Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1989, Page 23
payment does not constitute a ransom. Deprogrammers are not paid to deliver cultists to
parents or, following payment of a ransom, to cults. Rather, they are paid to deliver a
service: The attempted deconversion of the cultist. Whether or not the provision of this
service involves picking up and holding the cultist against his will is an ancillary issue that
may only be indirectly related to the service change, if it is related at all. Whether or not a
deprogramming meets the legal criteria for kidnapping, there seems to be little denial that it
can involve confining an individual despite his expressed wishes to leave, sometimes for
weeks.
The deprogrammer‟s claim of cultic mind control is central to the question of kidnapping or
involuntary confinement because it bears directly on the “choice of evils” defense used by
deprogrammers and their employers (the cultist‟s family) who have been prosecuted
following an unsuccessful deprogramming. The “choice of evils” defense is based on the
argument that the actions of family members, and the deprogrammers they employ, are
justified because the involuntary confinement of their loved one is “less evil” than the choice
of leaving a loved one in a destructive cult that utilizes mind control. Litigation relevant to
the issue of mind control has yielded contradictory decisions. Prior to 1978, Shepherd
(1985) stated that the reality of mind control has never been substantiated in court.
However, Rosedale (1986) notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court later decided that (in
Peterson v. Sorlien) “the conduct of new religious groups may well have impaired the
plaintiffs volitional capacity,” thereby giving credence to the mind control argument.
In one significant trial involving deprogrammers charged with kidnapping, a Denver jury
found deprogrammers Robert Brandyberry and Dennis Whalen “not guilty” of kidnapping
and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The case was brought in district court by the Denver
District Attorney on behalf of Unification Church member Christina Adolfsson. According to
defendants' attorney Ford Greene (himself a former deprogrammer), the jury decided that
during the attempted deprogramming “ordinary notions of intelligence and morality were
not as bad as what had happened to Adolfsson with the Unification Church ...by attempting
to deprogram Adolfsson, [the deprogrammers] were trying to save her from a greater harm
by a destructive cult” (Brandyberry and Whalen Not Guilty,” 1988).
Voluntary (exit-counseling) vs. involuntary Reprogramming. Despite some confusion,
the voluntary/involuntary, overt/covert nature of the initial phase of the deconversion event
appears to be the single most important characteristic differentiating exit counseling from
deprogramming.
Deprogramming began as an involuntary process, in part because voluntary methods were
not known or believed to be effective (Hassan, 1988), and in part because early
deprogrammers largely consisted of Ted Patrick's deprogrammees or those who followed
and believed in Patrick's theory and style of deprogramming. After the initial flurry of
successful deprogrammings began to take their toll on cult membership, however, many
cults began to fight back. Following a “failed” deprogramming (one in which the cultist
either escaped the deprogramming or returned to the group afterward), these organizations
would support or even encourage returning members to file civil and criminal actions
against their deprogrammers and the family members who hired them. Around the same
time, a growing number of deprogrammers, Steven Hassan figuring prominently among
them, began to grow wary of the ethical as well as legal dangers presented by
“involuntaries” (as deprogrammings involving a snatch came to be known). Several of these
deprogrammers began to refuse involuntaries. Still other deprogrammers, having completed
college and graduate school and entered formal mental health professions (e.g., Paul
Engel), wanted to continue deprogramming, yet felt obligated to obey legal regulations and
ethical codes that eschewed anything that even appeared coercive or deceptive. At first,
they described themselves as deprogrammers who only performed “voluntaries.” To
distinguish themselves still further from the deprogramming teams still engaged in
payment does not constitute a ransom. Deprogrammers are not paid to deliver cultists to
parents or, following payment of a ransom, to cults. Rather, they are paid to deliver a
service: The attempted deconversion of the cultist. Whether or not the provision of this
service involves picking up and holding the cultist against his will is an ancillary issue that
may only be indirectly related to the service change, if it is related at all. Whether or not a
deprogramming meets the legal criteria for kidnapping, there seems to be little denial that it
can involve confining an individual despite his expressed wishes to leave, sometimes for
weeks.
The deprogrammer‟s claim of cultic mind control is central to the question of kidnapping or
involuntary confinement because it bears directly on the “choice of evils” defense used by
deprogrammers and their employers (the cultist‟s family) who have been prosecuted
following an unsuccessful deprogramming. The “choice of evils” defense is based on the
argument that the actions of family members, and the deprogrammers they employ, are
justified because the involuntary confinement of their loved one is “less evil” than the choice
of leaving a loved one in a destructive cult that utilizes mind control. Litigation relevant to
the issue of mind control has yielded contradictory decisions. Prior to 1978, Shepherd
(1985) stated that the reality of mind control has never been substantiated in court.
However, Rosedale (1986) notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court later decided that (in
Peterson v. Sorlien) “the conduct of new religious groups may well have impaired the
plaintiffs volitional capacity,” thereby giving credence to the mind control argument.
In one significant trial involving deprogrammers charged with kidnapping, a Denver jury
found deprogrammers Robert Brandyberry and Dennis Whalen “not guilty” of kidnapping
and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The case was brought in district court by the Denver
District Attorney on behalf of Unification Church member Christina Adolfsson. According to
defendants' attorney Ford Greene (himself a former deprogrammer), the jury decided that
during the attempted deprogramming “ordinary notions of intelligence and morality were
not as bad as what had happened to Adolfsson with the Unification Church ...by attempting
to deprogram Adolfsson, [the deprogrammers] were trying to save her from a greater harm
by a destructive cult” (Brandyberry and Whalen Not Guilty,” 1988).
Voluntary (exit-counseling) vs. involuntary Reprogramming. Despite some confusion,
the voluntary/involuntary, overt/covert nature of the initial phase of the deconversion event
appears to be the single most important characteristic differentiating exit counseling from
deprogramming.
Deprogramming began as an involuntary process, in part because voluntary methods were
not known or believed to be effective (Hassan, 1988), and in part because early
deprogrammers largely consisted of Ted Patrick's deprogrammees or those who followed
and believed in Patrick's theory and style of deprogramming. After the initial flurry of
successful deprogrammings began to take their toll on cult membership, however, many
cults began to fight back. Following a “failed” deprogramming (one in which the cultist
either escaped the deprogramming or returned to the group afterward), these organizations
would support or even encourage returning members to file civil and criminal actions
against their deprogrammers and the family members who hired them. Around the same
time, a growing number of deprogrammers, Steven Hassan figuring prominently among
them, began to grow wary of the ethical as well as legal dangers presented by
“involuntaries” (as deprogrammings involving a snatch came to be known). Several of these
deprogrammers began to refuse involuntaries. Still other deprogrammers, having completed
college and graduate school and entered formal mental health professions (e.g., Paul
Engel), wanted to continue deprogramming, yet felt obligated to obey legal regulations and
ethical codes that eschewed anything that even appeared coercive or deceptive. At first,
they described themselves as deprogrammers who only performed “voluntaries.” To
distinguish themselves still further from the deprogramming teams still engaged in
