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the old forces have arranged for some people to get in, but why is it that
most people can do it now, but you can‘t? Haven‘t I taught the Fa to you?!
When problems arise, when something doesn‘t feel right, you have to look at
yourself! Look at where you were wrong and allowed the evil to take
advantage. If you were wrong you should recognize it and do better. Don‘t
forget, you are all Fa-rectification period Dafa disciples!
(http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2003/5/6/2003nyjiefa.html)
The members I met at our conference seem, for the most part, to be well-intentioned.
However, many of us who participated in the discussion felt very strongly that they were
―spinning‖ us, that they had a public relations agenda. Their goal seemed to be to portray
Falun Gong as a spiritual exercise aiming to promote a love of truth, compassion, and
tolerance (this triad seems to vary sometimes, for example, it is expressed as truth,
benevolence, and forbearance). I encountered resistance when I pressed them, for
example, on the nature of their relationship to Li. Their agenda seemed to be to enhance
Falun Gong‘s image so as to marshal western sentiment against the Chinese government,
an understandable agenda given the reports of human rights abuses in China, and to avoid
anything that might discomfort a western audience, such as their views on Li Hongzhi.
Nevertheless, an agenda that calls for ―spin‖ will cause some to wonder what the members
of the organization ―really‖ believe and to suspect that ―spin‖ is necessary because the truth
may not go over that well. I, for example, would like Falun Gong to answer the following
questions:
1. Do any of Li‘s teachings or the organization‘s writings on healing encourage
practitioners to take a common-sense, rather than a fanatical, attitude toward the
teachings on healing and/or provide guidelines on when to go to a doctor? If so,
which writings?
2. What has the organization done to make sure it‘s members pay attention to such
caveats, if they indeed exist?
3. Is there any internal dissent within the Falun Gong organization? When my
colleagues and I first began to dialogue with members of the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) several years ago, we were struck by the fact
that the ISKCON Communications Journal had published articles critical of events,
practices, and beliefs within ISKCON, e.g., the treatment of women and children, the
structure of the guru system. This internal dissent was an important factor in
convincing some of us that the reform movement within ISKCON is genuine, and it
strengthened our commitment to further dialogue. Dissent is an essential aspect of
any organization that permits its members to think for themselves. Is there
evidence of such internal dissent within Falun Gong, or are members only likely to
hear that all is well within Falun Gong and all ―bad‖ events are due to negative
―outside‖ forces?
4. When practitioners perform their qigong exercises, what goes on inside their minds,
and what is supposed to go on? I have heard, for example, that some practitioners
―claim that while practicing the exercises they can see gods, the F.G. paradise and
things in the other world‖ (Luo, Samuel, personal communication, June 28, 2003).
On the other hand, as noted above, Ching (2001) says that qigong seeks to cease
human thinking, implying an affinity with the mind-emptying forms of meditation in
Buddhism. Some meditative disciplines are aware of the risk of adverse
psychological effects. Has Falun Gong demonstrated any such awareness and has it
done anything to try to minimize this risk among its followers?

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 211
5. Who exactly is Li Hongzhi and what is his relationship with his followers? During the
discussion at our conference, I pressed some of the Falun Gong members on this
question. They had been emphasizing the ―exercises.‖ But when the issue of the
Chinese government‘s claim that Li had committed fraud came up, I asked them if
their relationship to the exercises would change if it turned out that the government
was correct. My reasoning was that if they indeed practice Falun Gong because of
the beneficial effects of the exercises, then it would not matter if Li were a crook. If,
for example, it were demonstrated that Dr. Atkins had committed grand larceny
when he was alive, the effectiveness of his diet would be neither diminished nor
augmented for the people who follow it. My question, however, encountered
noticeable resistance because, it later turned out, Li Hongzhi is much more than a
teacher of valuable spiritual exercises. One of the members in a private
conversation acknowledged that he sees Li as a god man, although he was quick to
point out that the term doesn‘t have the same meaning for him as it probably does
for a westerner. Whatever Li‘s status, he certainly talks as though he thinks he is
godlike, if not God:
I‘m now talking about it from yet another angle, which is, I‘m explaining to you why I didn‘t
do it inside the Three Realms when Fa-rectification began. Some students are thinking,
―Master doesn‘t acknowledge the old forces‘ arrangements. So why doesn‘t Master instantly
destroy the old forces?‖ Master is able to do that, and no matter how large they are, Master
could still do it. But have you thought about this: if I were to redirect the enormous,
gigantic energy in the Fa-rectification back here into the Three Realms to do things, it would
be like hitting a mosquito with an atomic bomb, it‘d be a clumsy use of force. (Hongzhi,
2003, February 15)
In my opinion, Falun Gong members have a right to believe Li is a god man or even God.
There are scores of people today whose followers deem them god men. However, if Falun
Gong members expect to be taken seriously in their cultivation of ―truth,‖ they ought not to
hide their beliefs simply because they might be unpopular and incompatible with a public
relations message focused more on ―effect‖ than ―truth.‖
Falun Gong and Political Stability
There is little that I can say about this subject that Patsy Rahn (2003) has not said in her
fine article in this issue. Rahn discusses the ―ruler-sectarian paradigm‖ as the historical
context of the conflict between Falun Gong and the Chinese government: ―The pattern of
ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times being threatened by
them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and
continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present‖ (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 10). There really is nothing new in the Falun-Gong-government conflict,
except perhaps the level of support Falun Gong has mustered outside of China.
Rahn presents a set of important questions to the Chinese government:
…is the ruler-sectarian paradigm still valid in the twenty-first century? Do
―heterodox‖ sectarian and religious groups with certain characteristics actually
pose a threat and if so, what is the best way to occlude that threat? This
over-riding question includes other questions: Is the use of intense national
campaigns productive or counter-productive? Is the goal of ―keeping
stability‖ legitimately achieved through intense campaigns if they cost the
credibility and trust of the Chinese people? Are these campaigns believable
anymore to the Chinese people? Is the crisis-management style of
legitimating ―ruthless and radical‖ actions against perceived ―contradictions
between the people and their enemies‖ still valid in the post-Mao era? (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 76, under heading, ―The Chinese Government‖)