Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 39
We further suggest that mystical manipulation is a pathway to the other seven criteria listed
by Lifton. Appealing to the initial event of dramatically altered ―inner experience‖ can then
enhance control. Cult recruiters, for example, tell their prospective converts to ask God for
a ―sign‖ as to whether their movement is the true path to enlightenment or their church the
true church. Those who see the ―divine light‖ or receive the ―burning in the bosom‖ as a
result of their earnest prayer easily interpret it as the sought-for ―sign.‖ But they are not
aware of how their internal experiences have been manipulated by outside events.
Objection: The Deterministic Fault
The Passantinos‘ false argument that the concept of mind-control is counter to biblical
Christianity has been addressed earlier, but we believe their argument deserves additional
discussion.
Part of the marvelous power of the human mind is its ability to analyze information and
make value judgments about that information. However, as with electronic ―minds‖
(computers), the human mind‘s conclusions are only as good as the information it receives.
When individuals receive erroneous information about a subject in the absence of correct
information about that same subject, they will make erroneous judgments.
Persons can also discount their own knowledge and abilities in favor of other persons
believed to be more competent. In such a case, individuals will tend to reject conflicting
data, not because it is illogical or fails to correlate with previous experience, but because it
does not line up with the external ―mind‖ the person has ―freely decided‖ to trust (what
philosophers call ―argument from authority‖). If the authority is incorrect, the person once
again bases his decision on false information and makes incorrect judgments.
In both of these situations, one could argue that the individual‘s freedom has been
compromised. They may be free to decide, but how meaningful is that freedom when the
information on which they base their decision is incorrect, or even deliberately falsified by
someone seeking to control them? Is the false information base-especially when it is
deliberately concocted-a mitigating circumstance in evaluating moral responsibility? Would
Adam and Eve have been as guilty for eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil if God had never told them to avoid that tree? And would they have been guiltier if
there had been no tempter, if they had merely said to God, ―You‘re not telling me what to
do!‖? The Passantinos do not seem to take such nuances into account when evaluating the
moral responsibility of cultists, especially with regard to the mind-control model.
The Passantinos state that ―many cults have made deceptive claims, used faulty logic,
misrepresented their beliefs, burdened their followers with unscriptural feelings of guilt, and
sought to bring people into financial or moral compromise to unethical demands. Yet it does
not necessarily or automatically follow that these pressures, practices, or demands remove
an individual‘s personal responsibility for his or her actions‖ (p. 33). The key word in this
statement is ―remove,‖ an all-or-nothing word: either something is removed or it is not. The
more appropriate word would be ―mitigate‖: deception, group pressure, and so on may not
remove all personal responsibility but they do diminish it. Choices that ―have been
predicated on something false‖ (p. 32) are not truly free choices. The outcome is
predetermined by the skill of the information provider, not the ethical or even rational
faculties of the agent making the ―choice.‖ What sense can be made of ―free agency‖ when
choices are based on false data? If ―free choices‖ result in the agent‘s being cut off from any
further source of information for a lifetime, is the agent free in any meaningful sense?
Further, in what sense can an agent make a free choice to return to a life in which it will
continue to be deceived? Might the agent‘s capacity to make informed choices (his mind and
will) be under the control of the one who controls the information? If an agent responds to
personal experience or outside data on the basis of false information about the
consequences of certain actions, is the agent making free choices when it rejects true data
We further suggest that mystical manipulation is a pathway to the other seven criteria listed
by Lifton. Appealing to the initial event of dramatically altered ―inner experience‖ can then
enhance control. Cult recruiters, for example, tell their prospective converts to ask God for
a ―sign‖ as to whether their movement is the true path to enlightenment or their church the
true church. Those who see the ―divine light‖ or receive the ―burning in the bosom‖ as a
result of their earnest prayer easily interpret it as the sought-for ―sign.‖ But they are not
aware of how their internal experiences have been manipulated by outside events.
Objection: The Deterministic Fault
The Passantinos‘ false argument that the concept of mind-control is counter to biblical
Christianity has been addressed earlier, but we believe their argument deserves additional
discussion.
Part of the marvelous power of the human mind is its ability to analyze information and
make value judgments about that information. However, as with electronic ―minds‖
(computers), the human mind‘s conclusions are only as good as the information it receives.
When individuals receive erroneous information about a subject in the absence of correct
information about that same subject, they will make erroneous judgments.
Persons can also discount their own knowledge and abilities in favor of other persons
believed to be more competent. In such a case, individuals will tend to reject conflicting
data, not because it is illogical or fails to correlate with previous experience, but because it
does not line up with the external ―mind‖ the person has ―freely decided‖ to trust (what
philosophers call ―argument from authority‖). If the authority is incorrect, the person once
again bases his decision on false information and makes incorrect judgments.
In both of these situations, one could argue that the individual‘s freedom has been
compromised. They may be free to decide, but how meaningful is that freedom when the
information on which they base their decision is incorrect, or even deliberately falsified by
someone seeking to control them? Is the false information base-especially when it is
deliberately concocted-a mitigating circumstance in evaluating moral responsibility? Would
Adam and Eve have been as guilty for eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil if God had never told them to avoid that tree? And would they have been guiltier if
there had been no tempter, if they had merely said to God, ―You‘re not telling me what to
do!‖? The Passantinos do not seem to take such nuances into account when evaluating the
moral responsibility of cultists, especially with regard to the mind-control model.
The Passantinos state that ―many cults have made deceptive claims, used faulty logic,
misrepresented their beliefs, burdened their followers with unscriptural feelings of guilt, and
sought to bring people into financial or moral compromise to unethical demands. Yet it does
not necessarily or automatically follow that these pressures, practices, or demands remove
an individual‘s personal responsibility for his or her actions‖ (p. 33). The key word in this
statement is ―remove,‖ an all-or-nothing word: either something is removed or it is not. The
more appropriate word would be ―mitigate‖: deception, group pressure, and so on may not
remove all personal responsibility but they do diminish it. Choices that ―have been
predicated on something false‖ (p. 32) are not truly free choices. The outcome is
predetermined by the skill of the information provider, not the ethical or even rational
faculties of the agent making the ―choice.‖ What sense can be made of ―free agency‖ when
choices are based on false data? If ―free choices‖ result in the agent‘s being cut off from any
further source of information for a lifetime, is the agent free in any meaningful sense?
Further, in what sense can an agent make a free choice to return to a life in which it will
continue to be deceived? Might the agent‘s capacity to make informed choices (his mind and
will) be under the control of the one who controls the information? If an agent responds to
personal experience or outside data on the basis of false information about the
consequences of certain actions, is the agent making free choices when it rejects true data
