Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 130
compliance (Dolinski &Nawrat, 1998), type of message processing (e.g., Baron et al.,
1973), conformity (e.g., Deutsch &Gerard, 1955), stereotyping (e.g., Paulhus et al., 1992
Pratto &Bargh, 1991), and cognitive dissonance effects (Stalder &Baron, 1998). In light of
the common occurrence of debilitating procedures during intense indoctrination, these
results suggest that impaired attentional capacity is a key component of such indoctrination.
Moreover, the available research findings support the view that the emotional arousal
common to intense indoctrination apparently contributes to this diminution of capacity. In
accord with this conclusion, the research indicates that both exercise-arousal manipulations
and emotional manipulations affect message processing (e.g., Gleicher &Petty, 1992
Sanbonmatsu &Kardes, 1988), conformity (e.g., Darley, 1966), and stereotyping (e.g.,
Baron, Inman, et al., 1992 Kim &Baron, 1988) that are quite similar to those produced by
other direct manipulations of cognitive capacity (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990 Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955).
According to this model, this lowered capacity leaves individuals more susceptible to poorly
supported arguments, social pressure, and the temptation to derogate nongroup members.
As such, it appears to play a key role in what I have described as the internalization stage
of intense indoctrination. This reduction in capacity also may heighten dissonance effects in
that low levels of attributional complexity recently have been linked to stronger dissonance-
produced attitude change in the induced compliance paradigm (Stalder &Baron, 1998).
In addition to this capacity mechanism regarding dissonance, data also show that arousal
per se enhances dissonance effects provided that it is interpreted as a consequence of one‘s
counterattitudinal behavior (e.g., Pittman, 1975).4 As a result, there are grounds to expect
particularly powerful dissonance phenomena during intense indoctrination. As noted, these
dissonance effects can contribute to initial attitude change in the internalization stage (as
the recruit attempts to justify early acts of compliance) as well as solidification of attitude in
the consolidation stage (as the recruit justifies the more extreme escalating commitments
that occur over time).
What I have deemed the cognitive miser view of consolidation suggests yet another
capacity-related mechanism relevant to the consolidation stage. More specifically, high
attentional load and fatigue should exacerbate our tendency to conserve our limited
attentional resources (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, the taxing and stressful aspects of intense
indoctrination are likely to discourage prolonged and recurrent examination of established
group doctrine or emerging group policy, encouraging instead categorical acceptance of that
doctrine. In short, considering the impact of intense indoctrination on attentional capacity
provides a number of interesting insights regarding why individuals can be seduced by
marginal arguments that seemingly violate their own self-interest and eventually reach the
point at which they are relatively impervious (Hassan, 1988) to attempts to dissuade them
from their newly acquired beliefs.
This is not to say that other internal states are irrelevant to the attitude and identity change
that so often occur following intense indoctrination. States such as guilt, disassociation, and
low self-esteem have been identified as likely to facilitate such outcomes as compliance,
stereotyping, conformity, message agreement, identity change, deference to authority, and
dissonance-produced attitude change (e.g., Cialdini, 1993 Lifton, 1961 Long &Spears,
1998 McGuire, 1968 Steele, Spencer, &Lynch, 1993). Unfortunately, there is not a great
deal of experimental data carefully examining the impact of guilt and disassociation on
these particular outcome behaviors, whereas the data regarding self-esteem are complex
(Abrams &Hogg, 1988 McGuire, 1968 Rhodes &Wood, 1992) and, in some cases,
contradictory (Gerard, Blevans, &Malcom, 1964 Steele et al., 1993 see also Long &
Spears, 1998). One solution here may be to separately consider the findings for chronic as
opposed to manipulated self-esteem in that one‘s chronic level of esteem may not be
momentarily salient when one is exposed to acute manipulations of self-esteem. In accord
compliance (Dolinski &Nawrat, 1998), type of message processing (e.g., Baron et al.,
1973), conformity (e.g., Deutsch &Gerard, 1955), stereotyping (e.g., Paulhus et al., 1992
Pratto &Bargh, 1991), and cognitive dissonance effects (Stalder &Baron, 1998). In light of
the common occurrence of debilitating procedures during intense indoctrination, these
results suggest that impaired attentional capacity is a key component of such indoctrination.
Moreover, the available research findings support the view that the emotional arousal
common to intense indoctrination apparently contributes to this diminution of capacity. In
accord with this conclusion, the research indicates that both exercise-arousal manipulations
and emotional manipulations affect message processing (e.g., Gleicher &Petty, 1992
Sanbonmatsu &Kardes, 1988), conformity (e.g., Darley, 1966), and stereotyping (e.g.,
Baron, Inman, et al., 1992 Kim &Baron, 1988) that are quite similar to those produced by
other direct manipulations of cognitive capacity (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990 Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955).
According to this model, this lowered capacity leaves individuals more susceptible to poorly
supported arguments, social pressure, and the temptation to derogate nongroup members.
As such, it appears to play a key role in what I have described as the internalization stage
of intense indoctrination. This reduction in capacity also may heighten dissonance effects in
that low levels of attributional complexity recently have been linked to stronger dissonance-
produced attitude change in the induced compliance paradigm (Stalder &Baron, 1998).
In addition to this capacity mechanism regarding dissonance, data also show that arousal
per se enhances dissonance effects provided that it is interpreted as a consequence of one‘s
counterattitudinal behavior (e.g., Pittman, 1975).4 As a result, there are grounds to expect
particularly powerful dissonance phenomena during intense indoctrination. As noted, these
dissonance effects can contribute to initial attitude change in the internalization stage (as
the recruit attempts to justify early acts of compliance) as well as solidification of attitude in
the consolidation stage (as the recruit justifies the more extreme escalating commitments
that occur over time).
What I have deemed the cognitive miser view of consolidation suggests yet another
capacity-related mechanism relevant to the consolidation stage. More specifically, high
attentional load and fatigue should exacerbate our tendency to conserve our limited
attentional resources (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, the taxing and stressful aspects of intense
indoctrination are likely to discourage prolonged and recurrent examination of established
group doctrine or emerging group policy, encouraging instead categorical acceptance of that
doctrine. In short, considering the impact of intense indoctrination on attentional capacity
provides a number of interesting insights regarding why individuals can be seduced by
marginal arguments that seemingly violate their own self-interest and eventually reach the
point at which they are relatively impervious (Hassan, 1988) to attempts to dissuade them
from their newly acquired beliefs.
This is not to say that other internal states are irrelevant to the attitude and identity change
that so often occur following intense indoctrination. States such as guilt, disassociation, and
low self-esteem have been identified as likely to facilitate such outcomes as compliance,
stereotyping, conformity, message agreement, identity change, deference to authority, and
dissonance-produced attitude change (e.g., Cialdini, 1993 Lifton, 1961 Long &Spears,
1998 McGuire, 1968 Steele, Spencer, &Lynch, 1993). Unfortunately, there is not a great
deal of experimental data carefully examining the impact of guilt and disassociation on
these particular outcome behaviors, whereas the data regarding self-esteem are complex
(Abrams &Hogg, 1988 McGuire, 1968 Rhodes &Wood, 1992) and, in some cases,
contradictory (Gerard, Blevans, &Malcom, 1964 Steele et al., 1993 see also Long &
Spears, 1998). One solution here may be to separately consider the findings for chronic as
opposed to manipulated self-esteem in that one‘s chronic level of esteem may not be
momentarily salient when one is exposed to acute manipulations of self-esteem. In accord
