Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 44
all of it, including the studies that point to the remarkable successes of some mind-control
efforts.
The Passantinos say, ―Some mind-control model advocates bring up studies that they feel
provide objective data in support of their theories. Such is not the case. These studies are
generally flawed in several areas: (1) Frequently the respondents are not from a wide cross
section of ex-members‖ (p. 37). First of all, invoking methodological purity is a common
ploy for avoiding the real issue in psychological discussion. Psychology is not nuclear
physics. It is rare to find fields in which all the relevant research uses representative
samples. That is why replication of empirical studies is so important and also why clinical
findings are respected, despite their limitations. These methodological problems are
compounded by ethical constraints on research (one cannot study the effects of trauma, for
example, by randomly assigning one group of subjects to a bus crash and another group to
a pleasant bus ride) that are especially applicable to the field of cultic studies. Nevertheless,
a growing body of empirical literature and a huge amount of clinical experience supports the
primary contention of mind-control advocates --namely, that cult involvement causes
psychological distress to many if not most cult members (Galanter, 1989 Langone, 1993
MacDonald, 1988 Martin et al. 1992 Yeakley, 1988).
The Passantinos also say that it is ―almost impossible to gather data from the same
individuals before cult affiliation, during cult affiliation, and after cult disaffection‖ (p. 37).
This is true, but it does not mean that psychological researchers are helpless. The same
problem existed with regard to the study of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among
Vietnam vets. There was no way to study them before they suffered PTSD yet some
excellent studies have been done using regression analysis (Winocur, Whitney, Sorenson,
Vaughn, &Foy, 1997).
Objection: Low Recruitment Rates
The Passantinos raise an objection to the mind-control model on the basis of ―low
recruitment rates.‖ They write:
Studies show that the vast majority of young people approached by new
religious movements (NRMs) never join despite heavy recruitment tactics ...
Eileen Barker documents that out of 1,000 people persuaded by the Moonies
to attend one of their overnight programs in 1979, 90% had no further
involvement. Only 8% joined for more than one week and less than 4%
remained members in 1981, two years later (p. 37).
In our opinion, the fact that almost 4% stayed in the group after one overnight program is
remarkable! That is amazing compared to Billy Graham‘s crusades in which only about 1%
of the attendees heed the altar call. And those who do heed the altar call return to their
families, jobs, and personal lives. They do not become full-time missionaries like the 4%
who join the Moonies after a brief workshop (Langone, 1993).
That the Passantinos seem impressed by Barker‘s finding reveals again their lack of
understanding of mind-control. No responsible mind-control advocate ever said that mind-
control is 100% effective on everyone, just as no doctor ever said that Tylenol is ineffective
because not everyone who takes it finds relief from headache. Are the Passantinos saying
that mind-control must be 100% effective in order to exist at all? Are they again shifting
from a presuppositional position, which says that mind-control cannot exist because people
can‘t lose their free will, to an empirical argument which says mind-control does exist,
people do lose their free will, but it doesn‘t work very well because only a very few people
succumb? What do they really wish to say?
Low recruitment rates demonstrate that a mind-control environment interacts with
idiosyncrasies within the person or his situation, not that mind-control does not exist. A net
all of it, including the studies that point to the remarkable successes of some mind-control
efforts.
The Passantinos say, ―Some mind-control model advocates bring up studies that they feel
provide objective data in support of their theories. Such is not the case. These studies are
generally flawed in several areas: (1) Frequently the respondents are not from a wide cross
section of ex-members‖ (p. 37). First of all, invoking methodological purity is a common
ploy for avoiding the real issue in psychological discussion. Psychology is not nuclear
physics. It is rare to find fields in which all the relevant research uses representative
samples. That is why replication of empirical studies is so important and also why clinical
findings are respected, despite their limitations. These methodological problems are
compounded by ethical constraints on research (one cannot study the effects of trauma, for
example, by randomly assigning one group of subjects to a bus crash and another group to
a pleasant bus ride) that are especially applicable to the field of cultic studies. Nevertheless,
a growing body of empirical literature and a huge amount of clinical experience supports the
primary contention of mind-control advocates --namely, that cult involvement causes
psychological distress to many if not most cult members (Galanter, 1989 Langone, 1993
MacDonald, 1988 Martin et al. 1992 Yeakley, 1988).
The Passantinos also say that it is ―almost impossible to gather data from the same
individuals before cult affiliation, during cult affiliation, and after cult disaffection‖ (p. 37).
This is true, but it does not mean that psychological researchers are helpless. The same
problem existed with regard to the study of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among
Vietnam vets. There was no way to study them before they suffered PTSD yet some
excellent studies have been done using regression analysis (Winocur, Whitney, Sorenson,
Vaughn, &Foy, 1997).
Objection: Low Recruitment Rates
The Passantinos raise an objection to the mind-control model on the basis of ―low
recruitment rates.‖ They write:
Studies show that the vast majority of young people approached by new
religious movements (NRMs) never join despite heavy recruitment tactics ...
Eileen Barker documents that out of 1,000 people persuaded by the Moonies
to attend one of their overnight programs in 1979, 90% had no further
involvement. Only 8% joined for more than one week and less than 4%
remained members in 1981, two years later (p. 37).
In our opinion, the fact that almost 4% stayed in the group after one overnight program is
remarkable! That is amazing compared to Billy Graham‘s crusades in which only about 1%
of the attendees heed the altar call. And those who do heed the altar call return to their
families, jobs, and personal lives. They do not become full-time missionaries like the 4%
who join the Moonies after a brief workshop (Langone, 1993).
That the Passantinos seem impressed by Barker‘s finding reveals again their lack of
understanding of mind-control. No responsible mind-control advocate ever said that mind-
control is 100% effective on everyone, just as no doctor ever said that Tylenol is ineffective
because not everyone who takes it finds relief from headache. Are the Passantinos saying
that mind-control must be 100% effective in order to exist at all? Are they again shifting
from a presuppositional position, which says that mind-control cannot exist because people
can‘t lose their free will, to an empirical argument which says mind-control does exist,
people do lose their free will, but it doesn‘t work very well because only a very few people
succumb? What do they really wish to say?
Low recruitment rates demonstrate that a mind-control environment interacts with
idiosyncrasies within the person or his situation, not that mind-control does not exist. A net
