Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 166
influence and membership have spread abroad. In 1999, after ten thousand
Falun Gong members participated in a silent vigil outside the Beijing
compound where China‘s top leaders live and work, the group was
condemned as a ―heretical cult organization‖ (the term was also used in
Confucian times for ideologically heterodox sects and superstitions) and an
―evil cult.‖ Thousands of adherents were imprisoned and some three hundred
were reportedly confined in mental hospitals.20
Although huge antigovernment antiwar demonstrations are tolerated in the United States,
an entrenched, defensive ruling party of a quasi-totalitarian autocracy is likely to react
differently. The giant 1999 rally, transpiring outside of residential party compounds (whose
locations were generally secret) was obviously interpreted as representing a dangerous
threat to the regime. What had been previously accepted and praised was suddenly
extremely stigmatized. From 1982 to 1999 traditional qigong practices had been widely
promoted and endorsed in China by reputable scholars. Although originally promoted as
secular health practices, a religious awakening in China may have led to an increasing
religious significance being conferred on the practices. In late 1999, however, the regime‘s
original proscription of Falun Gong was ―extended to all qigong groups regardless of their
beliefs or leadership,‖21 although enforcement of prohibitions of exercises not performed
under the specific auspices of Falun Gong has been regionally variable.
The Chinese authorities clearly reacted to the mass mobilization of Falun Gong as a threat
to their regime, particularly in a global context in which most other Communist regimes
were in trouble and shortly disappeared. The demonstrative, defiant behavior of Falun Gong
since its proscription has no doubt reinforced the authoritarian regime‘s perception of a
subversive conspiracy. ―The brutal suppression of Falun Gong continued through 2002 ....
yet despite thousands of arrests, quick trials followed by harsh prison sentences, and the
involuntary commitment of large numbers of defiant practitioners to mental hospitals, the
movement managed to stage numerous spectacular protests which included numerous
hijackings of government TV cable signals and even the disruption of nation-wide satellite
television broadcasts.‖22
The authoritarian regime has largely responded to the growth of Falun Gong as a subversive
political threat. To legitimate its severe persecution it has depicted Falun Gong as a wild and
pathological threat to society in general and to individuals. However, it wasn‘t until a huge
demonstration and mobilization appeared to threaten an insecure authoritarian regime that
severe persecution with thousands of arrests and hundreds of involuntary commitments
ensued. Falun Gong became absolutely insupportable because, in the context of an insecure
autocratic regime, its demonstrative tactics, its impressive mass mobilization, and it
perceived infiltration of middling and even higher party ranks appeared to pose a definite
political threat, although this might not have been the case in the context of a more secure
democratic regime.
To justify an image of Falun Gong congruent with that purveyed by the Chinese regime,
Rosedale cites some tragedies including the twelve-year-old girl‘s suicide. Rosedale‘s
reference to ―suicidal conformity‖ in Falun Gong (and his comparison to Heaven‘s Gate) is
unwarranted as only a tiny minority of Falun Gong members has committed suicide and no
evidence is presented by Rosedale of either systematic suicide training or ―mass suicide‖ in
Falun Gong. Bracketing the difficulties with accepting automatically at face value ―facts‖
purveyed by a manipulative, authoritarian regime, this may indeed indicate some degree of
apocalyptic frenzy among Chinese Falun Gong members. (We shall note later a warning on
this score by an important researcher on NRMs who has studied Canadian practitioners, and
who, while continuing to denounce persecution, is concerned about increasing
apocalypticism and politicization). It should be noted, however, that the alarming stories
influence and membership have spread abroad. In 1999, after ten thousand
Falun Gong members participated in a silent vigil outside the Beijing
compound where China‘s top leaders live and work, the group was
condemned as a ―heretical cult organization‖ (the term was also used in
Confucian times for ideologically heterodox sects and superstitions) and an
―evil cult.‖ Thousands of adherents were imprisoned and some three hundred
were reportedly confined in mental hospitals.20
Although huge antigovernment antiwar demonstrations are tolerated in the United States,
an entrenched, defensive ruling party of a quasi-totalitarian autocracy is likely to react
differently. The giant 1999 rally, transpiring outside of residential party compounds (whose
locations were generally secret) was obviously interpreted as representing a dangerous
threat to the regime. What had been previously accepted and praised was suddenly
extremely stigmatized. From 1982 to 1999 traditional qigong practices had been widely
promoted and endorsed in China by reputable scholars. Although originally promoted as
secular health practices, a religious awakening in China may have led to an increasing
religious significance being conferred on the practices. In late 1999, however, the regime‘s
original proscription of Falun Gong was ―extended to all qigong groups regardless of their
beliefs or leadership,‖21 although enforcement of prohibitions of exercises not performed
under the specific auspices of Falun Gong has been regionally variable.
The Chinese authorities clearly reacted to the mass mobilization of Falun Gong as a threat
to their regime, particularly in a global context in which most other Communist regimes
were in trouble and shortly disappeared. The demonstrative, defiant behavior of Falun Gong
since its proscription has no doubt reinforced the authoritarian regime‘s perception of a
subversive conspiracy. ―The brutal suppression of Falun Gong continued through 2002 ....
yet despite thousands of arrests, quick trials followed by harsh prison sentences, and the
involuntary commitment of large numbers of defiant practitioners to mental hospitals, the
movement managed to stage numerous spectacular protests which included numerous
hijackings of government TV cable signals and even the disruption of nation-wide satellite
television broadcasts.‖22
The authoritarian regime has largely responded to the growth of Falun Gong as a subversive
political threat. To legitimate its severe persecution it has depicted Falun Gong as a wild and
pathological threat to society in general and to individuals. However, it wasn‘t until a huge
demonstration and mobilization appeared to threaten an insecure authoritarian regime that
severe persecution with thousands of arrests and hundreds of involuntary commitments
ensued. Falun Gong became absolutely insupportable because, in the context of an insecure
autocratic regime, its demonstrative tactics, its impressive mass mobilization, and it
perceived infiltration of middling and even higher party ranks appeared to pose a definite
political threat, although this might not have been the case in the context of a more secure
democratic regime.
To justify an image of Falun Gong congruent with that purveyed by the Chinese regime,
Rosedale cites some tragedies including the twelve-year-old girl‘s suicide. Rosedale‘s
reference to ―suicidal conformity‖ in Falun Gong (and his comparison to Heaven‘s Gate) is
unwarranted as only a tiny minority of Falun Gong members has committed suicide and no
evidence is presented by Rosedale of either systematic suicide training or ―mass suicide‖ in
Falun Gong. Bracketing the difficulties with accepting automatically at face value ―facts‖
purveyed by a manipulative, authoritarian regime, this may indeed indicate some degree of
apocalyptic frenzy among Chinese Falun Gong members. (We shall note later a warning on
this score by an important researcher on NRMs who has studied Canadian practitioners, and
who, while continuing to denounce persecution, is concerned about increasing
apocalypticism and politicization). It should be noted, however, that the alarming stories
