Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 76
On the positive side, there is valuable material on the changing characteristics of new
religions and their members, a host of qualitative and quantitative studies are cited which
may be unfamiliar to non-sociologists, and many contributors apparently read the Journal of
Cultic Studies and Singer, Langone, Ofshe, Clark, Lifton, West, Hassan, etc. Their criticisms
of ‗ACM‘ demand responsible rebuttal. Contributor James Richardson, for one,
acknowledges, if only in a qualified footnote, that leaders and members of new religions
have indeed violated laws. (vol. 3A, p. 93) But, no contributor addresses in any depth the
relationship of some new religions to the far right or the manipulation of movie stars,
politicians, and academics. I recommend to scholars and researchers in all relevant
disciplines the chapter by Richardson, Balch, and Melton (vol. 3B, pp263-276) on problems
of research and data in the study of new religions. They make clear that it is exceptionally
difficult to collect a representative sample of cultists and ex-cultists and to obtain valid and
reliable data from them. Finally, many chapters are rich in thought provoking perspectives.
Biases and couched in sociological jargon though they may be at times, they still merit
careful consideration. Space prohibits full analysis here of the host of ideas, conjectures,
assertions, and speculation with which these volumes abound. However, I will consider
briefly selected chapters which address conversion and family, brainwashing, and mental
health.
Wright and D‘Antonio (vol. 3A, pp 222-227) summarize four perspectives that attempt to
link youth conversion to familial factors: identity formation theory, functional analysis,
family deprivation thesis, and the pathological model. The possibility that manipulative
group practices, intensive social influence, or psychological abuse (―If you can‘t persuade
your biological family to accept your true Father, they are doomed to hell!‖) might interfere
with family relationships is dismissed. Nor do any of the theorists presented here speculate
about the families who accept their children‘s conversion or about the children born of cult
parents.
Stark and Iannaccone (vol. 3A, pp 241-261) ―hope to demonstrate that the economic
rational choice approach to religion is possibly the most powerful and comprehensive social
scientific approach that scholars have at their disposal.‖ They liken religions to ―firms
supplying a commodity ‖ they ―assume that individuals choose their actions rationally.‖
After presenting a set of propositions in respect to conversion, sacrifice and stigma, they
assert that without resorting to brainwashing, psychopathology, or cognitive dissonance,
such propositions explain how people are attracted to religions. It is evident to me that
psychiatrists or psychologists could easily construct a more convincing contrary theory – a
theory of irrationality.
Many of these contributors attempt to demolish the straw concept of brainwashing. For
example, Machalek and Snow (Vol. 3, pp 53-74) in their chapter ―Conversion to New
Religious Movements.‖ Assert that the ―simplistic, monocausal‖ brainwashing model is
declining in popularity. They call for a more fully developed ―macrosociological approach to
the study of conversion to new religious movements.‖ Brainwashing is indeed a
controversial term but, as I see it, intensive social persuasion and hypnotic suggestion are
preferable explanatory concepts, which are more acceptable to social scientists.
Furthermore, drawing from law and criminology, deceptions, swindles, scams, and
confidence schemes should be included within a multidisciplinary approach to conversion.
―In general, studies on active members of NRM‘s tend to find membership beneficial, while
those on deprogrammed members conclude that cultic lifestyle has devastating effects on
personality. Adoption of better theoretical frameworks and methodological procedures is
necessary before any definite conclusions are reached on the effect of cult membership.‖
Thus Saliba summarizes his chapter, ―The New Religions and Mental Health‖ (Vol. 3B, pp
99-113). No studies published after 1990, are cited, and therefore the important recent
contributions of Singer, Lalich, West, Langone, Martin and others are not considered.
Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 77
Nevertheless, those who plan to study this controversial and very difficult topic will find
Saliba‘s chapter valuable.
What audience should buy this handbook? Probably university libraries. Serious scholars,
who are not acquainted with the sociology of religion, are advised instead to skim recent
issued of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, American Sociological Review, and
Sociological Analysis. Others can safely rely on this journal, the Observer, and Singer and
Lalich to keep up with research on cults. In sum, the contributors, even though frequently
one-sided, raise many issues which deserve careful consideration by social scientists.
Arthur A. Dole
Emeritus Professor Graduate School of Education
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Trenton, Maine
The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate. Kathy Pezdek, &William P.
Banks. (Eds.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1996, 394 pages.
What does an edited book about false memory of child sexual abuse (CSA) written by 34
psychologists have to offer those interested in cults? Quite a bit, if the reader can plow
through its scholarly jargon.
The false memory controversy started when adult children accused their parents of sexually
abusing them as children. Many of these accusers claimed to have recovered these
memories in adulthood, after years of suppression. Like parents of cult recruits, anguished
parents formed alliances with lawyers, theologians, exit consultants, and, most pertinent
here, with social scientists and mental health specialists. These behavioral scientists, mostly
academic psychologists and sociologists, assembled evidence that recovered memories
(especially as proposed by psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners) were unsupported and
that children‘s memories were inaccurate and distorted. They claimed that allegedly
incompetent and irresponsible therapists, as well as overzealous court officers misused mind
control methods to implant false memories of CSA. Other ―experts‖ supported the accusers.
They claimed that memories of CSA, whether or not they were forgotten and then recalled,
were based on real events. Hence the false memory debate among authorities, much like
the controversy between apologists and critics of new religions, continues in court, at
professional meetings, and in learned journals. In fact some of the cult critics, most notably
Margaret Singer and Richard Ofshe, have also been active in combating false memories.
Parenthetically, I became interested in false memories because of my professional
colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, Pamela and Peter Freyd. When their adult
daughter, Jennifer, an academic psychologist, accused her father of CSA, her parents‘ pain
and outrage reminded me of cult victims‘ parents (my wife and I included) when a beloved
child is entrapped in a manipulative group. The Freyds have founded the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation. Like its ―cousins,‖ the American Family Foundation and Cult
Awareness Network, the FMSF in defending those accused of CSA, has generated both
support and criticism. As is evident in this book, however, the two sides in the false
memory debate are by no means identical to the sides in the cult controversy. For example,
I am not aware that the supporters of recovered memories have been corrupted, as some
scholars have been in defending new religions.
In The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate, the contributors seem fair minded, even
handed, balanced, and evidence-oriented, whatever their positions about memory. Personal
attacks are absent. Each essay stakes out a position. However, if the reader is unacquainted
with the primary sources cited, it is difficult to evaluate the argument. The ―debate‖ is more
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