Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 179
seeking) rather than, as Robbins does, simply identify charged malefactors as not worthy of
belief or capable of dialogue. It is a powerful and ultimate difference between Robbins and
Rosedale that Robbins would simply turn his back upon and become deaf to dialogue with
those who will play a decisive role in the future and instead rely upon vilification and
unquestioning acceptance of claims of victimization by cult members, rather than deal with
the evolving struggle between individual rights and social obligations in a dynamic,
emerging society.
I believe that there is significant virtue in communication and that it is necessary to
continue the development of a more balanced database that deals not only with Falun Gong
in Chinese society but with information relating to the development of appropriate tools to
help a society confronting zealots and terrorists of all persuasions. Understanding the role
of social restraints requiring obedience to law and respect for rights of others raises
questions as to the scope of ―freedom‖ accorded zealots pursuing their idealistic ends.
Many groups have chosen to endorse law breaking to achieve publicity to further their ends.
Civil disobedience, however, should not be unqualifiedly justified as a legitimate response to
persecution any more than terrorist activity should always be classified as martyrdom.12
While Rosedale spoke of the change in the view towards zealous activities after September
11th, Robbins has not responded to the widespread recognition that religious behavior is no
longer (if it ever was) universally deemed benevolent and reflecting ideals to be encouraged
in practice. Rather, we are currently confronting leaders who justify use of weapons of
mass destruction to further their ends, mute concerns about denial of human rights to
women, and reject notions of respect and tolerance to those whose beliefs differ from
theirs. To exculpate destructive behavior by depicting it simply as a result of persecution is
to minimize its impact on society, to ignore the need for responsibility for harm, and
unacceptably to denigrate the rights of victims. I do not believe Robbins endorses the law
breaking behavior of terrorist groups on the ground that they have been driven to it by
being persecuted.13 An analogous rationale was advanced to support the doctrine of
necessity to justify forcible deprogramming a generation ago. This rationale was rejected
by Robbins, Rosedale, and others associated with AFF (and nearly all who countenanced it
25 years ago no longer do).
Finally, it seems that Robbins is unable to refrain from going back to stereotypic ideology by
his insertion of a ―coda‖ in his commentary seeking to critique Rosedale‘s distinctions
between the legal consequences of beliefs and practice in the area of religious freedom.
Unfortunately, Robbins ignores Rosedale‘s detailed analysis of this issue and its legal
aspects presented at the American Psychological Association convention years ago.14
Of course, beliefs matter, but their impact in dealing with issues relating to social regulation
depends upon the actions taken based upon the beliefs, just as the analysis of ―intent‖
relates to the legal consequences of actions. Insofar as beliefs are internalized and affect
only oneself, they are entitled to a broad degree of toleration, but when they precipitate
action affecting others, who may not share these beliefs, they are subject to regulation in a
society in which non believers have equal rights to believers.
Characterization and impact of belief in evaluating action and determining the appropriate
scope of state regulation of belief was recently highlighted in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court upholding the prohibition of cross burning. It was held that the
action could only be understood in the light of the motivation and background of the
behavior. Use of motive and intent in evaluating conduct is pervasive in the law and it may
enhance or exculpate the actor and legitimatize or stigmatize the conduct. To follow this
analysis does not try ―heresy,‖ if claimed motivation and intent has religious connotations.
Many racial bigots claim religious foundation for their conduct in their beliefs. Of course,
―beliefs matter‖ and they are taken into account not based upon whether the person having
those beliefs is a good or bad person, but rather through social evaluation of the conduct
seeking) rather than, as Robbins does, simply identify charged malefactors as not worthy of
belief or capable of dialogue. It is a powerful and ultimate difference between Robbins and
Rosedale that Robbins would simply turn his back upon and become deaf to dialogue with
those who will play a decisive role in the future and instead rely upon vilification and
unquestioning acceptance of claims of victimization by cult members, rather than deal with
the evolving struggle between individual rights and social obligations in a dynamic,
emerging society.
I believe that there is significant virtue in communication and that it is necessary to
continue the development of a more balanced database that deals not only with Falun Gong
in Chinese society but with information relating to the development of appropriate tools to
help a society confronting zealots and terrorists of all persuasions. Understanding the role
of social restraints requiring obedience to law and respect for rights of others raises
questions as to the scope of ―freedom‖ accorded zealots pursuing their idealistic ends.
Many groups have chosen to endorse law breaking to achieve publicity to further their ends.
Civil disobedience, however, should not be unqualifiedly justified as a legitimate response to
persecution any more than terrorist activity should always be classified as martyrdom.12
While Rosedale spoke of the change in the view towards zealous activities after September
11th, Robbins has not responded to the widespread recognition that religious behavior is no
longer (if it ever was) universally deemed benevolent and reflecting ideals to be encouraged
in practice. Rather, we are currently confronting leaders who justify use of weapons of
mass destruction to further their ends, mute concerns about denial of human rights to
women, and reject notions of respect and tolerance to those whose beliefs differ from
theirs. To exculpate destructive behavior by depicting it simply as a result of persecution is
to minimize its impact on society, to ignore the need for responsibility for harm, and
unacceptably to denigrate the rights of victims. I do not believe Robbins endorses the law
breaking behavior of terrorist groups on the ground that they have been driven to it by
being persecuted.13 An analogous rationale was advanced to support the doctrine of
necessity to justify forcible deprogramming a generation ago. This rationale was rejected
by Robbins, Rosedale, and others associated with AFF (and nearly all who countenanced it
25 years ago no longer do).
Finally, it seems that Robbins is unable to refrain from going back to stereotypic ideology by
his insertion of a ―coda‖ in his commentary seeking to critique Rosedale‘s distinctions
between the legal consequences of beliefs and practice in the area of religious freedom.
Unfortunately, Robbins ignores Rosedale‘s detailed analysis of this issue and its legal
aspects presented at the American Psychological Association convention years ago.14
Of course, beliefs matter, but their impact in dealing with issues relating to social regulation
depends upon the actions taken based upon the beliefs, just as the analysis of ―intent‖
relates to the legal consequences of actions. Insofar as beliefs are internalized and affect
only oneself, they are entitled to a broad degree of toleration, but when they precipitate
action affecting others, who may not share these beliefs, they are subject to regulation in a
society in which non believers have equal rights to believers.
Characterization and impact of belief in evaluating action and determining the appropriate
scope of state regulation of belief was recently highlighted in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court upholding the prohibition of cross burning. It was held that the
action could only be understood in the light of the motivation and background of the
behavior. Use of motive and intent in evaluating conduct is pervasive in the law and it may
enhance or exculpate the actor and legitimatize or stigmatize the conduct. To follow this
analysis does not try ―heresy,‖ if claimed motivation and intent has religious connotations.
Many racial bigots claim religious foundation for their conduct in their beliefs. Of course,
―beliefs matter‖ and they are taken into account not based upon whether the person having
those beliefs is a good or bad person, but rather through social evaluation of the conduct
