Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 70
Kabbani stated that 80 percent of all mosques and charities in the U.S. were in the hands of
extremists who posed a national security threat (Emerson, 2002, 160). Islamist propaganda
is easily found. Nearly all of the Islamist literature cited in this paper was found either on
the Internet or within three miles of the author‘s home, at stores catering to Muslims.
Training and Control
Prior to the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had a safe haven for
training recruits. Once selected, recruits trained in small groups or traveled to Afghanistan
for full scale military training, which included urban warfare, explosives, and even weapons
of mass destruction. Training lasted from four to six weeks. Individuals were instructed in
humility and sacrifice for the Ummah. Individual wants and national identities are
suppressed (Lumpkin, 2001). Trainees were taught to kill disbelievers.
Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double than
their rewards in fighting some one else not from the people of the book. They
have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. An infidel, and
enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his righteous
executioner. (bin Laden, 1996)
Recruits apparently were divided up into groups: the poorer, less educated individuals
ended up as foot soldiers for the Taliban, while more worldly, educated, and sophisticated
individuals were identified as potential members of al Qaeda (Moore &Baker, 2001, A10).
These individuals came with an understanding of the enemy, and of the outside world, that
could be used to form or augment cells for kaffir lands, or plan and lead military operations,
such as the September 11 mass murder. These individuals were provided classic intelligence
and partisan training, such as codes, dead drops, security, and forgery (Moore &Baker,
2001, A10).
Al Qaeda training videos clearly show personnel being trained to attack silhouettes adorned
with Christian symbols. In-group morality was emphasized there is no moral obligation to
those outside the Ummah, or indeed to other Muslims outside the group. They cite the
Koran: ―O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and Christians for friends‖ (Al Fouzan,
1997, 7). This admonition is extended to requiring hatred for disbelievers, not respecting or
trusting them, not permitting them any power, nor showing compassion to them (Al Fouzan,
1997, 12, 13, 29). Secularists and disbelievers are not even considered living. Mahmud
Abouhalima, involved in the first World Trade Center bombing, described non-religious
individuals as moving ―dead bodies‖ (Juergensmeyer, 2000, 69).
Captured terrorist manuals confirm various media reports that, while in the theater of war,
the terrorists were organized into cells, remained aloof from society, acquired additional
funds through petty theft, and reinvigorated their passion through intense meetings with
fellow members and through propagandistic videotapes (Weiser, 2001, B8). As with other
elite military units, loyalty was to the squad or cell, and differences were minimized
(Erlanger &Hodges, 2001, 4). Limited language skills and the lack of leisure time likely
enhanced their isolation from their target community. However, many of those in al Qaeda
had considerable time in the West, and their mental distance was a product of their pure
fanaticism. For example, one reporter noted that a wounded foreign Saudi fighter found in a
Pakistan hospital used perfect New York slang (Pomfret, 2001, A1, A30).
Al Qaeda as a Personality Cult
Being Islamists, The al Qaeda movement‘s members essentially come in with views that,
while extreme, are somewhat acceptable and somewhat lauded within the Islamic
community. They are alienated from their materialistic corrupt society, and from the
Western social construct. They have been told to hate non-Muslims and apostate Muslims.
Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 71
They believe the answer lies in total acceptance of the Koran as God‘s ordained
commandments and the creation of an upright society.
Usama bin Laden is less a cult leader than a model of a pious Muslim. He left a life of wealth
and leisure to fight the atheist Soviets for the sake of Islam. He was victorious,
demonstrating that Islam is not weak but could bring down a powerful nation by selfless
determination, trust in Allah, and creative warfare. He captured the imagination of Muslims,
and the fighters who marched at his side lived and died to fulfill his vision (Gerecht, 2001,
77). Bin Laden is considered a Robin Hood among many Muslims who name their children
after him and speak of his defense of Islam approvingly (http://www.pacdonald.com, no
date Addario, 2001, 38-41). His demeanor on his videotapes is that of a quiet, well-spoken
aesthete who, with simple Koranic-inspired allusions, explains the current world situation.
As with some other leaders of terrorist groups, bin Laden acts as an indispensable
inspiration, one who manifests the virtues to be attained, and one who explains the struggle
in a strategic, comprehensive manner.
Usama‘s success has been his ability to assemble and organize the young men seeking a
pious society and point them toward a jihad he envisions. In his view, this jihad is a just
war, in defense of and an expansion of, the Islamic Ummah. He provided his volunteers
training, focused them on the United States and Christian West as the enemy, World
Judaism as a primary threat, and the established governments in the Islamic world as foes
for destruction. Good and evil were clearly laid out, with the warriors placed at the center or
the cosmic struggle.
Because Muslims are fighting a war for Allah against a far more powerful foe, bin Laden has
argued that all means are just and all targets are legitimate. To justify his position bin
Laden repeated Iraq‘s propaganda that UN sanctions starve Muslim children, and he bewails
the deaths of Palestinians, although in fact he has no sympathy with either regime. In other
cases, bin Laden has justified the killing of American women and children because the
United States killed women and children in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (bin Laden in ―NIDA‘UL
ISLAM,‖ 1996).
Al Qaeda as a Suicide Cult
The suicidal murderers who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11 last year were not hard to find within the modern Islamic community. ―Our
biggest problem,‖ explained a Hamas leader, ―is the hordes of young men who beat on our
doors clambering to be sent‖ (Hassan, N., 2001). A respected poll of the people in Gaza
showed a 78 percent approval rate for suicide bombings (Lelyveld, 2001, 50).
Suicidal attacks in modern Islam have become, unfortunately, virtuous acts. They are
lauded by religious groups and even secular terrorist groups in the Middle East. Usama
believed they would prove the difference between the religious and the secular:
Those youths are different from your soldiers. Your problem will be how to
convince your troops to fight, while our problem will be how to restrain our
youths to wait for their turn in fighting and in operations. These youths are
commendation and praiseworthy. (bin Laden, 1996)
Islamic children are taught that ―to sacrifice oneself in the holy war (Jihad)‖ is a religious
obligation (Zihad, 1999, 4). Palestinian calendars are illustrated with ―martyrs,‖ and children
chant their names (Hassan, N., 2001). Volunteers for these acts are treated as ―living
martyrs,‖ given great respect, and find it virtually impossible to back out without shaming
their families. They instead concentrate on their mission, on ritual, and on their faith
(Hassan, N., 2001). In Palestine, suicide bomber deaths are announced in official
newspapers as wedding announcements to the ―black eyed‖ virgins who awaited them in
Paradise (Lelyveld, 2001, 51). This group dynamic—an emotional support structure, peer
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