Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 184
The Chinese Government’s Response
Cultural Context
Randy Kluver advises that ‗[p]olitical conflict must be considered within a larger context of
cultural meaning, something that is critically missing from most political analysis‘.2 He
explains that when diplomats, politicians and reporters ‗do not understand cultural cues and
issues involved‘, events tend to be focused on in isolation from cultural context and
interpreted from a ‗radically dissimilar worldview‘.
One brief example is the difference between placing primary importance on the right of the
individual over the collective right as in the United States, or the reverse of placing primary
importance on the good of the collective over the right of the individual as in China. Seeing
from a ‗radically dissimilar worldview‘ not only makes it difficult for outsiders to ‗understand
why certain strategic choices are made‘3 but can also create a frustrating pattern of
miscommunication that only increases distrust and tension.
A word of caution here: I do not mean that by understanding the cultural cues and issues
one thereby accepts non-critically the strategic choices made by the Chinese government.
The point is that by including the Chinese frame of reference on an issue, one can discuss,
debate, and dialogue without the immediate mishap of being at cultural loggerheads. In
relation to the government‘s response to the Falun Gong, this paper argues that the Chinese
government‘s response to the FLG is not a style of response unique to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rather, the government‘s response and its subsequent actions are
part of a cultural paradigm that has been a feature of Chinese history and now continues
under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
While news reports about the Falun Gong have sometimes referred to earlier religiously-
inspired groups that confronted China‘s rulers, most often mentioned is the mid-nineteenth
century Taiping rebellion, the history of sects and their potential threat to the Chinese state
(imagined and real) has an extensive and intensive history in China. This pattern of ruling
power in conflict with sectarian groups may have first developed as early as the second
century.
For the purpose of this paper, sectarian refers to groups that China‘s rulers considered to be
heterodox because their belief systems had branched off from larger, traditional systems of
belief. One common feature among these groups, as Robin Munro points out, is that
‗virtually all the sects and societies (even the Triads) evolved quite complex religious belief
systems. These were generally highly syncretic in nature and drew freely and sometimes
indiscriminately from Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (and later from Christianity and
Islam as well)‘.4
This religious syncretism is characteristic of sectarian groups in China, including the Falun
Gong. This is not to suggest that throughout Chinese history these groups had similar
teachings, but rather that a paradigm was developed based on the interplay of the ruling
power with these groups, that is, the ‗ruler-sectarian‘ paradigm.5 I suggest that the Chinese
government‘s campaign methods and justifications in use against the Falun Gong are
indigenously Chinese and part of this historical paradigm.
The Creation of a Paradigm
The Pattern. The pattern of ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at
times being threatened by them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early
as the second century and continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era
and into the present. The collapse of the Han dynasty in the second century produced a
period of profound political and cultural crisis. The development of popular movements at
this time ‗marked an important development in the history of Chinese religions, [namely]
The Chinese Government’s Response
Cultural Context
Randy Kluver advises that ‗[p]olitical conflict must be considered within a larger context of
cultural meaning, something that is critically missing from most political analysis‘.2 He
explains that when diplomats, politicians and reporters ‗do not understand cultural cues and
issues involved‘, events tend to be focused on in isolation from cultural context and
interpreted from a ‗radically dissimilar worldview‘.
One brief example is the difference between placing primary importance on the right of the
individual over the collective right as in the United States, or the reverse of placing primary
importance on the good of the collective over the right of the individual as in China. Seeing
from a ‗radically dissimilar worldview‘ not only makes it difficult for outsiders to ‗understand
why certain strategic choices are made‘3 but can also create a frustrating pattern of
miscommunication that only increases distrust and tension.
A word of caution here: I do not mean that by understanding the cultural cues and issues
one thereby accepts non-critically the strategic choices made by the Chinese government.
The point is that by including the Chinese frame of reference on an issue, one can discuss,
debate, and dialogue without the immediate mishap of being at cultural loggerheads. In
relation to the government‘s response to the Falun Gong, this paper argues that the Chinese
government‘s response to the FLG is not a style of response unique to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rather, the government‘s response and its subsequent actions are
part of a cultural paradigm that has been a feature of Chinese history and now continues
under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
While news reports about the Falun Gong have sometimes referred to earlier religiously-
inspired groups that confronted China‘s rulers, most often mentioned is the mid-nineteenth
century Taiping rebellion, the history of sects and their potential threat to the Chinese state
(imagined and real) has an extensive and intensive history in China. This pattern of ruling
power in conflict with sectarian groups may have first developed as early as the second
century.
For the purpose of this paper, sectarian refers to groups that China‘s rulers considered to be
heterodox because their belief systems had branched off from larger, traditional systems of
belief. One common feature among these groups, as Robin Munro points out, is that
‗virtually all the sects and societies (even the Triads) evolved quite complex religious belief
systems. These were generally highly syncretic in nature and drew freely and sometimes
indiscriminately from Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (and later from Christianity and
Islam as well)‘.4
This religious syncretism is characteristic of sectarian groups in China, including the Falun
Gong. This is not to suggest that throughout Chinese history these groups had similar
teachings, but rather that a paradigm was developed based on the interplay of the ruling
power with these groups, that is, the ‗ruler-sectarian‘ paradigm.5 I suggest that the Chinese
government‘s campaign methods and justifications in use against the Falun Gong are
indigenously Chinese and part of this historical paradigm.
The Creation of a Paradigm
The Pattern. The pattern of ruling power keeping a watchful eye on sectarian groups, at
times being threatened by them, at times raising campaigns against them, began as early
as the second century and continued throughout the dynastic period, through the Mao era
and into the present. The collapse of the Han dynasty in the second century produced a
period of profound political and cultural crisis. The development of popular movements at
this time ‗marked an important development in the history of Chinese religions, [namely]
