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compliance (Dolinski &Nawrat, 1998), type of message processing (e.g., Baron et al.,
1973), conformity (e.g., Deutsch &Gerard, 1955), stereotyping (e.g., Paulhus et al., 1992
Pratto &Bargh, 1991), and cognitive dissonance effects (Stalder &Baron, 1998). In light of
the common occurrence of debilitating procedures during intense indoctrination, these
results suggest that impaired attentional capacity is a key component of such indoctrination.
Moreover, the available research findings support the view that the emotional arousal
common to intense indoctrination apparently contributes to this diminution of capacity. In
accord with this conclusion, the research indicates that both exercise-arousal manipulations
and emotional manipulations affect message processing (e.g., Gleicher &Petty, 1992
Sanbonmatsu &Kardes, 1988), conformity (e.g., Darley, 1966), and stereotyping (e.g.,
Baron, Inman, et al., 1992 Kim &Baron, 1988) that are quite similar to those produced by
other direct manipulations of cognitive capacity (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990 Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955).
According to this model, this lowered capacity leaves individuals more susceptible to poorly
supported arguments, social pressure, and the temptation to derogate nongroup members.
As such, it appears to play a key role in what I have described as the internalization stage
of intense indoctrination. This reduction in capacity also may heighten dissonance effects in
that low levels of attributional complexity recently have been linked to stronger dissonance-
produced attitude change in the induced compliance paradigm (Stalder &Baron, 1998).
In addition to this capacity mechanism regarding dissonance, data also show that arousal
per se enhances dissonance effects provided that it is interpreted as a consequence of one‘s
counterattitudinal behavior (e.g., Pittman, 1975).4 As a result, there are grounds to expect
particularly powerful dissonance phenomena during intense indoctrination. As noted, these
dissonance effects can contribute to initial attitude change in the internalization stage (as
the recruit attempts to justify early acts of compliance) as well as solidification of attitude in
the consolidation stage (as the recruit justifies the more extreme escalating commitments
that occur over time).
What I have deemed the cognitive miser view of consolidation suggests yet another
capacity-related mechanism relevant to the consolidation stage. More specifically, high
attentional load and fatigue should exacerbate our tendency to conserve our limited
attentional resources (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, the taxing and stressful aspects of intense
indoctrination are likely to discourage prolonged and recurrent examination of established
group doctrine or emerging group policy, encouraging instead categorical acceptance of that
doctrine. In short, considering the impact of intense indoctrination on attentional capacity
provides a number of interesting insights regarding why individuals can be seduced by
marginal arguments that seemingly violate their own self-interest and eventually reach the
point at which they are relatively impervious (Hassan, 1988) to attempts to dissuade them
from their newly acquired beliefs.
This is not to say that other internal states are irrelevant to the attitude and identity change
that so often occur following intense indoctrination. States such as guilt, disassociation, and
low self-esteem have been identified as likely to facilitate such outcomes as compliance,
stereotyping, conformity, message agreement, identity change, deference to authority, and
dissonance-produced attitude change (e.g., Cialdini, 1993 Lifton, 1961 Long &Spears,
1998 McGuire, 1968 Steele, Spencer, &Lynch, 1993). Unfortunately, there is not a great
deal of experimental data carefully examining the impact of guilt and disassociation on
these particular outcome behaviors, whereas the data regarding self-esteem are complex
(Abrams &Hogg, 1988 McGuire, 1968 Rhodes &Wood, 1992) and, in some cases,
contradictory (Gerard, Blevans, &Malcom, 1964 Steele et al., 1993 see also Long &
Spears, 1998). One solution here may be to separately consider the findings for chronic as
opposed to manipulated self-esteem in that one‘s chronic level of esteem may not be
momentarily salient when one is exposed to acute manipulations of self-esteem. In accord

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 131
with this reasoning, there is reasonable support for the view that low manipulated self-
esteem leads to stronger conformity effects and outgroup derogation (for reviews, see Long
&Spears, 1998, McGuire, 1968). This is quite relevant to this discussion in that many of the
procedures of intense indoctrination (e.g., self-criticism) appear to challenge if not directly
assault one‘s feelings of esteem and adequacy. Thus, there are some grounds to suspect
that acute feelings of low self-esteem contribute to certain key aspects of intense
indoctrination. Interestingly, such low esteem often will lead individuals to underestimate
their cognitive capacity and so may also add a (low) motivational component to the
depleted capacity actually created during intense indoctrination.
Concluding Comments
A systematic scrutiny of various examples of intense indoctrination reveals a variety of
procedural events and internal states that lower one‘s ability and motivation to carefully
process social information. These capacity-related effects have been hypothesized to
heighten a variety of phenomena including stereotyping, conformity, superficial processing
of message content, and distorted conclusions regarding one‘s own actions (e.g., Baron,
1986 Bodenhausen et al., 1994). These hypotheses reflect the growing awareness that a
variety of well-established social psychological effects can be characterized as cognitive
shortcuts that are more likely to be relied on when attentional capacity is challenged. As
such, these effects can be viewed as specific instances of our general tendency to process
information as economically as possible. From this perspective, the procedural features
described in this article are important not just because they are often present during intense
indoctrination but because they heighten social psychological mechanisms of internalization
and consolidation to the point that, in concert, they produce a form of social persuasion that
is qualitatively different form normal instances of social influence. Much of the research I
have reviewed here is congruent with this view in that the research explicitly links key
internal states or direct manipulations of attentional capacity with exacerbation of many of
the social psychological phenomena well known to affect persuasion, stereotyping, and
social influence. This research not only provides greater insight regarding the psychological
dynamics that contribute to the frequent, long-term success of intense indoctrination, but it
also furthers our understanding of processes that underlie a variety of key phenomena in
social psychology.
Notes
1. I thank Kevin Crawley and Diana Paulina of Unbound, Inc., Coralville, Iowa, for their cooperation
and assistance in arranging interviews with over 40 of their clients who were recuperating from
involvement in charismatic groups.
2. There is some evidence that just appearing to agree with others may impact the nature of
message processing. Wells and Petty (1980), under the guise of having people evaluate
headphones, induced people to either nod their heads up and down (emulating a ―yes‖ nod) or
shake their heads from side to side (emulating a ―no‖ shake) while hearing a message. The
―nodders‖ exhibited more attitude change than did ―shakers.‖ Thus, the polite agreement
displayed by indoctrinees in the softening-up and compliance stages of intense indoctrination may
actually render them more susceptible to the persuasive messages they are exposed to.
3. Several distinctions can be drawn between the research on fear-inducing messages (e.g., Rogers,
1975) and the research in which messages are presented following an emotion manipulation (e.g.,
Baron, Inman, et al., 1992). First, the latter research focused specifically on whether message
processing is careful or superficial, whereas the former research ignored this issue. Second, the
research on ―frightening messages‖ creates greater potential for defensive avoidance in the
audience in that the message itself is the source of stress. Finally, in the research on frightening
messages, the fear is always relevant to the topic of the message. In contrast, when emotion is
manipulated prior to the message, the emotion can be either irrelevant or relevant to the message
topic.
4. I was tempted to interpret these dissonance-arousal studies as evidence for the view that depleted
attentional capacity mediated the heightened attitude change observed in the aroused conditions.