Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 195
Demonizing the ‗other‘, believing that one is more than human and no longer bound by the
‗conventional thoughts on integrity and righteousness‘ of the ordinary human, accepting
violent behavior in ‗other dimensions‘, and believing that one‘s task is to ‗eliminate evil‘, has
the potential to justify violent behavior. However, other factors present decrease the
likelihood these influences would justify violence. They are:
Public image: The FLG movement has developed a publicly acceptable role in the West as a
human rights movement and thereby possesses a positive public self-image. This is in
contrast to the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, which was heavily ridiculed publicly after its failed
attempt at forming a political party and having members, including its leader, run for public
office.71
Retribution: Retribution stories prove to practitioners that divine justice is being meted out
by the Fa to those who deserve it, thereby relieving individual practitioners of the
responsibility to bring about retribution. A 12 November 2001 posting titled ‗Ignoring the
Vicious Persecution of Falun Gong Practitioners Is a Crime‘ states that ‗Some people believe
that ‗evil will be met with evil‘ is just a curse or a threat, but it is not…‘ Immediate
retribution in this lifetime‘ is a warning that comes from caring and compassion. If people
still do not awaken, more severe consequences will follow. When people go past the point of
redemption, further advice or warnings will be useless‘.72 As long as this retribution
remains the task of the Fa and not individual practitioners, it will not be used to justify acts
of violence.
Protest movement options: The group continues to develop its identity and its means as a
protest movement giving them a sense of efficacy and empowerment. Development along
these lines include law suits brought against Chinese officials and law suits in the West
brought against those seen as slandering or inciting others towards hatred of them. Their
cause has also received attention from politicians in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate.73
Instructions: Continued instructions from Li and the Minghui site editors, as well as in
articles by practitioners, remind practitioners to avoid using violence or doing or saying
anything that might ‗injure the Fa‘, that is, bring the group bad publicity.
Concluding Comments
The Falun Gong
The FLG has three goals: its goal as a protest movement is to have the ban lifted in China,
the goal of its teachings is the Fa-rectification of the world and universe, and the goal of the
individual practitioner is to reach Consummation and ascend to Falun Dafa paradise.
The FLG‘s identity, both public and private, is strongly linked with the issue of human rights.
American acceptance and support is based on its recognition as a human rights movement
rather than on Li‘s teachings as a spiritual or cultivation system, and therefore the
persecution of the FLG in China plays a major role in the group‘s identity.
As the ban continues, the FLG will continue to function as a social protest movement with a
focus on the human rights issue. It is likely the group will continue to protest within China
and without, while also trying to maintain, if not increase, its membership. There is a
possibility the group could reach a period of internal crisis if the situation in China does not
improve, if the practice of practitioners ‗sending forth righteous thoughts‘ to ‗eliminate evil‘
is seen as ineffective, and if the Fa‘s acts of retribution are seen as insufficient. The
question of when the final moment of Fa-rectification will arrive may cause anxiety within
the group and require further developments in Li‘s teachings.
For now, the crisis in China and the group‘s involvement as a social protest movement,
along with the great cosmic battle between good and evil and the longing of practitioners to
Demonizing the ‗other‘, believing that one is more than human and no longer bound by the
‗conventional thoughts on integrity and righteousness‘ of the ordinary human, accepting
violent behavior in ‗other dimensions‘, and believing that one‘s task is to ‗eliminate evil‘, has
the potential to justify violent behavior. However, other factors present decrease the
likelihood these influences would justify violence. They are:
Public image: The FLG movement has developed a publicly acceptable role in the West as a
human rights movement and thereby possesses a positive public self-image. This is in
contrast to the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, which was heavily ridiculed publicly after its failed
attempt at forming a political party and having members, including its leader, run for public
office.71
Retribution: Retribution stories prove to practitioners that divine justice is being meted out
by the Fa to those who deserve it, thereby relieving individual practitioners of the
responsibility to bring about retribution. A 12 November 2001 posting titled ‗Ignoring the
Vicious Persecution of Falun Gong Practitioners Is a Crime‘ states that ‗Some people believe
that ‗evil will be met with evil‘ is just a curse or a threat, but it is not…‘ Immediate
retribution in this lifetime‘ is a warning that comes from caring and compassion. If people
still do not awaken, more severe consequences will follow. When people go past the point of
redemption, further advice or warnings will be useless‘.72 As long as this retribution
remains the task of the Fa and not individual practitioners, it will not be used to justify acts
of violence.
Protest movement options: The group continues to develop its identity and its means as a
protest movement giving them a sense of efficacy and empowerment. Development along
these lines include law suits brought against Chinese officials and law suits in the West
brought against those seen as slandering or inciting others towards hatred of them. Their
cause has also received attention from politicians in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate.73
Instructions: Continued instructions from Li and the Minghui site editors, as well as in
articles by practitioners, remind practitioners to avoid using violence or doing or saying
anything that might ‗injure the Fa‘, that is, bring the group bad publicity.
Concluding Comments
The Falun Gong
The FLG has three goals: its goal as a protest movement is to have the ban lifted in China,
the goal of its teachings is the Fa-rectification of the world and universe, and the goal of the
individual practitioner is to reach Consummation and ascend to Falun Dafa paradise.
The FLG‘s identity, both public and private, is strongly linked with the issue of human rights.
American acceptance and support is based on its recognition as a human rights movement
rather than on Li‘s teachings as a spiritual or cultivation system, and therefore the
persecution of the FLG in China plays a major role in the group‘s identity.
As the ban continues, the FLG will continue to function as a social protest movement with a
focus on the human rights issue. It is likely the group will continue to protest within China
and without, while also trying to maintain, if not increase, its membership. There is a
possibility the group could reach a period of internal crisis if the situation in China does not
improve, if the practice of practitioners ‗sending forth righteous thoughts‘ to ‗eliminate evil‘
is seen as ineffective, and if the Fa‘s acts of retribution are seen as insufficient. The
question of when the final moment of Fa-rectification will arrive may cause anxiety within
the group and require further developments in Li‘s teachings.
For now, the crisis in China and the group‘s involvement as a social protest movement,
along with the great cosmic battle between good and evil and the longing of practitioners to
