Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 180
resulting from them. Strongly held religious opinions do not override protection of human
rights. We have seen such determinations recently in connection with issues relating to
female genital mutilation, slavery, incest, and familial relational definitions. Keeping the
difference between belief and practice is essential in protecting the expression of unpopular
ideas and beliefs and in balancing individual freedom and social responsibility.
My view as a lawyer is that law does have an impact in shaping social behavior. We all
have seen how laws that embody values can have a deterrent effect on practices sought to
be inhibited or eliminated in our society. The impact of socially relevant legislation in areas
dealing with child labor and religious and racial discrimination in voting and employment is
obvious, yet Robbins seems to view religious beliefs and practices as something entitled to
unique and absolute protection. That is a key difference between his views and those of
Rosedale, who does not regard religious freedom as entitled to exculpation from
responsibility beyond that afforded freedom of speech and assembly. These differences
between Rosedale and Robbins are not as absolute as they would appear since when they
are addressed through dialogue, it becomes clear that there are large areas of commonality
and issues addressed in harsh and slogan-like terms appear gray and fuzzy when subject to
discussion.
In order to frame and focus on these issues, it would certainly help if parallel to the
background of dialogue between AFF and Chinese representatives, Robbins would address
as subjects for dialogue not limited to the context of the Chinese government and Falun
Gong the following areas of context involving cults and religious freedom in Western
culture:
With respect to polygamy, is it valid for the state to outlaw polygamous
conduct or incestuous conduct based upon findings of harm, including
proliferation of genetic defects through inbreeding?
What are the appropriate areas of state regulation of education so as to
mandate education for both sexes, require education for children up to a
certain age, and to monitor its content so as to prevent inculcation of racial,
religious, and sexual bigotry?
What is the appropriate level of state intervention in family matters when
dealing with issues such as ―discipline‖ of children through physical beating,
exploitation of minors through child labor, and imposition of involuntary
servitude through denial of compensation for labor in commercial enterprises
operated by religious entities?
What is the limit on imposition of secular responsibility and accountability on
religious entities and their leaders and representatives for harm done citizens
of the polity?
Finally, what are appropriate limitations on state intervention requiring
mandatory health care for adults and children and limitations on state
conduct under the aegis of furtherance of citizens‘ health and welfare where
they impact on religiously motivated conduct?
Perhaps if Robbins surveyed the literature published by sociologists of religion and
examined the emphasis and analysis they give to issues such as those just stated and those
with regard to harm caused by allegedly destructive cultic groups to members and non-
members, he might find that Rosedale could be rightly concerned about the lack of
emphasis and downplaying of issues of harm and abuse and that alleged champions of
human rights and religious freedom have been at least as sensitive to their supporters and
selective in their presentation as he expresses with respect to Rosedale‘s paper.

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 181
Finally, I would conclude that more rather than less dialogue should be encouraged relating
to issues dealing with freedom and human rights there is no ultimate benefit in excluding
from the dialogue those whose views are different.
Notes
1 The problem historically of commentators writing and speaking about the so-called anti-cult movement in the
United States without direct knowledge has been adverted to frequently. I hoped that there was a significant
change evidenced by the publication of Misunderstanding Cults, edited by Zablocki and Robbins, but, apparently,
the problem persists. The third-hand manner in which Robins went about his inquiry without even thinking of the
possibility of direct communication, testifies to the gulf between cult apologists and ―ACM‖ representatives and the
factors that inhibit direct dialogue.
2 Since September 11th, focus on political entities and movements which combine religious and secular authority
and do not recognize separation of church and state and which mobilize religious activity for political ends has
provoked new areas of concern about human rights violations as well as terrorist activity. It is naive to ignore
Falun Gong's support for law breaking to achieve their ends in this context or to ignore their blending of secular
and religious goals as they seek the benefits of separation of church and state by claiming protection against
persecution against their minority rights under a pluralist heading. That does not mean that protection of human
rights is not an issue. It does mean we cannot ignore cultural changes and the pressures of increased
fundamentalist religious zealots for conformity and truncation of rights of those who disagree with them by a
strident group claiming violation of their religious freedom. Nor can we ignore the need for vigilance in protection
of civil rights during periods of fear and uncertainty.
3 Particularly troublesome in responding to Robbins are his citations to material not available for critical
examination. For example, he cites an article to be published in a forthcoming collection that may not appear until
the year 2004. I have no doubt the material would be helpful and enlightening and look forward to examining it
and using it for the basis of continuing dialogue. I wonder, however, whether the compendium of articles edited by
Robbins under the tentative heading, ―New Religious Movements and State Control Around the Globe,‖ will include
discussions of states' activities in protection of religious freedom where such freedoms are sought to be abridged
by religions such as Islamic fundamentalists or whether that may not come under the definition of ―new‖ religious
movements. I would also hope that the articles about Falun Gong would include material dealing with harm and
activities by Falun Gong that impact upon and require regulation by the state to protect the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens.
4 Papers submitted at AFF conferences are sometimes available as videotapes and/or published in Cultic Studies
Review or other journals.
5 Included in presentations to the AFF conference audiences were critical comments from Chinese nationals about
the practices of the Chinese government.
6 Video tape reproductions of AFF conference presentations are available – see footnote 4 above.
7 It is a continuing logical flaw in presentations dealing with new or alternative religions to exclude relevant
analysis based on majority religions, old religions, or non religious groups. For example, the historical basis of the
development of religious freedom cannot be viewed independently of western political history relating to separation
of church and state, nor, for example, should views on the impact of religious persecution and the development of
religious freedom exclude persecution by established religions leading to secular restraints on religious behavior
and readjustment of political secular authority and control.
8 Of course, focus on fundamentalist totalistic states and the degree to which they require conformity in
ideological areas has been heightened since September 11th and more attention has been addressed to parallels
between cults and terrorist fundamentalists or fundamentalist political groups operating within states, as well as
the relationship of such groups to the state itself.
9 Robbins's helpfully refers to an April 2003 issue of Nova Religio, which contains a symposium and collection of
articles on Falun Gong, some of which are quite useful. For example, Ownby's article on popular religions and the
Chinese state gives constructive historical background, as do the studies of Rahn and others. The perspectives
expressed in the Nova Religio evaluations and information derived from ex members of Falun Gong unsurprisingly
omit any analysis of the social harm emanating from its practices inside China.
10 This response is a typical ideological one infused by the inconsistency of assuming that all ex-members respond
in a manner not worthy of credibility while all information furnished by believers and supporters should be accepted
at face value. I vainly hoped that progress had been made towards objective triangulation and skepticism in
investigating information relating to cults.
11 The inadequacy of Robbins' views with respect to Rosedale's emphasis and omission are highlighted when you
recognize that the issues do not relate solely to treatment by the Chinese government of Falun Gong's adherents
and supporters inside and outside China. The cult problem in China deals with many different groups, religious and
non-religious, and while it is true that there have been and are inappropriate and improper instances of abuses of
freedom ignoring permitted diversity of groups in Chinese society, we should discuss limits without the burden of
stereotypes of ideology.