Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 70
Kabbani stated that 80 percent of all mosques and charities in the U.S. were in the hands of
extremists who posed a national security threat (Emerson, 2002, 160). Islamist propaganda
is easily found. Nearly all of the Islamist literature cited in this paper was found either on
the Internet or within three miles of the author‘s home, at stores catering to Muslims.
Training and Control
Prior to the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had a safe haven for
training recruits. Once selected, recruits trained in small groups or traveled to Afghanistan
for full scale military training, which included urban warfare, explosives, and even weapons
of mass destruction. Training lasted from four to six weeks. Individuals were instructed in
humility and sacrifice for the Ummah. Individual wants and national identities are
suppressed (Lumpkin, 2001). Trainees were taught to kill disbelievers.
Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double than
their rewards in fighting some one else not from the people of the book. They
have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. An infidel, and
enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his righteous
executioner. (bin Laden, 1996)
Recruits apparently were divided up into groups: the poorer, less educated individuals
ended up as foot soldiers for the Taliban, while more worldly, educated, and sophisticated
individuals were identified as potential members of al Qaeda (Moore &Baker, 2001, A10).
These individuals came with an understanding of the enemy, and of the outside world, that
could be used to form or augment cells for kaffir lands, or plan and lead military operations,
such as the September 11 mass murder. These individuals were provided classic intelligence
and partisan training, such as codes, dead drops, security, and forgery (Moore &Baker,
2001, A10).
Al Qaeda training videos clearly show personnel being trained to attack silhouettes adorned
with Christian symbols. In-group morality was emphasized there is no moral obligation to
those outside the Ummah, or indeed to other Muslims outside the group. They cite the
Koran: ―O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and Christians for friends‖ (Al Fouzan,
1997, 7). This admonition is extended to requiring hatred for disbelievers, not respecting or
trusting them, not permitting them any power, nor showing compassion to them (Al Fouzan,
1997, 12, 13, 29). Secularists and disbelievers are not even considered living. Mahmud
Abouhalima, involved in the first World Trade Center bombing, described non-religious
individuals as moving ―dead bodies‖ (Juergensmeyer, 2000, 69).
Captured terrorist manuals confirm various media reports that, while in the theater of war,
the terrorists were organized into cells, remained aloof from society, acquired additional
funds through petty theft, and reinvigorated their passion through intense meetings with
fellow members and through propagandistic videotapes (Weiser, 2001, B8). As with other
elite military units, loyalty was to the squad or cell, and differences were minimized
(Erlanger &Hodges, 2001, 4). Limited language skills and the lack of leisure time likely
enhanced their isolation from their target community. However, many of those in al Qaeda
had considerable time in the West, and their mental distance was a product of their pure
fanaticism. For example, one reporter noted that a wounded foreign Saudi fighter found in a
Pakistan hospital used perfect New York slang (Pomfret, 2001, A1, A30).
Al Qaeda as a Personality Cult
Being Islamists, The al Qaeda movement‘s members essentially come in with views that,
while extreme, are somewhat acceptable and somewhat lauded within the Islamic
community. They are alienated from their materialistic corrupt society, and from the
Western social construct. They have been told to hate non-Muslims and apostate Muslims.
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