Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 121
these fear manipulations decreased the audience‘s sensitivity to message quality
differences, thereby again showing evidence of superficial message processing. Baron,
Inman, Kao, and Logan (1992) reported a similar finding using a more naturalistic
emotional manipulation.
In laboratory tests, it is hard to provoke strong levels of fear given that participants are free
to terminate their participation and, moreover, are generally under the (correct) impression
that strong stressors are unlikely to be used in modern psychological research. To develop a
nonlaboratory alternative, Baron, Inman, et al. (1992) manipulated emotional arousal in a
student dental clinic. In this setting, patients regularly received a complete description of
their upcoming dental treatment. In this study, some dental patients were randomly
assigned to receive this graphic description just minutes before hearing a message. These
―high-fear‖ patients were more persuaded by a purposely flawed message (accompanied by
an enthusiastic audience response) than were patients who did not receive this stressful
description until after reacting to the message. Thus, fear led to less careful message
processing in this study.
Moreover, fear is not the only emotion to provoke ―low-effort‖ message processing.
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that an anger manipulation heightened an audience‘s
responsiveness to peripheral message cues. In addition, this effect did not occur when a
nonarousing emotion (sadness) was manipulated. In short, a number of studies indicate
that arousing emotions tend to decrease the effort people employ when processing
persuasive content. Given the strong emotional arousal frequently present during the typical
instance of intense indoctrination, these results imply that indoctrinees are not likely to
engage in very careful processing of the persuasive manipulations they are exposed to.
Moreover, any resulting attitude change may be enhanced if the message or doctrine
suggests a means to control the threat or danger used to trigger the emotion. This is
particularly true in cases in which the persuasive messages used by the indoctrinating group
suggest simple (i.e., attainable) avenues of threat reduction. As Rogers (1975) pointed out,
under these conditions fear-based persuasive appeals are particularly effective at inducing
attitude change.3 Such appeals are indeed common in charismatic groups in which
adherence to doctrine and loyalty to the group are proffered as means of avoiding the
various threats and dangers made salient (e.g., Sargant, 1957 Singer, 1995).
One objection to this discussion of overload and superficial message processing is that, in
theory, attitudes formed on the basis of superficial processing are less stable and less
resistant to counterpropaganda than are attitudes formed or changed through more effortful
processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), Although there is emerging laboratory support for
these predictions (Eagly &Chaiken, 1993), these laboratory studies do not reproduce the
situation created by intense indoctrination in which the target of persuasion remains in a
controlled social setting after message exposure, surrounded by others who confirm and
reinforce the beliefs in question and in which social pressure is used to elicit a series of
behaviors congruent with the new beliefs. Moreover, in many indoctrination situations, the
target of persuasion remains socially dependent, sleep deprived, or otherwise debilitated
well into his or her indoctrination experience, thereby making a careful reevaluation of
doctrines and beliefs extremely difficult. Under these circumstances, it is expected that
attitudes and beliefs changed initially as a result of heuristic message processing will
become solidified, more extreme over time, integrated into other aspects of self and, as a
result, relatively impervious to change (see Maass &Clark, 1984, for very similar
reasoning).
Arousal, capacity, and conformity. Almost all accounts of intense indoctrination
acknowledge that conformity pressure is carefully applied in the typical case of intense
indoctrination (e.g., Galanter, 1989 Lifton, 1961, Singer, 1995). More important, however,
the procedures and states previously discussed are known to potentiate classic social
these fear manipulations decreased the audience‘s sensitivity to message quality
differences, thereby again showing evidence of superficial message processing. Baron,
Inman, Kao, and Logan (1992) reported a similar finding using a more naturalistic
emotional manipulation.
In laboratory tests, it is hard to provoke strong levels of fear given that participants are free
to terminate their participation and, moreover, are generally under the (correct) impression
that strong stressors are unlikely to be used in modern psychological research. To develop a
nonlaboratory alternative, Baron, Inman, et al. (1992) manipulated emotional arousal in a
student dental clinic. In this setting, patients regularly received a complete description of
their upcoming dental treatment. In this study, some dental patients were randomly
assigned to receive this graphic description just minutes before hearing a message. These
―high-fear‖ patients were more persuaded by a purposely flawed message (accompanied by
an enthusiastic audience response) than were patients who did not receive this stressful
description until after reacting to the message. Thus, fear led to less careful message
processing in this study.
Moreover, fear is not the only emotion to provoke ―low-effort‖ message processing.
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that an anger manipulation heightened an audience‘s
responsiveness to peripheral message cues. In addition, this effect did not occur when a
nonarousing emotion (sadness) was manipulated. In short, a number of studies indicate
that arousing emotions tend to decrease the effort people employ when processing
persuasive content. Given the strong emotional arousal frequently present during the typical
instance of intense indoctrination, these results imply that indoctrinees are not likely to
engage in very careful processing of the persuasive manipulations they are exposed to.
Moreover, any resulting attitude change may be enhanced if the message or doctrine
suggests a means to control the threat or danger used to trigger the emotion. This is
particularly true in cases in which the persuasive messages used by the indoctrinating group
suggest simple (i.e., attainable) avenues of threat reduction. As Rogers (1975) pointed out,
under these conditions fear-based persuasive appeals are particularly effective at inducing
attitude change.3 Such appeals are indeed common in charismatic groups in which
adherence to doctrine and loyalty to the group are proffered as means of avoiding the
various threats and dangers made salient (e.g., Sargant, 1957 Singer, 1995).
One objection to this discussion of overload and superficial message processing is that, in
theory, attitudes formed on the basis of superficial processing are less stable and less
resistant to counterpropaganda than are attitudes formed or changed through more effortful
processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), Although there is emerging laboratory support for
these predictions (Eagly &Chaiken, 1993), these laboratory studies do not reproduce the
situation created by intense indoctrination in which the target of persuasion remains in a
controlled social setting after message exposure, surrounded by others who confirm and
reinforce the beliefs in question and in which social pressure is used to elicit a series of
behaviors congruent with the new beliefs. Moreover, in many indoctrination situations, the
target of persuasion remains socially dependent, sleep deprived, or otherwise debilitated
well into his or her indoctrination experience, thereby making a careful reevaluation of
doctrines and beliefs extremely difficult. Under these circumstances, it is expected that
attitudes and beliefs changed initially as a result of heuristic message processing will
become solidified, more extreme over time, integrated into other aspects of self and, as a
result, relatively impervious to change (see Maass &Clark, 1984, for very similar
reasoning).
Arousal, capacity, and conformity. Almost all accounts of intense indoctrination
acknowledge that conformity pressure is carefully applied in the typical case of intense
indoctrination (e.g., Galanter, 1989 Lifton, 1961, Singer, 1995). More important, however,
the procedures and states previously discussed are known to potentiate classic social
