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increasingly feels the pressures of change and the weakening of its ideology. After officially
banning the FLG on 22 July 1999, a number of official statements issued within the
Communist Party and mentioned in the press described the threat as being ideological. In a
circular from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China it stated that ‗Li
Hongzhi preaches idealism and theism and denies all scientific truth and thus is absolutely
contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism‘. Several days later, the
People‘s Daily said: ‗If Li Hongzhi‘s heretical theories spread, the Party‘s foundation will be
shaken, and the great cause will be undermined‘. And on 29 July 1999 an article in the
China Daily bluntly stated that: ‗It is a political struggle in the ideological sphere about
winning over the broad masses of the people‘.42
Since the self-immolations in Tiananmen Square in January 2001, the government has
increasingly expressed its opposition to the group using the anti-cult theme, but initially,
this expression of ideological threat was substantial. The final straw in the government‘s
decision to ban the group may have been the number of CCP members who followed FLG,
possibly as many as 400,000.43 The threat, as seen by the government, was that Li‘s
‗theology‘ was the exact opposite of the Communist Party ideology and therefore had the
potential not only to undermine it, but to replace it. The leaders and people of China had
already lived through the Cultural Revolution and the ‗personality cult‘ of Mao. They had
seen what faith in an unquestioned leader could do and had experienced the trauma of a
people giving themselves over to the power drive of a charismatic leader. Seen in tandem
with the cultural paradigm, it seemed possible that someone who offered protection,
enlightenment and supernatural powers through the unquestioning acceptance of his
teachings and leadership, might fill the void of the current transitional period with yet
another personality cult.
The Chinese government‘s response in July 1999 was, therefore, the obvious one for it to
take. However, this time the ruler-sectarian paradigm met the twenty-first century and the
global community. What is new is that the group in question moved its center to another
country, opened an internet website which provided instant communication back into China
and around the world and adopted a Western stance on human rights to combat the
suppression and to help formulate its identity.
Whereas the Chinese government sees its response as legitimate and necessary, others see
it as draconian and containing infringements of international legal and human rights norms.
Given that the Chinese government‘s ban on the FLG is arguably legal under Chinese law,44
the manner in which the ban has been implemented raises questions of legality. Because of
the government‘s methods, the group‘s struggle has brought renewed attention to China‘s
system of detention and reeducation labor camps and intensified questions about police
abuse and fairness of trials.
The FLG have made repeated claims of torture in custody, stating that as of May 2001 over
two hundred practitioners have died either during or soon after detention. The government
denies the allegations, stating that those who have died in custody died of natural causes,
complications from hunger strikes, refusal of medical treatment or suicide. A 2001 Amnesty
International report states that: ‗Torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners is
widespread and systematic in China‘ and that this is especially true during ‗high-profile
political campaigns‘. Regarding the FLG accusations against the government it states that:
‗By mid January 2001, at least 120 Falun Gong practitioners…were reported to have died
since the beginning of the crackdown…. All had died in official custody, or shortly after
release, in circumstances that remain unclear and most following reports of torture and ill-
treatment‘. It acknowledges that ‗Amnesty International is not able independently to verify
these reports of torture resulting in death‘, however it goes on to say that the ‗blanket
denial of official wrongdoing will not be convincing‘.45

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In regards to this issue, a recent report published by a department within the Communist
Party‘s Central Committee gives a surprisingly frank description of the present social unrest
in China and its potential for increase,46 as well as a suggested list of countermeasures.
What was not mentioned on the list, and should be added, is vigilance on the part of the
government to prevent incidences of abuse or torture of detainees as they move within
China‘s legal system, and prevention of government policy being used implicitly or explicitly
by local officials as excuses for mistreatment of those detained.
Falun Gong – Self-Definition and Beyond
The FLG defines itself as a movement whose teachings promote good health and moral
living. The teachings are found in the books and FLG website statements of its teacher and
founder, Li Hongzhi. It is a non-political, non-violent movement that is fighting for its right
to practice FLG within China and to have the ban lifted. Because of the ban, the movement‘s
struggle has been identified with the issue of human rights in China: the right to freedom of
belief, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and, more specifically, freedom of religion.
The FLG story is one of a group of people suffering as it tenaciously fights for its rights. It is
the story of a pacifistic movement fighting a despotic regime. This is the public self-
definition presented by the FLG.
Yet this story is also the story of FLG practitioners trying to reach Consummation, of
defending the Fa and eliminating all evil from the universe. To date, there has been very
little discussion or analysis of Li‘s teachings and I will do so in the next section.
The Evolution of FLG Teachings Since the Ban
Communication and Information. After the ban was placed on the FLG in July 1999, Li
Hongzhi went into seclusion for nine months, when he neither appeared in public, gave
interviews, nor spoke to his followers. In May 2000 he broke his silence and made a
statement on the FLG website Minghui (also known as Clearwisdom), a website which
became the official website of FLG and an important tool in the struggle.47 On the one hand,
Li teaches his followers that they must read only his books regarding their inner life, that is,
religion, spirituality, qigong, cultivation, and so on. And on the other hand, in terms of what
is happening in the outer world, they are told to get their information only from the FLG
website. The site was sanctioned by Li as his means of communicating with his followers,
and it was designated as the only source of information that the practitioners could trust or
believe. Everything placed on the website is pre-approved. Because of this, the website has
come to play an important role in communicating ‗correct understanding‘ as well as
providing additional teaching literature in the form of articles written by FLG members.
When a news article is posted to the website it is edited to exclude opinions contrary to the
FLG view, statements by or reference to the Chinese government‘s position and any use of
the word ‗cult‘ or ‗sect‘. Followers are thereby limited in their information to a single source
with a constantly reinforced viewpoint. Practitioners are warned not to read the ‗bad things‘
that the ‗evil people‘ say about the FLG (therefore they are edited out of anything placed on
the FLG website), and they are not supposed to repeat anything they hear from other
sources, for to do so would only strengthen the evil.48 This limited information and strong
dualistic thinking may make it difficult for practitioners to either accept that others may not
agree with them, or to give validity to the alternative view of others.
The FLG management has expressed a similar tendency towards information in dealing with
the Western press. In an April 2001 posting, a practitioner described a FLG press conference
where the Western press was allowed in but the Chinese press forbidden. He described this
act as suffocating the evil and helping to create ‗some positive media‘. He then goes on:
‗We missed a chance to change the hearts of the Western media with our compassion. We
could have told them that China‘s media would interfere with them getting their questions