Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 190
increasingly feels the pressures of change and the weakening of its ideology. After officially
banning the FLG on 22 July 1999, a number of official statements issued within the
Communist Party and mentioned in the press described the threat as being ideological. In a
circular from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China it stated that ‗Li
Hongzhi preaches idealism and theism and denies all scientific truth and thus is absolutely
contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism‘. Several days later, the
People‘s Daily said: ‗If Li Hongzhi‘s heretical theories spread, the Party‘s foundation will be
shaken, and the great cause will be undermined‘. And on 29 July 1999 an article in the
China Daily bluntly stated that: ‗It is a political struggle in the ideological sphere about
winning over the broad masses of the people‘.42
Since the self-immolations in Tiananmen Square in January 2001, the government has
increasingly expressed its opposition to the group using the anti-cult theme, but initially,
this expression of ideological threat was substantial. The final straw in the government‘s
decision to ban the group may have been the number of CCP members who followed FLG,
possibly as many as 400,000.43 The threat, as seen by the government, was that Li‘s
‗theology‘ was the exact opposite of the Communist Party ideology and therefore had the
potential not only to undermine it, but to replace it. The leaders and people of China had
already lived through the Cultural Revolution and the ‗personality cult‘ of Mao. They had
seen what faith in an unquestioned leader could do and had experienced the trauma of a
people giving themselves over to the power drive of a charismatic leader. Seen in tandem
with the cultural paradigm, it seemed possible that someone who offered protection,
enlightenment and supernatural powers through the unquestioning acceptance of his
teachings and leadership, might fill the void of the current transitional period with yet
another personality cult.
The Chinese government‘s response in July 1999 was, therefore, the obvious one for it to
take. However, this time the ruler-sectarian paradigm met the twenty-first century and the
global community. What is new is that the group in question moved its center to another
country, opened an internet website which provided instant communication back into China
and around the world and adopted a Western stance on human rights to combat the
suppression and to help formulate its identity.
Whereas the Chinese government sees its response as legitimate and necessary, others see
it as draconian and containing infringements of international legal and human rights norms.
Given that the Chinese government‘s ban on the FLG is arguably legal under Chinese law,44
the manner in which the ban has been implemented raises questions of legality. Because of
the government‘s methods, the group‘s struggle has brought renewed attention to China‘s
system of detention and reeducation labor camps and intensified questions about police
abuse and fairness of trials.
The FLG have made repeated claims of torture in custody, stating that as of May 2001 over
two hundred practitioners have died either during or soon after detention. The government
denies the allegations, stating that those who have died in custody died of natural causes,
complications from hunger strikes, refusal of medical treatment or suicide. A 2001 Amnesty
International report states that: ‗Torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners is
widespread and systematic in China‘ and that this is especially true during ‗high-profile
political campaigns‘. Regarding the FLG accusations against the government it states that:
‗By mid January 2001, at least 120 Falun Gong practitioners…were reported to have died
since the beginning of the crackdown…. All had died in official custody, or shortly after
release, in circumstances that remain unclear and most following reports of torture and ill-
treatment‘. It acknowledges that ‗Amnesty International is not able independently to verify
these reports of torture resulting in death‘, however it goes on to say that the ‗blanket
denial of official wrongdoing will not be convincing‘.45
increasingly feels the pressures of change and the weakening of its ideology. After officially
banning the FLG on 22 July 1999, a number of official statements issued within the
Communist Party and mentioned in the press described the threat as being ideological. In a
circular from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China it stated that ‗Li
Hongzhi preaches idealism and theism and denies all scientific truth and thus is absolutely
contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism‘. Several days later, the
People‘s Daily said: ‗If Li Hongzhi‘s heretical theories spread, the Party‘s foundation will be
shaken, and the great cause will be undermined‘. And on 29 July 1999 an article in the
China Daily bluntly stated that: ‗It is a political struggle in the ideological sphere about
winning over the broad masses of the people‘.42
Since the self-immolations in Tiananmen Square in January 2001, the government has
increasingly expressed its opposition to the group using the anti-cult theme, but initially,
this expression of ideological threat was substantial. The final straw in the government‘s
decision to ban the group may have been the number of CCP members who followed FLG,
possibly as many as 400,000.43 The threat, as seen by the government, was that Li‘s
‗theology‘ was the exact opposite of the Communist Party ideology and therefore had the
potential not only to undermine it, but to replace it. The leaders and people of China had
already lived through the Cultural Revolution and the ‗personality cult‘ of Mao. They had
seen what faith in an unquestioned leader could do and had experienced the trauma of a
people giving themselves over to the power drive of a charismatic leader. Seen in tandem
with the cultural paradigm, it seemed possible that someone who offered protection,
enlightenment and supernatural powers through the unquestioning acceptance of his
teachings and leadership, might fill the void of the current transitional period with yet
another personality cult.
The Chinese government‘s response in July 1999 was, therefore, the obvious one for it to
take. However, this time the ruler-sectarian paradigm met the twenty-first century and the
global community. What is new is that the group in question moved its center to another
country, opened an internet website which provided instant communication back into China
and around the world and adopted a Western stance on human rights to combat the
suppression and to help formulate its identity.
Whereas the Chinese government sees its response as legitimate and necessary, others see
it as draconian and containing infringements of international legal and human rights norms.
Given that the Chinese government‘s ban on the FLG is arguably legal under Chinese law,44
the manner in which the ban has been implemented raises questions of legality. Because of
the government‘s methods, the group‘s struggle has brought renewed attention to China‘s
system of detention and reeducation labor camps and intensified questions about police
abuse and fairness of trials.
The FLG have made repeated claims of torture in custody, stating that as of May 2001 over
two hundred practitioners have died either during or soon after detention. The government
denies the allegations, stating that those who have died in custody died of natural causes,
complications from hunger strikes, refusal of medical treatment or suicide. A 2001 Amnesty
International report states that: ‗Torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners is
widespread and systematic in China‘ and that this is especially true during ‗high-profile
political campaigns‘. Regarding the FLG accusations against the government it states that:
‗By mid January 2001, at least 120 Falun Gong practitioners…were reported to have died
since the beginning of the crackdown…. All had died in official custody, or shortly after
release, in circumstances that remain unclear and most following reports of torture and ill-
treatment‘. It acknowledges that ‗Amnesty International is not able independently to verify
these reports of torture resulting in death‘, however it goes on to say that the ‗blanket
denial of official wrongdoing will not be convincing‘.45
