Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, Page 189
Another aspect of the use of this language is what Barend ter Haar refers to as the
‗demonological paradigm‘.36 He suggests that the idea of exorcising demons, which comes
from the ‗traditional religious culture in China as a whole‘, is an integral part of Chinese
culture that allows violence to be legitimized. It is operating on a mostly unconscious level
to set up the ‗other‘ against which one can legitimate violence, and is playing a similar role
in China as racism plays in the West.37 While the demonization of the ‗other‘ is often found
in violent conflict, ter Haar suggests that this cultural element of literal demon exorcism
forms an underlying justification for use of violence in China.
This demonizing dynamic is mutually employed. It could be argued that the entire campaign
by the Chinese government has been a means of demonizing the FLG movement in order to
justify any measures taken against it. On the other hand, Li Hongzhi has also used this
paradigm, dehumanizing and demonizing Falun Gong‘s enemies.38 In Li‘s ‗Suffocate the Evil‘
posted to the FLG website 22 October 2000, Li comments on a reeducation camp where
‗[m]ost of the disciplinary guards there are reincarnated minor ghosts from hell‘. And in his
‗Beyond the Limits of Forbearance‘ statement posted 2 January 2001, Li states that ‗the
present performance of the evil shows that they are utterly inhuman and completely without
righteous thoughts‘.39 The Chinese government calls the FLG an evil cult and Li Hongzhi an
evil man and speaks of protecting China from chaos, while Li Hongzhi calls for the
elimination of evil from the universe and speaks of protecting the cosmos from chaos.
Self-Definition and Beyond
To a large extent, this conflict has become a war of words a ‗propaganda war‘ as some
journalists call it. The prize of this war of words is the claim to truth, the ability to have one
version of reality accepted over another.40 The ramifications include not only the right of
Falun Gong practitioners in China to practice and to have the ban lifted, but also issues of
international relations, arms sales, trade, economics, cold wars and hot wars. In this
process, each side presented their version of reality as a simple, powerful story to legitimate
their actions and reach their goals.
Each side has had to define itself, as well as their opponent. The Chinese government has
put most of its energy into defining its adversary the FLG movement, although as of Spring
2001 it began some efforts at self-definition to counter-act the Falun Gong‘s message. The
government‘s attempts at defining its opponent have been played out mainly within China,
with some success, particularly due to the intensified campaign following the self-
immolations in Tiananmen Square in January 2001.41 During the first year after the ban, the
FLG spent most of its energy defining itself, mainly as a means of counter-acting the
government‘s accusations that it was a cult, although as of September 2000 the FLG began
to put more effort into defining its opponent, the Chinese government, with a specific focus
on Jiang Zemin, the president of China. The Falun Gong‘s attempts at defining itself and its
opponent have been played out mainly in the West.
Chinese Government – Self-Definition and Beyond
The Chinese government states that it wants to protect its people and protect its country‘s
stability by banning a group it believes is harmful to its own followers and a threat to social
stability. It believes the group is led by a charismatic leader who ‗hood-winked‘ millions of
Chinese into following him and is now using them for his own political ends. It believes the
Falun Gong has joined anti-China forces in the West to bring down the Chinese Communist
Party. Having banned the group, it claims it is now resisting anti-China forces that want to
destabilize its society, and helping to reeducate Falun Gong followers back into normal lives.
This is the public self-definition presented by the Chinese government.
Yet it is also the story of a nation in the midst of major economic and social changes whose
governing ideology is progressively seen as irrelevant and whose one-party rulership
Another aspect of the use of this language is what Barend ter Haar refers to as the
‗demonological paradigm‘.36 He suggests that the idea of exorcising demons, which comes
from the ‗traditional religious culture in China as a whole‘, is an integral part of Chinese
culture that allows violence to be legitimized. It is operating on a mostly unconscious level
to set up the ‗other‘ against which one can legitimate violence, and is playing a similar role
in China as racism plays in the West.37 While the demonization of the ‗other‘ is often found
in violent conflict, ter Haar suggests that this cultural element of literal demon exorcism
forms an underlying justification for use of violence in China.
This demonizing dynamic is mutually employed. It could be argued that the entire campaign
by the Chinese government has been a means of demonizing the FLG movement in order to
justify any measures taken against it. On the other hand, Li Hongzhi has also used this
paradigm, dehumanizing and demonizing Falun Gong‘s enemies.38 In Li‘s ‗Suffocate the Evil‘
posted to the FLG website 22 October 2000, Li comments on a reeducation camp where
‗[m]ost of the disciplinary guards there are reincarnated minor ghosts from hell‘. And in his
‗Beyond the Limits of Forbearance‘ statement posted 2 January 2001, Li states that ‗the
present performance of the evil shows that they are utterly inhuman and completely without
righteous thoughts‘.39 The Chinese government calls the FLG an evil cult and Li Hongzhi an
evil man and speaks of protecting China from chaos, while Li Hongzhi calls for the
elimination of evil from the universe and speaks of protecting the cosmos from chaos.
Self-Definition and Beyond
To a large extent, this conflict has become a war of words a ‗propaganda war‘ as some
journalists call it. The prize of this war of words is the claim to truth, the ability to have one
version of reality accepted over another.40 The ramifications include not only the right of
Falun Gong practitioners in China to practice and to have the ban lifted, but also issues of
international relations, arms sales, trade, economics, cold wars and hot wars. In this
process, each side presented their version of reality as a simple, powerful story to legitimate
their actions and reach their goals.
Each side has had to define itself, as well as their opponent. The Chinese government has
put most of its energy into defining its adversary the FLG movement, although as of Spring
2001 it began some efforts at self-definition to counter-act the Falun Gong‘s message. The
government‘s attempts at defining its opponent have been played out mainly within China,
with some success, particularly due to the intensified campaign following the self-
immolations in Tiananmen Square in January 2001.41 During the first year after the ban, the
FLG spent most of its energy defining itself, mainly as a means of counter-acting the
government‘s accusations that it was a cult, although as of September 2000 the FLG began
to put more effort into defining its opponent, the Chinese government, with a specific focus
on Jiang Zemin, the president of China. The Falun Gong‘s attempts at defining itself and its
opponent have been played out mainly in the West.
Chinese Government – Self-Definition and Beyond
The Chinese government states that it wants to protect its people and protect its country‘s
stability by banning a group it believes is harmful to its own followers and a threat to social
stability. It believes the group is led by a charismatic leader who ‗hood-winked‘ millions of
Chinese into following him and is now using them for his own political ends. It believes the
Falun Gong has joined anti-China forces in the West to bring down the Chinese Communist
Party. Having banned the group, it claims it is now resisting anti-China forces that want to
destabilize its society, and helping to reeducate Falun Gong followers back into normal lives.
This is the public self-definition presented by the Chinese government.
Yet it is also the story of a nation in the midst of major economic and social changes whose
governing ideology is progressively seen as irrelevant and whose one-party rulership
