International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation Volume 6 2023 2
Pseudolaw’s approach to contracts is largely recognizable
to those familiar with the dominant UK-derived
common law and European civil law legal traditions.
But pseudolaw’s version of contract rules includes
a number of variations that are different from, and
rejected by, mainstream legal systems and courts. One
example is whether or not “silence means agreement.”
Contract formation involves several parts. The first is
the “offer”: party A proposes an arrangement of goods
and/or services in exchange for something from party
B. Party B then can accept or reject the offer. If the offer
proposed by party A is accepted by party B, then “a
contract” has been formed. That contract binds both
A and B.
Conventional legal systems almost universally demand
that the “acceptance” of the offer is a positive step (e.g.,
in Canada, reviewed in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB
571, paras. 447-528). In conventional legal systems, if
an offer were to include a part that states “here is the
offer, and if I do not hear from you in 30 days, my offer is
accepted and the contract is now binding,” then courts
would reject that component of the offer. A contract
offer cannot unilaterally bind party B, if party B does
not do or say anything. A “silence means agreement”
term is not valid and enforceable. Pseudolaw, however,
takes the opposite branch, and, based on a dubious
foundation of misquoted and obsolete legal concepts,
says that silence is, indeed, agreement (Netolitzky,
2018d, pp. 1049-1051). This example illustrates how
pseudolaw sometimes differs from conventional
law. Pseudolaw has rules, but some of those rules
apply different principles or a different test, and, as a
consequence, come to different results.
All law functions as a kind of social engineering. So why
are the contract rules different in law vs pseudolaw? The
reason is that a “silence means agreement” rule makes
paper weapons powerful. “Silence means agreement”
permits a person to unilaterally force obligations on
others. For example, in pseudolaw, a person sued to pay
an outstanding debt could send the lender a document
that says:
You have 30 days to prove the money you loaned
me is real lawful money, founded on precious
metals, and not worthless fiat currency. If you
do not prove that, you agree my debt does not
exist.
Since modern currencies no longer operate on the gold
standard, demanding proof in this way--and with the
rule that “silence means agreement”--would miracle
away debts and obtain money for nothing. Or at least
that is the theory. This kind of foisted documentary
claim is a quite commonplace pseudolaw strategy to
eliminate debts based on spurious financial concepts
(Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, para. 227 Netolitzky,
2018d, p. 1064), but never works.
“Silence means agreement” has a dark side, too,
which is why this rule is consistently rejected by
mainstream legal systems. Every day would require
endless vigilance, to detect and reject contract offers.
Documents concealed within an unopened envelope
could unilaterally impose unwanted services. An
unanswered telephone call might create a contract.
And pseudolaw adherents take this principle even
further, imagining “Invisible Contracts” that result
from apparently innocent acts, like using a postal
code purportedly creates government jurisdiction and
authority via a concealed trickster’s bargain (Meads
v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, paras. 231-234 Netolitzky,
2021, p. 179).
But not all pseudolaw operates simply on the basis
that law took a different path when legal rules were
developed in past centuries. Some aspects of pseudolaw
are probably best described as magic (Dew, 2016, pp.
87-91 Netolitzky, 2018d Wessinger, 2000, p. 160).
For example, some pseudolaw documents cannot,
rationally, have the claimed effect and authority,
and can only be explained as sympathetic magic
(Netolitzky, 2018d, pp. 1053-1056). Other pseudolaw
practices appear to be “cargo cult” imitations of
processes pseudolaw’s users did not understand, but
were perceived as having importance and/or power
(Netolitzky, 2018d, pp. 1057-1069).
Strangest of all is the one unique aspect of pseudolaw
that has no parallel in any other legal system: the
Strawman Theory doppelganger (reviewed in d’Abadie
v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, paras. 57-
70 Kalinowski, 2019, pp. 158-164 Meads v Meads,
2012 ABQB 571, paras. 417-446 Netolitzky, 2018d, pp.
1069-1078 Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency),
2017 ABQB 123, paras. 67-88 Rothweiler v Payette,
2018 ABQB 134, paras. 10-17 Rothweiler v Payette,
2018 ABQB 399, paras. 25-33).
Pseudolaw’s approach to contracts is largely recognizable
to those familiar with the dominant UK-derived
common law and European civil law legal traditions.
But pseudolaw’s version of contract rules includes
a number of variations that are different from, and
rejected by, mainstream legal systems and courts. One
example is whether or not “silence means agreement.”
Contract formation involves several parts. The first is
the “offer”: party A proposes an arrangement of goods
and/or services in exchange for something from party
B. Party B then can accept or reject the offer. If the offer
proposed by party A is accepted by party B, then “a
contract” has been formed. That contract binds both
A and B.
Conventional legal systems almost universally demand
that the “acceptance” of the offer is a positive step (e.g.,
in Canada, reviewed in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB
571, paras. 447-528). In conventional legal systems, if
an offer were to include a part that states “here is the
offer, and if I do not hear from you in 30 days, my offer is
accepted and the contract is now binding,” then courts
would reject that component of the offer. A contract
offer cannot unilaterally bind party B, if party B does
not do or say anything. A “silence means agreement”
term is not valid and enforceable. Pseudolaw, however,
takes the opposite branch, and, based on a dubious
foundation of misquoted and obsolete legal concepts,
says that silence is, indeed, agreement (Netolitzky,
2018d, pp. 1049-1051). This example illustrates how
pseudolaw sometimes differs from conventional
law. Pseudolaw has rules, but some of those rules
apply different principles or a different test, and, as a
consequence, come to different results.
All law functions as a kind of social engineering. So why
are the contract rules different in law vs pseudolaw? The
reason is that a “silence means agreement” rule makes
paper weapons powerful. “Silence means agreement”
permits a person to unilaterally force obligations on
others. For example, in pseudolaw, a person sued to pay
an outstanding debt could send the lender a document
that says:
You have 30 days to prove the money you loaned
me is real lawful money, founded on precious
metals, and not worthless fiat currency. If you
do not prove that, you agree my debt does not
exist.
Since modern currencies no longer operate on the gold
standard, demanding proof in this way--and with the
rule that “silence means agreement”--would miracle
away debts and obtain money for nothing. Or at least
that is the theory. This kind of foisted documentary
claim is a quite commonplace pseudolaw strategy to
eliminate debts based on spurious financial concepts
(Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, para. 227 Netolitzky,
2018d, p. 1064), but never works.
“Silence means agreement” has a dark side, too,
which is why this rule is consistently rejected by
mainstream legal systems. Every day would require
endless vigilance, to detect and reject contract offers.
Documents concealed within an unopened envelope
could unilaterally impose unwanted services. An
unanswered telephone call might create a contract.
And pseudolaw adherents take this principle even
further, imagining “Invisible Contracts” that result
from apparently innocent acts, like using a postal
code purportedly creates government jurisdiction and
authority via a concealed trickster’s bargain (Meads
v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, paras. 231-234 Netolitzky,
2021, p. 179).
But not all pseudolaw operates simply on the basis
that law took a different path when legal rules were
developed in past centuries. Some aspects of pseudolaw
are probably best described as magic (Dew, 2016, pp.
87-91 Netolitzky, 2018d Wessinger, 2000, p. 160).
For example, some pseudolaw documents cannot,
rationally, have the claimed effect and authority,
and can only be explained as sympathetic magic
(Netolitzky, 2018d, pp. 1053-1056). Other pseudolaw
practices appear to be “cargo cult” imitations of
processes pseudolaw’s users did not understand, but
were perceived as having importance and/or power
(Netolitzky, 2018d, pp. 1057-1069).
Strangest of all is the one unique aspect of pseudolaw
that has no parallel in any other legal system: the
Strawman Theory doppelganger (reviewed in d’Abadie
v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, paras. 57-
70 Kalinowski, 2019, pp. 158-164 Meads v Meads,
2012 ABQB 571, paras. 417-446 Netolitzky, 2018d, pp.
1069-1078 Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency),
2017 ABQB 123, paras. 67-88 Rothweiler v Payette,
2018 ABQB 134, paras. 10-17 Rothweiler v Payette,
2018 ABQB 399, paras. 25-33).
