Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1989, Page 13
ethical system, however, is still very much in dispute. My belief is that cult behavior often
invokes an inverted, antisocial ethical system that is antithetical to the self-systems and
behaviors of most cultists prior to their membership. Therefore, the central questions
involved in the study of Nazi doctors and members of destructive cults seem similar: how
do otherwise intelligent, articulate, educated, and idealistic (young) people become
fanatically devoted to a movement that (in the case of cultists, according to cult critics) is
the very antithesis of the idealism and humanism that inspired its members in the first
place?
Lifton (1986, pp. 418-465) postulated that this behavior was made possible by a “Faustian
bargain” involving a “psychological principle” he termed “doubling.” Doubling involves a
division of the self-system into two independently functioning wholes. The division initially
occurs because, on some level, the Nazi physician must come to grips with the fact that his
duties are in violation of his pre-Nazi self. The new behaviors being demanded and
rewarded by the official (totalistic) regime are so radically different from the “old self”
(which is intimately associated with the normal duties of a physician) that “normal”
psychological defenses (e.g., repression, rationalization, compartmentalization) are
insufficient to allow continued functioning. All the thoughts, beliefs, actions, feelings, and
roles associated with the physician‟s duties as a concentration camp doctor become
organized into an independent self-system, a part-self that can successfully perform all the
duties of the “whole” self within the milieu of the death camp.
The part-self acts as an entire self. An Auschwitz doctor could, through doubling, not only
kill and contribute to killing but organize silently, on behalf of that evil project, an entire
self-structure (or self process) encompassing virtually all aspects of his behavior. (Lifton,
1986, p. 418).
Lifton differentiated doubling from more traditional concepts of “split” consciousness (such
as those found in dissociation or the borderline personality syndromes) and “split”
psychological self-systems (i.e. multiple personalities). These processes are typically
considered lifelong patterns that begin in early childhood, usually in response to a series of
traumatic events and highly conflicted identifications that the young psyche cannot
comprehend or integrate and remain intact or “whole.” Moreover, the dissociated or
multiple personality‟s “self-systems” are usually not consciously aware of each other, but
rather operate independently. In doubling, however, the two “selves” are aware of each
other, and yet the actions of the “evil” double have no moral consequence for the “healer”
or non-evil self. Doubling does not occur in children even when they are faced with
overwhelming trauma. It occurs in adults responding to an extreme but non
incomprehensible situation (such as a totalistic regime). Moreover, there is an element of
active participation in the adult who “doubles.”
Doubling is an active psychological process, a means of adaptation to
extremity … The adaptation requires a dissolving of “psychic glue” as an
alternative to a radical breakdown of the self. (p.422) … The disorder in the
type of doubling I have described is more focused and temporary and occurs
as part of a larger institutional structure which encourages or even demands
it. (p. 423).
Lifton did not see doubling as psychopathological, but rather as a universal human potential
that is neither inherently good nor evil, and can be found in both victim and victimizer.
“Doubling is part of the universal potential for what William James called “the divided self‟”
(Lifton, 1986, p. 420). It is initially similar to the defense mechanism of
compartmentalization, but it ultimately involves a far broader range of feelings, beliefs, and
behaviors. Compartmentalization involves splitting off undesirable aspects of the self-
system doubling involves the development of two independent self-systems.
ethical system, however, is still very much in dispute. My belief is that cult behavior often
invokes an inverted, antisocial ethical system that is antithetical to the self-systems and
behaviors of most cultists prior to their membership. Therefore, the central questions
involved in the study of Nazi doctors and members of destructive cults seem similar: how
do otherwise intelligent, articulate, educated, and idealistic (young) people become
fanatically devoted to a movement that (in the case of cultists, according to cult critics) is
the very antithesis of the idealism and humanism that inspired its members in the first
place?
Lifton (1986, pp. 418-465) postulated that this behavior was made possible by a “Faustian
bargain” involving a “psychological principle” he termed “doubling.” Doubling involves a
division of the self-system into two independently functioning wholes. The division initially
occurs because, on some level, the Nazi physician must come to grips with the fact that his
duties are in violation of his pre-Nazi self. The new behaviors being demanded and
rewarded by the official (totalistic) regime are so radically different from the “old self”
(which is intimately associated with the normal duties of a physician) that “normal”
psychological defenses (e.g., repression, rationalization, compartmentalization) are
insufficient to allow continued functioning. All the thoughts, beliefs, actions, feelings, and
roles associated with the physician‟s duties as a concentration camp doctor become
organized into an independent self-system, a part-self that can successfully perform all the
duties of the “whole” self within the milieu of the death camp.
The part-self acts as an entire self. An Auschwitz doctor could, through doubling, not only
kill and contribute to killing but organize silently, on behalf of that evil project, an entire
self-structure (or self process) encompassing virtually all aspects of his behavior. (Lifton,
1986, p. 418).
Lifton differentiated doubling from more traditional concepts of “split” consciousness (such
as those found in dissociation or the borderline personality syndromes) and “split”
psychological self-systems (i.e. multiple personalities). These processes are typically
considered lifelong patterns that begin in early childhood, usually in response to a series of
traumatic events and highly conflicted identifications that the young psyche cannot
comprehend or integrate and remain intact or “whole.” Moreover, the dissociated or
multiple personality‟s “self-systems” are usually not consciously aware of each other, but
rather operate independently. In doubling, however, the two “selves” are aware of each
other, and yet the actions of the “evil” double have no moral consequence for the “healer”
or non-evil self. Doubling does not occur in children even when they are faced with
overwhelming trauma. It occurs in adults responding to an extreme but non
incomprehensible situation (such as a totalistic regime). Moreover, there is an element of
active participation in the adult who “doubles.”
Doubling is an active psychological process, a means of adaptation to
extremity … The adaptation requires a dissolving of “psychic glue” as an
alternative to a radical breakdown of the self. (p.422) … The disorder in the
type of doubling I have described is more focused and temporary and occurs
as part of a larger institutional structure which encourages or even demands
it. (p. 423).
Lifton did not see doubling as psychopathological, but rather as a universal human potential
that is neither inherently good nor evil, and can be found in both victim and victimizer.
“Doubling is part of the universal potential for what William James called “the divided self‟”
(Lifton, 1986, p. 420). It is initially similar to the defense mechanism of
compartmentalization, but it ultimately involves a far broader range of feelings, beliefs, and
behaviors. Compartmentalization involves splitting off undesirable aspects of the self-
system doubling involves the development of two independent self-systems.
