientific knowledge, we must try to help hurting people and
forewarn those as yet unaffected, especially youth, as best we can. But we should do this
with a humility that permits us to continue to learn, even as we teach and counsel.