Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 65
a small footprint and carefully select a few members based upon their likely reliability and
commitment to the group‘s goals.
Cults might wish to alter society and might, like the Aum cult, even occasionally use terror
to achieve these goals. Cults, however, are primarily focused upon self-preservation and
the amassing of members. They will recruit anyone, so long as they can eventually
manipulate those recruits into unquestioning allegiance. Thus, Aum might be defined as a
cult that used terror, while Peru‘s Shining Path would be considered a terrorist group with a
cult-like leader. Most terrorist groups do not have a cult-like leader because that structure
makes them vulnerable to quick destruction. Abimael Guzman‘s cult of personality, for
example, was so great that the movement collapsed once he was removed from the scene
(Callihan, 1998).
Nonterrorist political groups can also develop into full-fledged cults. Tourish and Wohlforth
(2000, 8-9) noted that political cults tend to have rigid belief systems, and an ideology
immune from falsification. Political cults also have an authoritarian inner elite who exempt
themselves from many of the cult‘s rules and who exploit junior members for personal gain,
and a living or dead figure who is the font of unquestioned wisdom. One quickly notes that
many of these attributes may be found among strict adherents religious cults. There is, in
this sense, little distinction between political and religious cults. Common to both political
and religious cults is a focus on Apocalyptic fantasies (Tourish &Wohlforth, 2000, 212-213).
Such extreme views can convince believers that they must take extreme action to save
humanity from impending doom, or to hasten the coming glory.
Cultural Factors That Helped Form Al Qaeda
Although Tourish and Wohlforth note that Western political cults tend to spring forth among
the political fringe, Al Qaeda built upon some powerful themes within the Islamic world and
reflects less a major diversion from traditional Islamic views than an extreme version of
traditional Islamic thought. Those who hold these extreme traditional views are frequently
referred to as Islamists, of which al Qaeda is just a violent faction. The International Policy
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (http://www.ict.org.il/) states that al Qaeda is a network of
many different fundamentalist organizations in diverse countries. This network coordinates
terrorist operations to achieve a political goal, which is primarily the overthrow of ―heretic
governments‖ in their respective countries and the establishment of Islamic governments
based on the rule of Sharia (also spelled Shariah), the Islamic legal and social code.
The Muslim community extends from the west coast of Africa to the Philippines, an area
composed of diverse cultures and communities and few commonalties. One major
commonality is the experience of colonialism, which resulted in the artificial assembly of
various tribes and subcultures into national sovereign states (Hutchinson &Smith, 1994, 8).
Whereas the idea of nation is perceived as universal to the West, in the Islamic region the
national boundaries were not decided locally and are not necessarily reflective of the local
cultural boundaries (Robinson, 1994, 214-217).
Consequently, many in the local population within these national bodies often did not have a
sense of national identity or pride. Within the Arab world there were attempts to create an
Arab national identity, but these efforts floundered for a variety of reasons (Kerr, 1982).
This lack of common identity has left the local populations alienated from their national
governments and disgusted with what they perceive to be rampant, selfish corruption on
the part of the ruling elite.
Meanwhile, the secular vision of Arab nationalists and other Islamic leaders failed to
produce sufficient pride, employment, or avenues of dissent. The Arab world‘s secular
governments were discredited in the eyes of many with their utter defeat by Israel in 1967
in just six days (Hiro, 1989, 68). Islamists within these countries offered what they believed
a small footprint and carefully select a few members based upon their likely reliability and
commitment to the group‘s goals.
Cults might wish to alter society and might, like the Aum cult, even occasionally use terror
to achieve these goals. Cults, however, are primarily focused upon self-preservation and
the amassing of members. They will recruit anyone, so long as they can eventually
manipulate those recruits into unquestioning allegiance. Thus, Aum might be defined as a
cult that used terror, while Peru‘s Shining Path would be considered a terrorist group with a
cult-like leader. Most terrorist groups do not have a cult-like leader because that structure
makes them vulnerable to quick destruction. Abimael Guzman‘s cult of personality, for
example, was so great that the movement collapsed once he was removed from the scene
(Callihan, 1998).
Nonterrorist political groups can also develop into full-fledged cults. Tourish and Wohlforth
(2000, 8-9) noted that political cults tend to have rigid belief systems, and an ideology
immune from falsification. Political cults also have an authoritarian inner elite who exempt
themselves from many of the cult‘s rules and who exploit junior members for personal gain,
and a living or dead figure who is the font of unquestioned wisdom. One quickly notes that
many of these attributes may be found among strict adherents religious cults. There is, in
this sense, little distinction between political and religious cults. Common to both political
and religious cults is a focus on Apocalyptic fantasies (Tourish &Wohlforth, 2000, 212-213).
Such extreme views can convince believers that they must take extreme action to save
humanity from impending doom, or to hasten the coming glory.
Cultural Factors That Helped Form Al Qaeda
Although Tourish and Wohlforth note that Western political cults tend to spring forth among
the political fringe, Al Qaeda built upon some powerful themes within the Islamic world and
reflects less a major diversion from traditional Islamic views than an extreme version of
traditional Islamic thought. Those who hold these extreme traditional views are frequently
referred to as Islamists, of which al Qaeda is just a violent faction. The International Policy
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (http://www.ict.org.il/) states that al Qaeda is a network of
many different fundamentalist organizations in diverse countries. This network coordinates
terrorist operations to achieve a political goal, which is primarily the overthrow of ―heretic
governments‖ in their respective countries and the establishment of Islamic governments
based on the rule of Sharia (also spelled Shariah), the Islamic legal and social code.
The Muslim community extends from the west coast of Africa to the Philippines, an area
composed of diverse cultures and communities and few commonalties. One major
commonality is the experience of colonialism, which resulted in the artificial assembly of
various tribes and subcultures into national sovereign states (Hutchinson &Smith, 1994, 8).
Whereas the idea of nation is perceived as universal to the West, in the Islamic region the
national boundaries were not decided locally and are not necessarily reflective of the local
cultural boundaries (Robinson, 1994, 214-217).
Consequently, many in the local population within these national bodies often did not have a
sense of national identity or pride. Within the Arab world there were attempts to create an
Arab national identity, but these efforts floundered for a variety of reasons (Kerr, 1982).
This lack of common identity has left the local populations alienated from their national
governments and disgusted with what they perceive to be rampant, selfish corruption on
the part of the ruling elite.
Meanwhile, the secular vision of Arab nationalists and other Islamic leaders failed to
produce sufficient pride, employment, or avenues of dissent. The Arab world‘s secular
governments were discredited in the eyes of many with their utter defeat by Israel in 1967
in just six days (Hiro, 1989, 68). Islamists within these countries offered what they believed
