Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 18, 2001, Page 119
prolonged consideration of group doctrine. Consider the experience of Patricia Hearst
(1982):
Once I came to accept in my own mind the stark reality of my new life—that I was now a
part of the SLA…the racking turmoil within me subsided. My everyday life became
somewhat easier. All I had to do was to go along with them and that became easier day
by day. (p.164)
In addition to this cognitive miser view and the dissonance interpretation of attitude
consolidation, I add Sargant‘s (1957) argument that social confirmation contributes to the
intense attitude persistence created by indoctrination (see also Schein et al., 1961). Sargant
argued that confirmation of one‘s views by others increased the probability that the new
attitudes would become well integrated into one‘s sense of self and the other attitudes and
values in one‘s cognitive system. As a result, these attitudes were expected to be costly to
change. A number of well-established research findings support these original speculations.
First, research on various forms of attitude involvement indicates that ego-involving
attitudes are indeed relatively resistant to change (Johnson &Eagly, 1989). The research on
social identification makes a related point. This research assumes that group membership
often will be a key element in self-definition and self-esteem (e.g., Mackie &Cooper, 1984
Wood, Pool, Leck &Purvis, 1996). As predicted, this research indicates that attitudes linked
to valued groups are resistant to attack especially from outgroup members (David &Turner,
1996). In addition, Pool, Wood, and Leck (1998) reported that individuals experience
lowered self-esteem when they learn that their opinions are contradicted by valued in-group
members. This, of course, supports the view that there are self-related reasons for
individuals to adhere to (attitudinal) group norms in cases in which they strongly identify
with their groups.
Also in accord with Sargant‘s (1957) social confirmation view, the group interaction
literature indicates that discussion between like-minded individuals (one form of social
confirmation) generally provokes polarization of attitude (Isenberg, 1986) as well as
heightened confidence (Janis, 1972 Stasser, Taylor, &Hanna, 1989). Indeed, full
discussion may not even be necessary to provoke such changes. Baron, Hoppe, Linneweh,
and Rogers (1996) recently reported a series of studies indicating that when individuals
learned only that others agreed with their judgments and opinions (without knowing why),
they increased the extremity of these responses and felt greater confidence regarding these
more extreme views (see also Luus &Wells, 1994).
Interactive Processes in Indoctrination
In short, a variety of mechanisms are capable of producing the attitude consolidation
outlined in this model. A second set of interesting issues concerns the extent to which the
internal states described here interact with these processes and those listed as causes of
compliance and attitude internalization. This is discussed in the following sections.
Interactive Dynamics and Compliance
Although there are not abundant data addressing how compliance is affected by internal
states such as fear, self-esteem, and attentional capacity, there are reasons to expect
strong relations. For example, the feelings of guilt and low self-esteem should heighten the
effectiveness of requests to publicly criticize (and confess) one‘s past actions that so often
characterize intense indoctrination. In the same vein, attentional depletion should leave one
more susceptible to the compliance manipulations generally used to elicit behavioral
commitment. Cialdini (1993) outlined a number of creative strategies for resisting
compliance procedures. These strategies all entail mindful and sophisticated awareness of
subtle social pressures integral to such techniques. Such awareness is likely to be impaired
when attentional capacity is limited. Dolinski and Nawrat (1998) recently reported that
individuals were far more likely to comply with various requests (for money, experimental
prolonged consideration of group doctrine. Consider the experience of Patricia Hearst
(1982):
Once I came to accept in my own mind the stark reality of my new life—that I was now a
part of the SLA…the racking turmoil within me subsided. My everyday life became
somewhat easier. All I had to do was to go along with them and that became easier day
by day. (p.164)
In addition to this cognitive miser view and the dissonance interpretation of attitude
consolidation, I add Sargant‘s (1957) argument that social confirmation contributes to the
intense attitude persistence created by indoctrination (see also Schein et al., 1961). Sargant
argued that confirmation of one‘s views by others increased the probability that the new
attitudes would become well integrated into one‘s sense of self and the other attitudes and
values in one‘s cognitive system. As a result, these attitudes were expected to be costly to
change. A number of well-established research findings support these original speculations.
First, research on various forms of attitude involvement indicates that ego-involving
attitudes are indeed relatively resistant to change (Johnson &Eagly, 1989). The research on
social identification makes a related point. This research assumes that group membership
often will be a key element in self-definition and self-esteem (e.g., Mackie &Cooper, 1984
Wood, Pool, Leck &Purvis, 1996). As predicted, this research indicates that attitudes linked
to valued groups are resistant to attack especially from outgroup members (David &Turner,
1996). In addition, Pool, Wood, and Leck (1998) reported that individuals experience
lowered self-esteem when they learn that their opinions are contradicted by valued in-group
members. This, of course, supports the view that there are self-related reasons for
individuals to adhere to (attitudinal) group norms in cases in which they strongly identify
with their groups.
Also in accord with Sargant‘s (1957) social confirmation view, the group interaction
literature indicates that discussion between like-minded individuals (one form of social
confirmation) generally provokes polarization of attitude (Isenberg, 1986) as well as
heightened confidence (Janis, 1972 Stasser, Taylor, &Hanna, 1989). Indeed, full
discussion may not even be necessary to provoke such changes. Baron, Hoppe, Linneweh,
and Rogers (1996) recently reported a series of studies indicating that when individuals
learned only that others agreed with their judgments and opinions (without knowing why),
they increased the extremity of these responses and felt greater confidence regarding these
more extreme views (see also Luus &Wells, 1994).
Interactive Processes in Indoctrination
In short, a variety of mechanisms are capable of producing the attitude consolidation
outlined in this model. A second set of interesting issues concerns the extent to which the
internal states described here interact with these processes and those listed as causes of
compliance and attitude internalization. This is discussed in the following sections.
Interactive Dynamics and Compliance
Although there are not abundant data addressing how compliance is affected by internal
states such as fear, self-esteem, and attentional capacity, there are reasons to expect
strong relations. For example, the feelings of guilt and low self-esteem should heighten the
effectiveness of requests to publicly criticize (and confess) one‘s past actions that so often
characterize intense indoctrination. In the same vein, attentional depletion should leave one
more susceptible to the compliance manipulations generally used to elicit behavioral
commitment. Cialdini (1993) outlined a number of creative strategies for resisting
compliance procedures. These strategies all entail mindful and sophisticated awareness of
subtle social pressures integral to such techniques. Such awareness is likely to be impaired
when attentional capacity is limited. Dolinski and Nawrat (1998) recently reported that
individuals were far more likely to comply with various requests (for money, experimental
