Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 186
and founded the Ming dynasty with himself as the first emperor. During the Ming (1368–
1644) alone, there were 41 sectarian disturbances16 and in the final dynasty, the Qing
(1644–1911), there was the famous Taiping rebellion and the Boxers movement.
In the modern era, the case of the Yi Guan Dao is an illustrative example. The imperial Qing
government, the Nationalist Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, all campaigned
against it. When the CCP first came to power, it initiated a campaign against the
‗counterrevolutionary forces of superstition‘ with particular focus on the Yi Guan Dao. It
enacted an intense mass campaign against the group for ten years before it finally claimed
success. And when the Yi Guan Dao fled to Taiwan in 1949 it had to go underground to
survive and was only finally recognized by the Taiwan government in 1987.17 Even so, the Yi
Guan Dao continues to exist today in Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries and as
recently as the 1980s was listed once again as one of the active sects in China.18
The long-term campaign against the Yi Guan Dao may be the most recent modern-day
forerunner and possible model for the Falun Gong campaign.19 Ironically, Li Hongzhi has
called the Yi Guan Dao an ‗evil religion‘ predestined by history to be eradicated, perhaps
evidence of the success of the government‘s intense propaganda campaign against the Yi
Guan Dao,20 a campaign the likes of which Li would experience himself decades later. News
reports generally describe the Falun Gong as a qigong movement, and while it is true that Li
developed it during the 1980s qigong boom in China and began his teaching of it as a
qigong healing movement, I believe the development of the Falun Gong most closely
resembles a sectarian group including its role as contender to the Chinese state.
The Communist Party and the Paradigm. Many charges made against the Falun Gong by the
Chinese government are found in campaigns against earlier groups such as the Yi Guan
Dao. The following partial list from a 1985 report by the PRC Ministry of Public Security No.1
Bureau, titled ‗Main Activities of Sects and Societies in Recent Years‘,21 describes the
offending features of groups that moved them from acceptable to unacceptable in the eyes
of the CCP. These characteristics include: recruiting from within the ranks of the CCP,
organizing across provinces and counties, membership that proselytizes, making criticism of
the CCP, claims by the leader to be a god or emperor, spreading superstition and
heterodoxy and receiving support from ‗forces overseas‘. These were elements considered
common to potentially subversive groups, and, according to the Chinese government, the
Falun Gong met all the criteria.
The character of the government‘s response is connected, as Kluver points out, to whether
the conflict is seen as legitimate and ‗in-house‘ that is, a ‗contradiction from among the
people‘ in which case it may be dealt with gently, or whether the conflict is viewed as a
‗contradiction between the people and their enemies‘, in which case the group ‗must be
addressed ruthlessly and radically‘.22
Within this paradigm, ruthless and radical responses are seen as appropriate, necessary and
acceptable. The CCP sees the conflict with the FLG as one ‗between the people and their
enemies‘ for several reasons: 1) the government believes Li‘s teachings endanger people,
mainly due to the teachings regarding medicine 2) the government believes Li‘s teachings
were gaining enough adherents across China and specifically within the CCP to be a
potential rival ideologically 3) because Li moved to the US and has, according to the
government‘s view, linked up with those in the West who wish to see the fall of the CCP.
The conflict between the government and the FLG is, therefore, seen as being between ‗the
people and their enemies‘ and according to the crisis management style of the CCP, it is
appropriate, acceptable and necessary to utilize ruthless and radical responses.
At the end of this 1985 report by the PRC Ministry of Public Security, the concluding
comment states that ‗our struggle against the reactionary sects and societies is going to be
a long-term and protracted one‘,23 a comment echoed almost word for word decades later
and founded the Ming dynasty with himself as the first emperor. During the Ming (1368–
1644) alone, there were 41 sectarian disturbances16 and in the final dynasty, the Qing
(1644–1911), there was the famous Taiping rebellion and the Boxers movement.
In the modern era, the case of the Yi Guan Dao is an illustrative example. The imperial Qing
government, the Nationalist Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, all campaigned
against it. When the CCP first came to power, it initiated a campaign against the
‗counterrevolutionary forces of superstition‘ with particular focus on the Yi Guan Dao. It
enacted an intense mass campaign against the group for ten years before it finally claimed
success. And when the Yi Guan Dao fled to Taiwan in 1949 it had to go underground to
survive and was only finally recognized by the Taiwan government in 1987.17 Even so, the Yi
Guan Dao continues to exist today in Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries and as
recently as the 1980s was listed once again as one of the active sects in China.18
The long-term campaign against the Yi Guan Dao may be the most recent modern-day
forerunner and possible model for the Falun Gong campaign.19 Ironically, Li Hongzhi has
called the Yi Guan Dao an ‗evil religion‘ predestined by history to be eradicated, perhaps
evidence of the success of the government‘s intense propaganda campaign against the Yi
Guan Dao,20 a campaign the likes of which Li would experience himself decades later. News
reports generally describe the Falun Gong as a qigong movement, and while it is true that Li
developed it during the 1980s qigong boom in China and began his teaching of it as a
qigong healing movement, I believe the development of the Falun Gong most closely
resembles a sectarian group including its role as contender to the Chinese state.
The Communist Party and the Paradigm. Many charges made against the Falun Gong by the
Chinese government are found in campaigns against earlier groups such as the Yi Guan
Dao. The following partial list from a 1985 report by the PRC Ministry of Public Security No.1
Bureau, titled ‗Main Activities of Sects and Societies in Recent Years‘,21 describes the
offending features of groups that moved them from acceptable to unacceptable in the eyes
of the CCP. These characteristics include: recruiting from within the ranks of the CCP,
organizing across provinces and counties, membership that proselytizes, making criticism of
the CCP, claims by the leader to be a god or emperor, spreading superstition and
heterodoxy and receiving support from ‗forces overseas‘. These were elements considered
common to potentially subversive groups, and, according to the Chinese government, the
Falun Gong met all the criteria.
The character of the government‘s response is connected, as Kluver points out, to whether
the conflict is seen as legitimate and ‗in-house‘ that is, a ‗contradiction from among the
people‘ in which case it may be dealt with gently, or whether the conflict is viewed as a
‗contradiction between the people and their enemies‘, in which case the group ‗must be
addressed ruthlessly and radically‘.22
Within this paradigm, ruthless and radical responses are seen as appropriate, necessary and
acceptable. The CCP sees the conflict with the FLG as one ‗between the people and their
enemies‘ for several reasons: 1) the government believes Li‘s teachings endanger people,
mainly due to the teachings regarding medicine 2) the government believes Li‘s teachings
were gaining enough adherents across China and specifically within the CCP to be a
potential rival ideologically 3) because Li moved to the US and has, according to the
government‘s view, linked up with those in the West who wish to see the fall of the CCP.
The conflict between the government and the FLG is, therefore, seen as being between ‗the
people and their enemies‘ and according to the crisis management style of the CCP, it is
appropriate, acceptable and necessary to utilize ruthless and radical responses.
At the end of this 1985 report by the PRC Ministry of Public Security, the concluding
comment states that ‗our struggle against the reactionary sects and societies is going to be
a long-term and protracted one‘,23 a comment echoed almost word for word decades later
