Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 211
5. Who exactly is Li Hongzhi and what is his relationship with his followers? During the
discussion at our conference, I pressed some of the Falun Gong members on this
question. They had been emphasizing the ―exercises.‖ But when the issue of the
Chinese government‘s claim that Li had committed fraud came up, I asked them if
their relationship to the exercises would change if it turned out that the government
was correct. My reasoning was that if they indeed practice Falun Gong because of
the beneficial effects of the exercises, then it would not matter if Li were a crook. If,
for example, it were demonstrated that Dr. Atkins had committed grand larceny
when he was alive, the effectiveness of his diet would be neither diminished nor
augmented for the people who follow it. My question, however, encountered
noticeable resistance because, it later turned out, Li Hongzhi is much more than a
teacher of valuable spiritual exercises. One of the members in a private
conversation acknowledged that he sees Li as a god man, although he was quick to
point out that the term doesn‘t have the same meaning for him as it probably does
for a westerner. Whatever Li‘s status, he certainly talks as though he thinks he is
godlike, if not God:
I‘m now talking about it from yet another angle, which is, I‘m explaining to you why I didn‘t
do it inside the Three Realms when Fa-rectification began. Some students are thinking,
―Master doesn‘t acknowledge the old forces‘ arrangements. So why doesn‘t Master instantly
destroy the old forces?‖ Master is able to do that, and no matter how large they are, Master
could still do it. But have you thought about this: if I were to redirect the enormous,
gigantic energy in the Fa-rectification back here into the Three Realms to do things, it would
be like hitting a mosquito with an atomic bomb, it‘d be a clumsy use of force. (Hongzhi,
2003, February 15)
In my opinion, Falun Gong members have a right to believe Li is a god man or even God.
There are scores of people today whose followers deem them god men. However, if Falun
Gong members expect to be taken seriously in their cultivation of ―truth,‖ they ought not to
hide their beliefs simply because they might be unpopular and incompatible with a public
relations message focused more on ―effect‖ than ―truth.‖
Falun Gong and Political Stability
There is little that I can say about this subject that Patsy Rahn (2003) has not said in her
fine article in this issue. Rahn discusses the ―ruler-sectarian paradigm‖ as the historical
context of the conflict between Falun Gong and the Chinese government: ―The pattern of
ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times being threatened by
them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and
continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present‖ (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 10). There really is nothing new in the Falun-Gong-government conflict,
except perhaps the level of support Falun Gong has mustered outside of China.
Rahn presents a set of important questions to the Chinese government:
…is the ruler-sectarian paradigm still valid in the twenty-first century? Do
―heterodox‖ sectarian and religious groups with certain characteristics actually
pose a threat and if so, what is the best way to occlude that threat? This
over-riding question includes other questions: Is the use of intense national
campaigns productive or counter-productive? Is the goal of ―keeping
stability‖ legitimately achieved through intense campaigns if they cost the
credibility and trust of the Chinese people? Are these campaigns believable
anymore to the Chinese people? Is the crisis-management style of
legitimating ―ruthless and radical‖ actions against perceived ―contradictions
between the people and their enemies‖ still valid in the post-Mao era? (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 76, under heading, ―The Chinese Government‖)
5. Who exactly is Li Hongzhi and what is his relationship with his followers? During the
discussion at our conference, I pressed some of the Falun Gong members on this
question. They had been emphasizing the ―exercises.‖ But when the issue of the
Chinese government‘s claim that Li had committed fraud came up, I asked them if
their relationship to the exercises would change if it turned out that the government
was correct. My reasoning was that if they indeed practice Falun Gong because of
the beneficial effects of the exercises, then it would not matter if Li were a crook. If,
for example, it were demonstrated that Dr. Atkins had committed grand larceny
when he was alive, the effectiveness of his diet would be neither diminished nor
augmented for the people who follow it. My question, however, encountered
noticeable resistance because, it later turned out, Li Hongzhi is much more than a
teacher of valuable spiritual exercises. One of the members in a private
conversation acknowledged that he sees Li as a god man, although he was quick to
point out that the term doesn‘t have the same meaning for him as it probably does
for a westerner. Whatever Li‘s status, he certainly talks as though he thinks he is
godlike, if not God:
I‘m now talking about it from yet another angle, which is, I‘m explaining to you why I didn‘t
do it inside the Three Realms when Fa-rectification began. Some students are thinking,
―Master doesn‘t acknowledge the old forces‘ arrangements. So why doesn‘t Master instantly
destroy the old forces?‖ Master is able to do that, and no matter how large they are, Master
could still do it. But have you thought about this: if I were to redirect the enormous,
gigantic energy in the Fa-rectification back here into the Three Realms to do things, it would
be like hitting a mosquito with an atomic bomb, it‘d be a clumsy use of force. (Hongzhi,
2003, February 15)
In my opinion, Falun Gong members have a right to believe Li is a god man or even God.
There are scores of people today whose followers deem them god men. However, if Falun
Gong members expect to be taken seriously in their cultivation of ―truth,‖ they ought not to
hide their beliefs simply because they might be unpopular and incompatible with a public
relations message focused more on ―effect‖ than ―truth.‖
Falun Gong and Political Stability
There is little that I can say about this subject that Patsy Rahn (2003) has not said in her
fine article in this issue. Rahn discusses the ―ruler-sectarian paradigm‖ as the historical
context of the conflict between Falun Gong and the Chinese government: ―The pattern of
ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at times being threatened by
them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early as the second century and
continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era and into the present‖ (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 10). There really is nothing new in the Falun-Gong-government conflict,
except perhaps the level of support Falun Gong has mustered outside of China.
Rahn presents a set of important questions to the Chinese government:
…is the ruler-sectarian paradigm still valid in the twenty-first century? Do
―heterodox‖ sectarian and religious groups with certain characteristics actually
pose a threat and if so, what is the best way to occlude that threat? This
over-riding question includes other questions: Is the use of intense national
campaigns productive or counter-productive? Is the goal of ―keeping
stability‖ legitimately achieved through intense campaigns if they cost the
credibility and trust of the Chinese people? Are these campaigns believable
anymore to the Chinese people? Is the crisis-management style of
legitimating ―ruthless and radical‖ actions against perceived ―contradictions
between the people and their enemies‖ still valid in the post-Mao era? (Rahn,
2003, paragraph 76, under heading, ―The Chinese Government‖)
