Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 44
Inner Experience and Conversion
Michael D. Langone, Ph.D.
Executive Director, AFF
Editor, Cultic Studies Review
Abstract
Cognitive therapy is similar to religious conversion in that both are associated
with changes in a person‘s fundamental assumptions about the world, self,
and others. These fundamental assumptions derive in large part from
experience, rather than rational deliberation. In some conversions, powerful
inner experiences, whether manipulated (―outer generated‖) or not (―inner
generated‖), may cause a person to adopt new fundamental assumptions.
Sometimes, a new set of experiences can cause a convert to reject the new
assumptions and leave the group. The resulting disillusionment may cause
serious adjustment problems. The impact and implications of inner
experiences should be considered when trying to help former group members.
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines conversion as ―the action of
converting or fact of being converted to some opinion, belief, party, etc.‖ (p. 546). This
definition makes a useful distinction between ―converting‖ and ―being converted,‖ what I
have sometimes referred to as ―inner-generated‖ and ―outer-generated‖ conversions.
We typically associate conversions to cultic groups as ―outer-generated‖ that is, as being in
large part the product of manipulation and deception. But not all conversions are
manipulated, not even all cultic conversions. As Zablocki has pointed out, what many of us
would call cultic environments are characterized more by the difficulty people have getting
out than by the diverse ways through which they get in (Zablocki, 2001). Hence, conversion
to cultic groups cannot always be explained by theories of manipulation. We need other
models that take into account, but are not limited by, factors of manipulation.
In this brief paper, I will propose another way to look at conversion. What I will discuss
does not rise to the level of being a ―theory.‖ I hope, however, that it points the way toward
a more useful theory than those we currently have.
By definition, all conversions—manipulated and non-manipulated—presume that one‘s way
of viewing and relating to the world has changed in some fundamental way. (I don‘t use the
term ―conversion‖ here to refer to changes of religion that are made, for example, to
maintain marital harmony. I use the term only to refer to genuine and significant changes in
worldview.)
What accounts for such dramatic change? Nobody really knows. There are many theories of
conversion. Indeed, the disciplines that study conversion—psychology, theology, religious
studies, anthropology, and sociology—embrace many competing theories.
I prefer and will discuss here a cognitive psychological approach, which assumes that
human beings tend toward logical consistency in their beliefs and behaviors. I say, ―tend
toward‖ because only a fool would deny that we human beings aren‘t nearly so logical as we
think we are. Indeed, one of the more widely respected psychological theories—i.e., the
theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957)—addresses the ways in which people
resolve inconsistencies between and among their beliefs and behaviors. Nevertheless, that
we are bothered by logical inconsistencies testifies to our tendency to seek logical
consistency.
Inner Experience and Conversion
Michael D. Langone, Ph.D.
Executive Director, AFF
Editor, Cultic Studies Review
Abstract
Cognitive therapy is similar to religious conversion in that both are associated
with changes in a person‘s fundamental assumptions about the world, self,
and others. These fundamental assumptions derive in large part from
experience, rather than rational deliberation. In some conversions, powerful
inner experiences, whether manipulated (―outer generated‖) or not (―inner
generated‖), may cause a person to adopt new fundamental assumptions.
Sometimes, a new set of experiences can cause a convert to reject the new
assumptions and leave the group. The resulting disillusionment may cause
serious adjustment problems. The impact and implications of inner
experiences should be considered when trying to help former group members.
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines conversion as ―the action of
converting or fact of being converted to some opinion, belief, party, etc.‖ (p. 546). This
definition makes a useful distinction between ―converting‖ and ―being converted,‖ what I
have sometimes referred to as ―inner-generated‖ and ―outer-generated‖ conversions.
We typically associate conversions to cultic groups as ―outer-generated‖ that is, as being in
large part the product of manipulation and deception. But not all conversions are
manipulated, not even all cultic conversions. As Zablocki has pointed out, what many of us
would call cultic environments are characterized more by the difficulty people have getting
out than by the diverse ways through which they get in (Zablocki, 2001). Hence, conversion
to cultic groups cannot always be explained by theories of manipulation. We need other
models that take into account, but are not limited by, factors of manipulation.
In this brief paper, I will propose another way to look at conversion. What I will discuss
does not rise to the level of being a ―theory.‖ I hope, however, that it points the way toward
a more useful theory than those we currently have.
By definition, all conversions—manipulated and non-manipulated—presume that one‘s way
of viewing and relating to the world has changed in some fundamental way. (I don‘t use the
term ―conversion‖ here to refer to changes of religion that are made, for example, to
maintain marital harmony. I use the term only to refer to genuine and significant changes in
worldview.)
What accounts for such dramatic change? Nobody really knows. There are many theories of
conversion. Indeed, the disciplines that study conversion—psychology, theology, religious
studies, anthropology, and sociology—embrace many competing theories.
I prefer and will discuss here a cognitive psychological approach, which assumes that
human beings tend toward logical consistency in their beliefs and behaviors. I say, ―tend
toward‖ because only a fool would deny that we human beings aren‘t nearly so logical as we
think we are. Indeed, one of the more widely respected psychological theories—i.e., the
theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957)—addresses the ways in which people
resolve inconsistencies between and among their beliefs and behaviors. Nevertheless, that
we are bothered by logical inconsistencies testifies to our tendency to seek logical
consistency.
