Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 170
appeared to be promising adherents actual immortality. Dr. Langone doubted whether the
leaders actually believed their claims and he may have been right. But I suspect that many
―cult leaders‖ strongly believe their doctrines (or some of them) and that is why some of
them are so dangerous. Adolf Hitler operated somewhat as a mega-cult leader and also in
some ways as a con man. But had he not deeply believed in the demonic depravity of Jews
would six million of the latter have died? Had Hitler not viewed Slavs as only one rung
above Jews, the behavior of Nazi occupation authorities in Russia and E. Europe would not
have been so notoriously more oppressive than the behavior of Nazi authorities in Western
Europe. Hitler did not merely manipulate prejudice to ―scapegoat victims.‖ He was a ―true
believer.‖
I could give more examples. Let me suffice with one more. Most conventional
fundamentalist churches are committed to apocalyptic and millennialist doctrines. But they
are ―pre-tribulationist‖ and believe in ―The Rapture‖ such that they do not expect to have to
endure the persecution, violence and chaos of the ―Great Tribulation‖ and the Reign of
Antichrist. This belief probably operates as sort of safety valve: the leader and the devotees
will not in their view have to endure the maximum persecution and terror, and so the actual
threats they do face are somewhat less weighty and partly sub-eschatological. The political
leader or force who seems threatening is probably not Antichrist, who will not rule until the
―Saints‖ have departed the planet. The believers are thus not under maximum threat. In
contrast some of the wilder Christian groups are ―posttribulationist‖ (or ―midtribulationist‖)
and anticipate having to endure all or part of the Tribulation. Such an expectation leads
often to militant survivalism and puts a premium on self-defense, amassing weapons, etc.
This enhances volatility. (The Branch Davidians are said to have been in effect mid-
Tribulationists). So beliefs and doctrines can have significant tangible consequences.
The importance of religious beliefs probably varies from group to group. The content of
beliefs may sometimes be more effect than cause. But Mr. Rosedale‘s absolutist statement
is too glib. Beliefs can be sincere (for better or worse) and can strongly influence behavior.
I suspect that underlying Rosedale‘s extreme devaluation of the significance of beliefs is the
desire of Rosedale and other activist critics of cults to not think of themselves (and be
thought of by others) as ―heresy hunters‖ persecuting belief. It is generally conceded that
in America freedom of religious belief, unlike freedom of religious action, is absolute. ―The
law knows no heresy‖ is a principle of constitutional law enshrined in US v. Ballard (1944).
If the role of belief is only marginal, anticult activism and the promotion of state
―regulation‖ of cults may not seem to amount to a persecutory heresy hunt.
Some critics of the activist critics of cults may believe that, notwithstanding protestation,
there is a concealed attack on beliefs in some attacks on cults in the West. Be that as it
may, the Chinese persecution of Falun Gong, which has been stigmatized by officials as a
―heretical cult,‖ does persecute beliefs. In a recent excellent article, ―Chinese Law and the
International Protection of Religious Freedom‖ in the Journal of Church and State, Carolyn
Evans maintains that some Chinese control policies violate elements of international law in
part because the Chinese are trying to extirpate belief, which contravenes the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which the Chinese are supposedly
committed.45 Dr. Evans has examined the Chinese legitimations of their policies:
The Chinese government‘s arguments, moreover, suggest an attempt by the
authorities to reach into the internal beliefs ...of its people – something that
is clearly prohibited by International laws. As the wording of Art. 18 makes
clear only the manifestation of a religion can be limited the right to have a
religion or belief is absolute. While the Chinese government emphatically
rejects the notion that it interferes with the religious belief of its people, the
constant references to the ―superstitious‖ nature of Falun Gong and the
Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 171
argument that it ―blasphemes‖ against religions suggest that the government
is judging the beliefs themselves [my emphasis] rather than their undesirable
manifestations. Similarly the government assumes that the apocalyptic
beliefs of the movement and its rejection of modern medicine make it clear
that it is a ―cult‖ rather than a religion.46
Evans notes that in China members of Falun Gong and other highly stigmatized sects are
held in custody for ―re-education,‖ a procedure which Evans maintains is analogous to
coercive deprogramming. Evans further suggests that ―detention for re-education, as well
as the process of re-education itself, amounts to coercion,‖ which is barred by international
law.47
So, I restate my earlier point that whatever ―analogies‖ Mr. Rosedale perceives between
Falun Gong and destructive American groups, in evaluating Chinese policy, one cannot
ignore the overall context of authoritarian state control. China is no longer trying (as Mao
attempted) to totally eradicate religions. However, ―The government is [still] committed to
transforming China into an atheist state and believes that the decline of religion is
inevitable.‖ Until this happens that government will allow a limited number of ‗official‘
religions. But from a religious freedom standpoint, ―Official religions are only permissible so
long as there is still freedom for people to belong to other, non-official religions.‖48 Such
freedom only exists in China to the degree that repressive rules are not uniformly enforced
in practice. The government meddles in internal religious matters (e.g., appointing the new
Panchen Lama) to ensure that religious practice and training is subordinate to ―patriotic‖
imperatives.
This is not freedom of religion. The transgressions and excesses of Falun Gong in China,
which may have been exaggerated, cannot justify the brutal persecution which Chinese
authorities have applied to the dissidents.49 Some of the control measures such as
involuntary hospitalization have also been employed against political dissidents. The
―psychopathology‖ rationale for such tactics cannot simply be accepted at face value. Nor
can the claims of authorities to not be persecuting beliefs in their attacks on a ―heretical
cult‖ be accepted. The overwhelming context of an intolerant, authoritarian regime cannot
be overlooked. Brutal persecution evokes and extrapolates the very excesses and
apocalyptic frenzies which may be complained of, thus fueling and rationalizing more
persecution.50
Notes
1 Herbert Rosedale, ―Perspectives on Cults as Affected by the September 11 Tragedy,‖ paper
presented in Beijing at the Meeting of the China Anti-Cult Association, December 2001.
2 According to Professor Scott Lowe, China does not have an independent anti-cult movement, i.e.,
Chinese anti-cult organizations are ultimately government controlled. Scott Lowe, ―Religion on a
Leash: NRMs and the Limits of Chinese Freedom,‖ forthcoming in Phillip Lucas and Thomas Robbins,
eds. New Religious Movements and State Control Around the Globe (New Religious Movements in the
Twenty-First Century), Routledge Books, 2003/2004.
3 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
4 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
5 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
6 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
7 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
8 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
9 Lowe. ―Religion on a Leash.‖
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