In this paper I deal with the main causes, from
my point of view, of this confusion: primarily
that the increase in suggestibility produced while
one is under hypnosis, which is a major
characteristic of hypnosis, is also a core feature
of contexts in which people are being
manipulated.
However, despite this similarity between
hypnosis and manipulation, there is a key
difference: Persons under hypnosis have the
freedom to reverse the process under which their
suggestibility has been heightened. In other
words, they have total freedom in choosing
when to come out of hypnosis (a state that they
also entered freely) whenever they desire to do
so. I will give some examples of this difference.
States of high suggestibility can be attained in
many ways (ways that imply a lesser or higher
degree of manipulation). Hypnosis is merely one
of these ways.
To offer a better explanation of this distinction, I
will first pay attention to what hypnosis is, and
what its essential components are. Then I will
compare what occurs during hypnosis with what
happens in other high-suggestibility contexts. I
will pay special attention to what occurs when
these states are manipulative, such as in cases of
seduction and coercion.
To conclude, I will observe that what occurs
during hypnosis is more because of the
characteristics of human beings than of any
characteristics associated with hypnosis. In other
words, the strength to make us more suggestible
is internal, stemming from our cognitive and
affective architecture, rather than external,
stemming from hypnosis.
Hypnosis and Psychological Manipulation
I am not going to pay much attention to
explaining the impossibility of getting someone
to do something through hypnosis that he would
not do without it. Instead, I will offer some
references that have been widely agreed on
(Capafons, 2001 Lynn &Kirsch, 2006 Orne,
1962) for those wishing to expand their
understanding about this issue. To give one
example, Barber and colleagues (Barber,
Spanos, &Chaves, 1974) obtained from highly
motivated but not hypnotized participants, and
from hypnotized participants, in one task, the
same responses to the same suggestions. The
researchers concluded that hypnosis was not
needed, or at least that no more than high
motivation was needed, to account for the
responses to the suggestions.
Orne (1962) points out that the view sustained
by the likes of Wells (1941), Rowland (1939),
Young (1948), Estabrooks (1993), Wolberg
(1945 1948), and Weitzenhoffer (1949)—that
under hypnosis the subject can be led to do
anything—becomes untenable when one poses
the question as follows: “Does hypnosis increase
the amount of social control that the hypnotist
has over the subject above that which existed
before the induction of hypnosis?”
However, it is fair to say that Orne leaves a door
open for the potential of hypnosis to increase the
amount of social control one may have over a
person under special conditions. These
conditions would be when the person is
ambivalent toward the realization of an action.
Orne (1962) says that
In such a situation, he might well refuse
to carry out the behavior in his normal
waking state, but he could be induced
to carry it out under certain special
circumstances. One condition sufficient
to resolve the ambivalence might be
hypnosis. (…) Quite possibly, in some
instances hypnosis, like alcohol, might
provide the necessary rationalization
for the execution of normally
unacceptable actions. (pp. 186–187)
It is of note, though, that any shift in behavior in
these special circumstances would be as a
consequence of the significance the person who
is hypnotized attached to the term hypnosis
rather than a consequence of hypnosis itself.
That significance would affect both the
hypnotized and the hypnotizer, as the following
quotation from Lynn and Kirsch indicates in
reference to clinical hypnosis (2006):
Other meanings attached to the term are
responsible for its therapeutic efficacy.
As we mentioned earlier, hypnosis can
provide a disinhibiting context,
allowing patients to exhibit responses
that they do not realize they are capable
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015 49
my point of view, of this confusion: primarily
that the increase in suggestibility produced while
one is under hypnosis, which is a major
characteristic of hypnosis, is also a core feature
of contexts in which people are being
manipulated.
However, despite this similarity between
hypnosis and manipulation, there is a key
difference: Persons under hypnosis have the
freedom to reverse the process under which their
suggestibility has been heightened. In other
words, they have total freedom in choosing
when to come out of hypnosis (a state that they
also entered freely) whenever they desire to do
so. I will give some examples of this difference.
States of high suggestibility can be attained in
many ways (ways that imply a lesser or higher
degree of manipulation). Hypnosis is merely one
of these ways.
To offer a better explanation of this distinction, I
will first pay attention to what hypnosis is, and
what its essential components are. Then I will
compare what occurs during hypnosis with what
happens in other high-suggestibility contexts. I
will pay special attention to what occurs when
these states are manipulative, such as in cases of
seduction and coercion.
To conclude, I will observe that what occurs
during hypnosis is more because of the
characteristics of human beings than of any
characteristics associated with hypnosis. In other
words, the strength to make us more suggestible
is internal, stemming from our cognitive and
affective architecture, rather than external,
stemming from hypnosis.
Hypnosis and Psychological Manipulation
I am not going to pay much attention to
explaining the impossibility of getting someone
to do something through hypnosis that he would
not do without it. Instead, I will offer some
references that have been widely agreed on
(Capafons, 2001 Lynn &Kirsch, 2006 Orne,
1962) for those wishing to expand their
understanding about this issue. To give one
example, Barber and colleagues (Barber,
Spanos, &Chaves, 1974) obtained from highly
motivated but not hypnotized participants, and
from hypnotized participants, in one task, the
same responses to the same suggestions. The
researchers concluded that hypnosis was not
needed, or at least that no more than high
motivation was needed, to account for the
responses to the suggestions.
Orne (1962) points out that the view sustained
by the likes of Wells (1941), Rowland (1939),
Young (1948), Estabrooks (1993), Wolberg
(1945 1948), and Weitzenhoffer (1949)—that
under hypnosis the subject can be led to do
anything—becomes untenable when one poses
the question as follows: “Does hypnosis increase
the amount of social control that the hypnotist
has over the subject above that which existed
before the induction of hypnosis?”
However, it is fair to say that Orne leaves a door
open for the potential of hypnosis to increase the
amount of social control one may have over a
person under special conditions. These
conditions would be when the person is
ambivalent toward the realization of an action.
Orne (1962) says that
In such a situation, he might well refuse
to carry out the behavior in his normal
waking state, but he could be induced
to carry it out under certain special
circumstances. One condition sufficient
to resolve the ambivalence might be
hypnosis. (…) Quite possibly, in some
instances hypnosis, like alcohol, might
provide the necessary rationalization
for the execution of normally
unacceptable actions. (pp. 186–187)
It is of note, though, that any shift in behavior in
these special circumstances would be as a
consequence of the significance the person who
is hypnotized attached to the term hypnosis
rather than a consequence of hypnosis itself.
That significance would affect both the
hypnotized and the hypnotizer, as the following
quotation from Lynn and Kirsch indicates in
reference to clinical hypnosis (2006):
Other meanings attached to the term are
responsible for its therapeutic efficacy.
As we mentioned earlier, hypnosis can
provide a disinhibiting context,
allowing patients to exhibit responses
that they do not realize they are capable
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015 49
