Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 120
participation, or charity work) soon after a brief period of fear. In accord with this
argument, they attributed this ―fear, then relief‖ compliance procedure to the depletion of
attentional capacity that is thought by many to occur soon after a person experiences
strong emotion (e.g., Cohen, 1978).
Interactive Dynamics During Internalization
Arousal, capacity, and superficial message processing. The change in private beliefs
that occurs during the internalization stage is hypothesized to be affected by the amount of
attentional capacity available to individuals during intense indoctrination. Persuasion
researchers agree that one way of resisting a flawed persuasive attempt is to carefully
evaluate the merits of the message. In cases of indoctrination, individuals are often cajoled
into violating their values, engaging in costly behaviors, or committing themselves to
irrevocable decisions in service of fanciful, paranoid and unverifiable doctrines. For example,
the members of the SLA committed a variety of very public criminal actions, convinced that
they were at the brink of triggering and leading a mass ―people‘s revolution‖ across the
United States. One would think that careful processing of such teachings would draw
attention to faulty logic, incomplete verification, undiscussed consequences, or erroneous
information. However, careful, systematic processing requires a good deal of effort and
concentration (Chaiken, 1987 Petty &Cacioppo, 1986). People who are debilitated because
of malnourishment, sleep deprivation, or overwork should be less capable of carefully
processing message characteristics. This, in turn, should heighten the impact of peripheral
cues such as audience response, speaker confidence, or emotional manipulations. In short,
the fact that a variety of indoctrination procedures deplete attentional capacity may explain
why individuals in such settings so often appear to accept even fanciful aspects of group
doctrine with such little critical objection.2
A variety of findings indicate that this attentional capacity prediction has validity. It is
congruent with research that documents that distraction and time pressure produce less
careful message processing (e.g., Baron, Baron, &Miller, 1973 Kruglanski, 1989). The
strong arousal generated during intense indoctrination represents another factor that may
increase the likelihood of heuristic processing. A number of writers have reviewed evidence
showing that emotional arousal depletes attentional capacity (e.g., Eysenck, 1977). Given
that careful message processing is presumed to occur only when one has the necessary
capacity and motivation, Baron (1986) argued that if arousal lowers such capacity, it should
decrease the likelihood of elaborate message processing (see Bodenhausen, Sheppard, &
Kramer, 1994, for a related view).
This argument, in fact, echoes early theorizing by Sargant (1957), who argued on the basis
of anthropological and historical observations, that emotional excitement somehow
disrupted critical thinking and caused the ultraparadoxical reversal of previously conditioned
preferences referred to earlier. More interesting, Sargant suspected these effects were
caused by some disturbance of cerebral function. He presciently suggested that a form of
cortical reciprocal inhibition (pp. 43, 55) may be involved, a position espoused some 16
years later by Walley and Weiden (1973).
Until recently there was not a great deal of data relevant to the idea that strong emotion
would heighten superficial message processing, but in the last few years a number of
studies have reported support for this view. Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) reported that
a step exercise (arousal) manipulation increased responsiveness to peripheral cues while
decreasing audience responsiveness to message quality differences. This pattern, of course,
is typically associated with superficial (i.e., peripheral) processing of message content.
Although Sanbonmatsu and Kardes did not use an emotion manipulation, Gleicher and Petty
(1992) varied moderate fear by warning students about either a new illness on campus or
campus crime. They found that when peripheral cues were easily available to participants,
participation, or charity work) soon after a brief period of fear. In accord with this
argument, they attributed this ―fear, then relief‖ compliance procedure to the depletion of
attentional capacity that is thought by many to occur soon after a person experiences
strong emotion (e.g., Cohen, 1978).
Interactive Dynamics During Internalization
Arousal, capacity, and superficial message processing. The change in private beliefs
that occurs during the internalization stage is hypothesized to be affected by the amount of
attentional capacity available to individuals during intense indoctrination. Persuasion
researchers agree that one way of resisting a flawed persuasive attempt is to carefully
evaluate the merits of the message. In cases of indoctrination, individuals are often cajoled
into violating their values, engaging in costly behaviors, or committing themselves to
irrevocable decisions in service of fanciful, paranoid and unverifiable doctrines. For example,
the members of the SLA committed a variety of very public criminal actions, convinced that
they were at the brink of triggering and leading a mass ―people‘s revolution‖ across the
United States. One would think that careful processing of such teachings would draw
attention to faulty logic, incomplete verification, undiscussed consequences, or erroneous
information. However, careful, systematic processing requires a good deal of effort and
concentration (Chaiken, 1987 Petty &Cacioppo, 1986). People who are debilitated because
of malnourishment, sleep deprivation, or overwork should be less capable of carefully
processing message characteristics. This, in turn, should heighten the impact of peripheral
cues such as audience response, speaker confidence, or emotional manipulations. In short,
the fact that a variety of indoctrination procedures deplete attentional capacity may explain
why individuals in such settings so often appear to accept even fanciful aspects of group
doctrine with such little critical objection.2
A variety of findings indicate that this attentional capacity prediction has validity. It is
congruent with research that documents that distraction and time pressure produce less
careful message processing (e.g., Baron, Baron, &Miller, 1973 Kruglanski, 1989). The
strong arousal generated during intense indoctrination represents another factor that may
increase the likelihood of heuristic processing. A number of writers have reviewed evidence
showing that emotional arousal depletes attentional capacity (e.g., Eysenck, 1977). Given
that careful message processing is presumed to occur only when one has the necessary
capacity and motivation, Baron (1986) argued that if arousal lowers such capacity, it should
decrease the likelihood of elaborate message processing (see Bodenhausen, Sheppard, &
Kramer, 1994, for a related view).
This argument, in fact, echoes early theorizing by Sargant (1957), who argued on the basis
of anthropological and historical observations, that emotional excitement somehow
disrupted critical thinking and caused the ultraparadoxical reversal of previously conditioned
preferences referred to earlier. More interesting, Sargant suspected these effects were
caused by some disturbance of cerebral function. He presciently suggested that a form of
cortical reciprocal inhibition (pp. 43, 55) may be involved, a position espoused some 16
years later by Walley and Weiden (1973).
Until recently there was not a great deal of data relevant to the idea that strong emotion
would heighten superficial message processing, but in the last few years a number of
studies have reported support for this view. Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) reported that
a step exercise (arousal) manipulation increased responsiveness to peripheral cues while
decreasing audience responsiveness to message quality differences. This pattern, of course,
is typically associated with superficial (i.e., peripheral) processing of message content.
Although Sanbonmatsu and Kardes did not use an emotion manipulation, Gleicher and Petty
(1992) varied moderate fear by warning students about either a new illness on campus or
campus crime. They found that when peripheral cues were easily available to participants,
