Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 24
Freedom of belief is an application of freedom of conscience. We may also say it is an
application of freedom of thought. These freedoms are individual freedoms.
Freedom of religion is a freedom that allows you to practice your belief with other people. It
is an application of the freedom of association. It is, then, a collective freedom.
But, of course, there may be conflicts between individual freedoms and collective freedoms.
Problems also may occur between these freedoms and the laws of a country and
international conventions one has to apply like laws. In Europe, for example, we sometimes
have to apply European laws instead of our own home laws.
So what are the most important freedoms we have to respect? The individual ones, or the
collective ones? What are the limits? The laws of one's own country or the international
laws?
These laws are supposed to protect each of us against abuse. Each country, even in
Europe, may have its own answer. This answer should respect the rights the people have in
the context of national and international laws applied in each country. If the laws do not
protect the rights of people, or if these laws exist but are not applied, such a country cannot
be considered a democracy.
In a democracy, groups are allowed to form, and these groups may have rights. However,
if ―groups‖ become primary to the country's laws, then it ceases to be a country with
citizens, and instead becomes a country with clans.
So the ―freedom of religion‖ that some sociologists of religion talk about is a kind of ―clanic‖
freedom, and the political system they want may be a political ―clanic‖ system. In that case
the group becomes more important than the citizen, and later on the group may be the only
consideration. This is a political system without citizens! Yet this is the kind of political
system that some cult sympathizers seem to advocate.
We know that many cultic groups are totalitarian. Their members are not permitted to
criticize the group or its leader and may suffer greatly if they dissent or disobey. If a
political system deems the freedom of religion of such totalitarian groups to be more vital
than their members' freedom of belief, how may we call such a political system democratic?
How can a country call itself democratic if it values the rights of groups over the rights of
individual citizens?
For example, one may say, ―The Mafia is a religious group because it has rituals of initiation,
pledges of loyalty, and a solemn secretiveness that seems sacred to its members.‖ Should
we then ask the Italian government and the Italian justice system to stop prosecuting the
members of the Mafia? The same reasoning would hold for the many terrorist groups that
claim a religious lineage. If, for example, one told an immigration officer of the United
States that one belongs to a religious terrorist group, would that officer have to make an
exemption to the laws that restrict immigration of terrorists?
Obviously, such interpretations would be silly. Yet these are the kinds of interpretations
that some cult sympathizers urge upon us when they neglect to consider the distinction
between freedom of belief and freedom of religion and forget that democracies, if they are
to function as democracies, need citizens with free minds, with freedom of belief,
conscience, and thought.
You may with that freedom join and leave groups and alter your religious and other beliefs
as you see fit and as it is written in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. But for this
freedom to be meaningful, it must take precedence of the freedom of totalitarian groups to
pursue their anti-democratic agendas.
Freedom of belief is an application of freedom of conscience. We may also say it is an
application of freedom of thought. These freedoms are individual freedoms.
Freedom of religion is a freedom that allows you to practice your belief with other people. It
is an application of the freedom of association. It is, then, a collective freedom.
But, of course, there may be conflicts between individual freedoms and collective freedoms.
Problems also may occur between these freedoms and the laws of a country and
international conventions one has to apply like laws. In Europe, for example, we sometimes
have to apply European laws instead of our own home laws.
So what are the most important freedoms we have to respect? The individual ones, or the
collective ones? What are the limits? The laws of one's own country or the international
laws?
These laws are supposed to protect each of us against abuse. Each country, even in
Europe, may have its own answer. This answer should respect the rights the people have in
the context of national and international laws applied in each country. If the laws do not
protect the rights of people, or if these laws exist but are not applied, such a country cannot
be considered a democracy.
In a democracy, groups are allowed to form, and these groups may have rights. However,
if ―groups‖ become primary to the country's laws, then it ceases to be a country with
citizens, and instead becomes a country with clans.
So the ―freedom of religion‖ that some sociologists of religion talk about is a kind of ―clanic‖
freedom, and the political system they want may be a political ―clanic‖ system. In that case
the group becomes more important than the citizen, and later on the group may be the only
consideration. This is a political system without citizens! Yet this is the kind of political
system that some cult sympathizers seem to advocate.
We know that many cultic groups are totalitarian. Their members are not permitted to
criticize the group or its leader and may suffer greatly if they dissent or disobey. If a
political system deems the freedom of religion of such totalitarian groups to be more vital
than their members' freedom of belief, how may we call such a political system democratic?
How can a country call itself democratic if it values the rights of groups over the rights of
individual citizens?
For example, one may say, ―The Mafia is a religious group because it has rituals of initiation,
pledges of loyalty, and a solemn secretiveness that seems sacred to its members.‖ Should
we then ask the Italian government and the Italian justice system to stop prosecuting the
members of the Mafia? The same reasoning would hold for the many terrorist groups that
claim a religious lineage. If, for example, one told an immigration officer of the United
States that one belongs to a religious terrorist group, would that officer have to make an
exemption to the laws that restrict immigration of terrorists?
Obviously, such interpretations would be silly. Yet these are the kinds of interpretations
that some cult sympathizers urge upon us when they neglect to consider the distinction
between freedom of belief and freedom of religion and forget that democracies, if they are
to function as democracies, need citizens with free minds, with freedom of belief,
conscience, and thought.
You may with that freedom join and leave groups and alter your religious and other beliefs
as you see fit and as it is written in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. But for this
freedom to be meaningful, it must take precedence of the freedom of totalitarian groups to
pursue their anti-democratic agendas.
