Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 196
reach Consummation, are the group‘s driving force.74 On the one hand, the group struggles
in the political sphere for its right to practice freely in China and on the other hand, the
group struggles to eliminate evil from the universe and reach Consummation. How these
goals will interact and affect one another is worth continued observation and study.
The Chinese Government
The questions raised for the Chinese government are many and pressing. The primary
question is is the ruler-sectarian paradigm still valid in the twenty-first century? Do
‗heterodox‘ sectarian and religious groups with certain characteristics actually pose a threat
and if so, what is the best way to occlude that threat? This over-riding question includes
other questions: Is the use of intense national campaigns productive or counter-productive?
Is the goal of ‗keeping stability‘ legitimately achieved through intense campaigns if they cost
the credibility and trust of the Chinese people? Are these campaigns believable anymore to
the Chinese people? Is the crisis management style of legitimating ‗ruthless and radical‘
actions against perceived ‗contradictions between the people and their enemies‘ still valid in
the post-Mao era?
Then there are the issues of violence in the culture starting with the demonization paradigm
and extending into the legal structure of detention without trial and re-education camps, as
well as the issues of police abuse and use of torture outside the established official legal
norms. Although the press in China is incrementally gaining openness and the ability to
report more freely, it may ultimately be a question of how much trust can be put into the
Chinese people to receive freely gathered news. It may also be a question of how much
trust can be put into the Chinese people to express views and openly discuss and debate
issues, even ones which differ from the Communist Party line.
The Chinese government may truly believe that the teachings of the FLG have been harmful
to those who practice it, that the FLG organization is a destabilizing influence, and that Li
Hongzhi is a potential charismatic leader with political intent, yet, the question remains is
the old paradigm still the solution? The government needs to ask: what is our society
lacking that could cause a group like this to be such a threat, and what is our society lacking
that we must resort to burning books and banning beliefs? The early answer given to the
first question has been ‗science‘ the people need to be educated so that ‗science‘ will win
out over ‗superstition‘. The early answer has been development of a ‗social safety net‘ to
decrease the anxiety level so that people do not turn to such ‗irrational‘ beliefs. However,
education and social safety-nets will not prevent ‗irrational‘ ideas from being promulgated,
they will not prevent people from being attracted to them, nor will they prevent ideas
unpleasant to the CCP from being offered and considered in the future. The question for the
Chinese government is how much longer can the old paradigm be used?
Acknowledgment
From Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002). Reprinted by
permission from Frank Cass Publishers, London.
Notes
1 James Tong, ‗Behind the Falungong Façade: Organizational Structure and Finance‘, unpublished
article (Sept. 2000). The FLG tried to re-register with: the National Minority Affairs
Commission as a nonreligious, academic organization the China Buddhist Federation as a
nonreligious, cultural organization for the study of Buddhism and the United Front
Department as a nonreligious, academic organization. p.4. I want to thank David Rapoport for
requesting that I write this second paper on the issue, and for his continued encouragement,
patience and support. I also thank Catherine Wessinger for over a year of email discussions on
new religious movements and the FLG. Any errors or inadequacies in this article are solely my
responsibility.
reach Consummation, are the group‘s driving force.74 On the one hand, the group struggles
in the political sphere for its right to practice freely in China and on the other hand, the
group struggles to eliminate evil from the universe and reach Consummation. How these
goals will interact and affect one another is worth continued observation and study.
The Chinese Government
The questions raised for the Chinese government are many and pressing. The primary
question is is the ruler-sectarian paradigm still valid in the twenty-first century? Do
‗heterodox‘ sectarian and religious groups with certain characteristics actually pose a threat
and if so, what is the best way to occlude that threat? This over-riding question includes
other questions: Is the use of intense national campaigns productive or counter-productive?
Is the goal of ‗keeping stability‘ legitimately achieved through intense campaigns if they cost
the credibility and trust of the Chinese people? Are these campaigns believable anymore to
the Chinese people? Is the crisis management style of legitimating ‗ruthless and radical‘
actions against perceived ‗contradictions between the people and their enemies‘ still valid in
the post-Mao era?
Then there are the issues of violence in the culture starting with the demonization paradigm
and extending into the legal structure of detention without trial and re-education camps, as
well as the issues of police abuse and use of torture outside the established official legal
norms. Although the press in China is incrementally gaining openness and the ability to
report more freely, it may ultimately be a question of how much trust can be put into the
Chinese people to receive freely gathered news. It may also be a question of how much
trust can be put into the Chinese people to express views and openly discuss and debate
issues, even ones which differ from the Communist Party line.
The Chinese government may truly believe that the teachings of the FLG have been harmful
to those who practice it, that the FLG organization is a destabilizing influence, and that Li
Hongzhi is a potential charismatic leader with political intent, yet, the question remains is
the old paradigm still the solution? The government needs to ask: what is our society
lacking that could cause a group like this to be such a threat, and what is our society lacking
that we must resort to burning books and banning beliefs? The early answer given to the
first question has been ‗science‘ the people need to be educated so that ‗science‘ will win
out over ‗superstition‘. The early answer has been development of a ‗social safety net‘ to
decrease the anxiety level so that people do not turn to such ‗irrational‘ beliefs. However,
education and social safety-nets will not prevent ‗irrational‘ ideas from being promulgated,
they will not prevent people from being attracted to them, nor will they prevent ideas
unpleasant to the CCP from being offered and considered in the future. The question for the
Chinese government is how much longer can the old paradigm be used?
Acknowledgment
From Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002). Reprinted by
permission from Frank Cass Publishers, London.
Notes
1 James Tong, ‗Behind the Falungong Façade: Organizational Structure and Finance‘, unpublished
article (Sept. 2000). The FLG tried to re-register with: the National Minority Affairs
Commission as a nonreligious, academic organization the China Buddhist Federation as a
nonreligious, cultural organization for the study of Buddhism and the United Front
Department as a nonreligious, academic organization. p.4. I want to thank David Rapoport for
requesting that I write this second paper on the issue, and for his continued encouragement,
patience and support. I also thank Catherine Wessinger for over a year of email discussions on
new religious movements and the FLG. Any errors or inadequacies in this article are solely my
responsibility.
