Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 64
Cults and Terrorism: Similarities and Differences
Christopher M. Centner
Abstract
Pundits and politicians have proposed many models to explain al Qaeda‘s
actions. One theory postulated for understanding terrorist organizations such
as al Qaeda is that the group might be like a cult. In this view, Usama bin
Laden is a controlling figure, and the members are disconnected from the
greater Islamic community. If this theory held, then it might be possible to
create a cultic model of terrorist groups in general and to understand their
behavior as more akin to a destructive religious movement than to a violent
political faction. This paper will explain that al Qaeda is a religiously spawned
movement that seeks to create an Islamic State, and even an Islamic World
Order. The paper will explain that al Qaeda, and most terrorist groups, are
not cults in the traditional sense. Al Qaeda has, however, some cult-like
attributes. This paper will also propose certain indicators that might be useful
in identifying religious movements that are careening toward terrorist
violence. Spelling of certain Arabic terms quoted in the text has, on occasion,
been standardized for ease of reading.
Smile in the face of death, oh young man!
For you are on your way to the everlasting paradise!
From the letter of instructions for the 11 September hijackers who murdered thousands
(Source: CBS News)
Defining Terms
One problem associated with understanding both terrorists and cults is that of finding a
proper definition for both terms. The U.S. legal definition for terrorist groups is not very
enlightening, stating essentially that terrorists are people who commit terror. The European
Union‘s definition is just a bit more helpful: ―a terrorist group is a ―structured organisation .
..of more than two persons, acting in concert to commit terrorist offences.‖ The offenses
range from murder and hostage-taking to damaging public property and urban violence,
committed with the aim of ―intimidating and seriously altering or destroying the political,
economic or social structures of countries‖ (BBC News, 20 September 2001).
A most useful definition of cult is
a group or movement exhibiting a great or excessive devotion or dedication
to some person, idea, or thing and employing unethically manipulative
techniques of persuasion and control (e.g., isolation from former friends and
family, debilitation, use of special methods to heighten suggestibility and
subservience, powerful group pressures, information management,
suspension of individuality or critical judgment, promotion of total
dependency on the group and fear of leaving it, etc.), designed to advance
the goals of the group‘s leaders, to the actual or possible detriment of
members, their families, or the community. (West &Langone, 1986, 119-
120)
One can note immediately that cults can be terrorist groups and terrorist groups, cults.
However, the two can be distinguished by their strategic focus: by definition, one is
outward—what the entity does to non-members—while the other is inward—what it does to
members. While terrorist groups can use cultic methods, their goal is to achieve political
change, not to increase in size or wealth. Indeed, many terrorist groups tend to appreciate

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 65
a small footprint and carefully select a few members based upon their likely reliability and
commitment to the group‘s goals.
Cults might wish to alter society and might, like the Aum cult, even occasionally use terror
to achieve these goals. Cults, however, are primarily focused upon self-preservation and
the amassing of members. They will recruit anyone, so long as they can eventually
manipulate those recruits into unquestioning allegiance. Thus, Aum might be defined as a
cult that used terror, while Peru‘s Shining Path would be considered a terrorist group with a
cult-like leader. Most terrorist groups do not have a cult-like leader because that structure
makes them vulnerable to quick destruction. Abimael Guzman‘s cult of personality, for
example, was so great that the movement collapsed once he was removed from the scene
(Callihan, 1998).
Nonterrorist political groups can also develop into full-fledged cults. Tourish and Wohlforth
(2000, 8-9) noted that political cults tend to have rigid belief systems, and an ideology
immune from falsification. Political cults also have an authoritarian inner elite who exempt
themselves from many of the cult‘s rules and who exploit junior members for personal gain,
and a living or dead figure who is the font of unquestioned wisdom. One quickly notes that
many of these attributes may be found among strict adherents religious cults. There is, in
this sense, little distinction between political and religious cults. Common to both political
and religious cults is a focus on Apocalyptic fantasies (Tourish &Wohlforth, 2000, 212-213).
Such extreme views can convince believers that they must take extreme action to save
humanity from impending doom, or to hasten the coming glory.
Cultural Factors That Helped Form Al Qaeda
Although Tourish and Wohlforth note that Western political cults tend to spring forth among
the political fringe, Al Qaeda built upon some powerful themes within the Islamic world and
reflects less a major diversion from traditional Islamic views than an extreme version of
traditional Islamic thought. Those who hold these extreme traditional views are frequently
referred to as Islamists, of which al Qaeda is just a violent faction. The International Policy
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (http://www.ict.org.il/) states that al Qaeda is a network of
many different fundamentalist organizations in diverse countries. This network coordinates
terrorist operations to achieve a political goal, which is primarily the overthrow of ―heretic
governments‖ in their respective countries and the establishment of Islamic governments
based on the rule of Sharia (also spelled Shariah), the Islamic legal and social code.
The Muslim community extends from the west coast of Africa to the Philippines, an area
composed of diverse cultures and communities and few commonalties. One major
commonality is the experience of colonialism, which resulted in the artificial assembly of
various tribes and subcultures into national sovereign states (Hutchinson &Smith, 1994, 8).
Whereas the idea of nation is perceived as universal to the West, in the Islamic region the
national boundaries were not decided locally and are not necessarily reflective of the local
cultural boundaries (Robinson, 1994, 214-217).
Consequently, many in the local population within these national bodies often did not have a
sense of national identity or pride. Within the Arab world there were attempts to create an
Arab national identity, but these efforts floundered for a variety of reasons (Kerr, 1982).
This lack of common identity has left the local populations alienated from their national
governments and disgusted with what they perceive to be rampant, selfish corruption on
the part of the ruling elite.
Meanwhile, the secular vision of Arab nationalists and other Islamic leaders failed to
produce sufficient pride, employment, or avenues of dissent. The Arab world‘s secular
governments were discredited in the eyes of many with their utter defeat by Israel in 1967
in just six days (Hiro, 1989, 68). Islamists within these countries offered what they believed