Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 180
resulting from them. Strongly held religious opinions do not override protection of human
rights. We have seen such determinations recently in connection with issues relating to
female genital mutilation, slavery, incest, and familial relational definitions. Keeping the
difference between belief and practice is essential in protecting the expression of unpopular
ideas and beliefs and in balancing individual freedom and social responsibility.
My view as a lawyer is that law does have an impact in shaping social behavior. We all
have seen how laws that embody values can have a deterrent effect on practices sought to
be inhibited or eliminated in our society. The impact of socially relevant legislation in areas
dealing with child labor and religious and racial discrimination in voting and employment is
obvious, yet Robbins seems to view religious beliefs and practices as something entitled to
unique and absolute protection. That is a key difference between his views and those of
Rosedale, who does not regard religious freedom as entitled to exculpation from
responsibility beyond that afforded freedom of speech and assembly. These differences
between Rosedale and Robbins are not as absolute as they would appear since when they
are addressed through dialogue, it becomes clear that there are large areas of commonality
and issues addressed in harsh and slogan-like terms appear gray and fuzzy when subject to
discussion.
In order to frame and focus on these issues, it would certainly help if parallel to the
background of dialogue between AFF and Chinese representatives, Robbins would address
as subjects for dialogue not limited to the context of the Chinese government and Falun
Gong the following areas of context involving cults and religious freedom in Western
culture:
With respect to polygamy, is it valid for the state to outlaw polygamous
conduct or incestuous conduct based upon findings of harm, including
proliferation of genetic defects through inbreeding?
What are the appropriate areas of state regulation of education so as to
mandate education for both sexes, require education for children up to a
certain age, and to monitor its content so as to prevent inculcation of racial,
religious, and sexual bigotry?
What is the appropriate level of state intervention in family matters when
dealing with issues such as ―discipline‖ of children through physical beating,
exploitation of minors through child labor, and imposition of involuntary
servitude through denial of compensation for labor in commercial enterprises
operated by religious entities?
What is the limit on imposition of secular responsibility and accountability on
religious entities and their leaders and representatives for harm done citizens
of the polity?
Finally, what are appropriate limitations on state intervention requiring
mandatory health care for adults and children and limitations on state
conduct under the aegis of furtherance of citizens‘ health and welfare where
they impact on religiously motivated conduct?
Perhaps if Robbins surveyed the literature published by sociologists of religion and
examined the emphasis and analysis they give to issues such as those just stated and those
with regard to harm caused by allegedly destructive cultic groups to members and non-
members, he might find that Rosedale could be rightly concerned about the lack of
emphasis and downplaying of issues of harm and abuse and that alleged champions of
human rights and religious freedom have been at least as sensitive to their supporters and
selective in their presentation as he expresses with respect to Rosedale‘s paper.
resulting from them. Strongly held religious opinions do not override protection of human
rights. We have seen such determinations recently in connection with issues relating to
female genital mutilation, slavery, incest, and familial relational definitions. Keeping the
difference between belief and practice is essential in protecting the expression of unpopular
ideas and beliefs and in balancing individual freedom and social responsibility.
My view as a lawyer is that law does have an impact in shaping social behavior. We all
have seen how laws that embody values can have a deterrent effect on practices sought to
be inhibited or eliminated in our society. The impact of socially relevant legislation in areas
dealing with child labor and religious and racial discrimination in voting and employment is
obvious, yet Robbins seems to view religious beliefs and practices as something entitled to
unique and absolute protection. That is a key difference between his views and those of
Rosedale, who does not regard religious freedom as entitled to exculpation from
responsibility beyond that afforded freedom of speech and assembly. These differences
between Rosedale and Robbins are not as absolute as they would appear since when they
are addressed through dialogue, it becomes clear that there are large areas of commonality
and issues addressed in harsh and slogan-like terms appear gray and fuzzy when subject to
discussion.
In order to frame and focus on these issues, it would certainly help if parallel to the
background of dialogue between AFF and Chinese representatives, Robbins would address
as subjects for dialogue not limited to the context of the Chinese government and Falun
Gong the following areas of context involving cults and religious freedom in Western
culture:
With respect to polygamy, is it valid for the state to outlaw polygamous
conduct or incestuous conduct based upon findings of harm, including
proliferation of genetic defects through inbreeding?
What are the appropriate areas of state regulation of education so as to
mandate education for both sexes, require education for children up to a
certain age, and to monitor its content so as to prevent inculcation of racial,
religious, and sexual bigotry?
What is the appropriate level of state intervention in family matters when
dealing with issues such as ―discipline‖ of children through physical beating,
exploitation of minors through child labor, and imposition of involuntary
servitude through denial of compensation for labor in commercial enterprises
operated by religious entities?
What is the limit on imposition of secular responsibility and accountability on
religious entities and their leaders and representatives for harm done citizens
of the polity?
Finally, what are appropriate limitations on state intervention requiring
mandatory health care for adults and children and limitations on state
conduct under the aegis of furtherance of citizens‘ health and welfare where
they impact on religiously motivated conduct?
Perhaps if Robbins surveyed the literature published by sociologists of religion and
examined the emphasis and analysis they give to issues such as those just stated and those
with regard to harm caused by allegedly destructive cultic groups to members and non-
members, he might find that Rosedale could be rightly concerned about the lack of
emphasis and downplaying of issues of harm and abuse and that alleged champions of
human rights and religious freedom have been at least as sensitive to their supporters and
selective in their presentation as he expresses with respect to Rosedale‘s paper.
