Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 187
regarding the Falun Gong campaign. For the Chinese historically, the struggle between the
government and sectarian groups has indeed been a long-term and protracted one. Perhaps
the main question to be raised is whether or not this paradigm remains viable. This question
will be addressed later. But first I will explain the contemporary qigong boom in China from
which the Falun Gong movement arose, and how it relates to the ruler-sectarian paradigm.
The Qigong Boom
Li Hongzhi‘s Falun Gong movement developed during a period in China known as the
‗Qigong Boom‘. Following the Cultural Revolution when China began reforms in the late
1970s, there was an opening up to religion which included not only the main religious
practices but also folk religion practices ‗packed away‘ during the Mao era. Hand in hand
with this revival of religious beliefs came the long-established conflict in China between
superstition and orthodoxy, or in the case of the CCP, superstition and science. In modern
China, to be scientific means to be legitimate, to be superstitious is to be feudal and in need
of education or eradication. Part of this cultural revival included the practice of qigong and it
was prime material to be caught up in this conflict of science and superstition.
While the revival of qigong was seen by some as ‗a forerunner of the scientific revolution of
the twenty-first century‘,24 it was seen by others as a marriage of qigong practice to strange
and marvelous tales of the paranormal found in traditional Chinese stories. The qigong
revival thus balanced precariously between the traditional gap between science and
superstition. On the one hand, there was the claim that the theory of qi was a distinctly
Chinese science, and the qigong boom since the 1980s has made explicit and enthusiastic
linkage between qigong and a scientific basis.25 On the other hand, there were claims,
beginning in the late 1970s, of paranormal and miraculous abilities connected to qigong
beginning with the well-publicized feat of a young boy said to be able to read with his ear.26
Lines were drawn between those who wanted to use scientific claims to legitimize
paranormal skills and those who wanted to use scientific claims to debunk superstition,
while both sides wanted to use science to investigate and legitimize the Chinese theory of
qi. ‗Science‘ now sat on both sides of the divide: orthodoxy and heterodoxy, science and
superstition. Which category a group fell into as a qigong teaching meant the difference
between registration and legitimacy or elimination. Important in this regard was the amount
of support your group had from those in high places and the accompanying official
sponsorship, one reason the Falun Gong and other qigong groups cultivated friendships,
clientele and members from within the CCP.
The qigong boom in China was massive. It began in the late 1970s and by 1986 there were
over 2,000 qigong organizations. To regulate these groups, the government established the
Chinese Qigong Scientific Research Organization. The year 1986 was a pivotal year because
it saw the emergence of a new type of qigong master and qigong movement. Up until the
mid-1980s qigong was taught by ‗orthodox Qigong masters, generally of a fairly
conservative tendency‘.27 In 1986 a new kind of teacher emerged who offered not only good
health but fast results, and their movements could number thousands. The most famous of
these new qigong masters was Yan Xin who, at the height of his teachings was referred to
as ‗the spiritual hope for the Chinese masses who feel they have lost their way‘. His
meetings drew up to as many as 30,000 at a time.28 Qigong had moved beyond the role of
health-care and now encompassed a mixture of benefits: it offered a form of spiritual
practice, a form of moral guidance, a form of social organization which sometimes included
civic-type activities,29 and it offered a sense of goodness and pride to people living in a time
of great insecurity and change. Some have suggested it even acted as a nationalistic
counterweight to anger at the Japanese and the West:
The shame our nation has experienced over the last hundred years, and in particular
the sense of helpless humiliation in the last ten years when we opened ourselves to
regarding the Falun Gong campaign. For the Chinese historically, the struggle between the
government and sectarian groups has indeed been a long-term and protracted one. Perhaps
the main question to be raised is whether or not this paradigm remains viable. This question
will be addressed later. But first I will explain the contemporary qigong boom in China from
which the Falun Gong movement arose, and how it relates to the ruler-sectarian paradigm.
The Qigong Boom
Li Hongzhi‘s Falun Gong movement developed during a period in China known as the
‗Qigong Boom‘. Following the Cultural Revolution when China began reforms in the late
1970s, there was an opening up to religion which included not only the main religious
practices but also folk religion practices ‗packed away‘ during the Mao era. Hand in hand
with this revival of religious beliefs came the long-established conflict in China between
superstition and orthodoxy, or in the case of the CCP, superstition and science. In modern
China, to be scientific means to be legitimate, to be superstitious is to be feudal and in need
of education or eradication. Part of this cultural revival included the practice of qigong and it
was prime material to be caught up in this conflict of science and superstition.
While the revival of qigong was seen by some as ‗a forerunner of the scientific revolution of
the twenty-first century‘,24 it was seen by others as a marriage of qigong practice to strange
and marvelous tales of the paranormal found in traditional Chinese stories. The qigong
revival thus balanced precariously between the traditional gap between science and
superstition. On the one hand, there was the claim that the theory of qi was a distinctly
Chinese science, and the qigong boom since the 1980s has made explicit and enthusiastic
linkage between qigong and a scientific basis.25 On the other hand, there were claims,
beginning in the late 1970s, of paranormal and miraculous abilities connected to qigong
beginning with the well-publicized feat of a young boy said to be able to read with his ear.26
Lines were drawn between those who wanted to use scientific claims to legitimize
paranormal skills and those who wanted to use scientific claims to debunk superstition,
while both sides wanted to use science to investigate and legitimize the Chinese theory of
qi. ‗Science‘ now sat on both sides of the divide: orthodoxy and heterodoxy, science and
superstition. Which category a group fell into as a qigong teaching meant the difference
between registration and legitimacy or elimination. Important in this regard was the amount
of support your group had from those in high places and the accompanying official
sponsorship, one reason the Falun Gong and other qigong groups cultivated friendships,
clientele and members from within the CCP.
The qigong boom in China was massive. It began in the late 1970s and by 1986 there were
over 2,000 qigong organizations. To regulate these groups, the government established the
Chinese Qigong Scientific Research Organization. The year 1986 was a pivotal year because
it saw the emergence of a new type of qigong master and qigong movement. Up until the
mid-1980s qigong was taught by ‗orthodox Qigong masters, generally of a fairly
conservative tendency‘.27 In 1986 a new kind of teacher emerged who offered not only good
health but fast results, and their movements could number thousands. The most famous of
these new qigong masters was Yan Xin who, at the height of his teachings was referred to
as ‗the spiritual hope for the Chinese masses who feel they have lost their way‘. His
meetings drew up to as many as 30,000 at a time.28 Qigong had moved beyond the role of
health-care and now encompassed a mixture of benefits: it offered a form of spiritual
practice, a form of moral guidance, a form of social organization which sometimes included
civic-type activities,29 and it offered a sense of goodness and pride to people living in a time
of great insecurity and change. Some have suggested it even acted as a nationalistic
counterweight to anger at the Japanese and the West:
The shame our nation has experienced over the last hundred years, and in particular
the sense of helpless humiliation in the last ten years when we opened ourselves to
