Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 42
differing perspectives do not mean that there is not a common base, a common recognition
that certain groups do things to some people that seriously diminish their informed consent
and seriously violate a number of generally accepted ethical precepts.
The second point the Passantinos make, however, is way off the mark. They say:
A definition of mind-control that removes its involuntary component is
intrinsically at odds with the prevailing teachings of Singer, Hassan, Martin,
and others that cult victims are unable to think for themselves or make
decisions. Instead, it is more in agreement with the case we have been
arguing --that cult members are capable of independent thought and rational
choice-making, but because of factual and spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, and improper religious commitments,
they make unwise choices and adopt false beliefs instead (p. 34).
Again, there is a little truth with error here. We reiterate: we do not believe Singer, Hassan,
and others hold this robotic view of mind-control that the Passantinos attribute to them.
Certainly, we do not. Further, the Passantinos‘ description of cult dynamics in the above
quote fails to recognize that through deception and seductive, specious reasoning cult
members have been taught that ―independent thought and rational choice‖ are ―rebellious,‖
―factious,‖ ―divisive,‖ and/or ―of the devil.‖ This is not to say that cult members are totally
incapable of independent thought. On the contrary, in many areas, most members are still
able to make their own decisions but typically these are areas in which the cult has not
made rules or pronouncements. We would also expand the Passantinos‘ description of cult
dynamics to be more specifically applicable to spiritually legalistic or restrictive cults. Such
groups present a form of religious legalism (rule keeping) which, through cunning and
clever reasoning, a ―spiritual leader‖ is able to persuade his followers is the will of God. The
cult member, convinced that this is ―of God,‖ may be driven by guilt and fear to the point of
exhaustion. Such an environment can lead to severe depression, anxiety, or even, in some
cases, nervous breakdown and attempted or successful suicide.6
In addition, how do the Passantinos know that solely spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, improper religious commitments, and unwise choices
cause cultists‘ problems? If a person joins a cult, according to the Passantinos, he has been
spiritually deceived and has made an improper religious decision. Well, how do the authors
know? Have they talked to him? The Passantinos may respond, ―Well, yeah, we did, but he
denies he‘s deceived.‖ So, the Passantinos could end up in circular reasoning themselves. If
the ex-cult member admits he was spiritually deceived, then the Passantinos are right. But
if he denies he was spiritually deceived, he does so, according to the Passantinos, because
he is spiritually deceived.
Objection: The Brainwashing Evidence
In the section on brainwashing, the authors argue that all the relevant literature shows that
brainwashing is not particularly effective. This is very odd. Are the Passantinos saying there
is no such thing as brainwashing? Are they saying there is brainwashing, but it does not
work very well? Or are they saying, ―Brainwashing does work, but only on a few people‖? It
seems that the Passantinos are suddenly jumping from presuppositional arguments against
brainwashing of any kind to admission on empirical grounds that there is brainwashing of an
involuntary, robotic, Manchurian-Candidate type, but that it doesn‘t happen very often.
Which way do they want it? Do they discount brainwashing on biblical and other
presuppositions? If so, then they can‘t allow for even rare cases of brainwashing on the
basis of empirical evidence.
They go on to state that a lot of the Koreans and Chinese used extreme forms of physically
coercive persuasion, but very few individuals changed their basic worldviews and
differing perspectives do not mean that there is not a common base, a common recognition
that certain groups do things to some people that seriously diminish their informed consent
and seriously violate a number of generally accepted ethical precepts.
The second point the Passantinos make, however, is way off the mark. They say:
A definition of mind-control that removes its involuntary component is
intrinsically at odds with the prevailing teachings of Singer, Hassan, Martin,
and others that cult victims are unable to think for themselves or make
decisions. Instead, it is more in agreement with the case we have been
arguing --that cult members are capable of independent thought and rational
choice-making, but because of factual and spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, and improper religious commitments,
they make unwise choices and adopt false beliefs instead (p. 34).
Again, there is a little truth with error here. We reiterate: we do not believe Singer, Hassan,
and others hold this robotic view of mind-control that the Passantinos attribute to them.
Certainly, we do not. Further, the Passantinos‘ description of cult dynamics in the above
quote fails to recognize that through deception and seductive, specious reasoning cult
members have been taught that ―independent thought and rational choice‖ are ―rebellious,‖
―factious,‖ ―divisive,‖ and/or ―of the devil.‖ This is not to say that cult members are totally
incapable of independent thought. On the contrary, in many areas, most members are still
able to make their own decisions but typically these are areas in which the cult has not
made rules or pronouncements. We would also expand the Passantinos‘ description of cult
dynamics to be more specifically applicable to spiritually legalistic or restrictive cults. Such
groups present a form of religious legalism (rule keeping) which, through cunning and
clever reasoning, a ―spiritual leader‖ is able to persuade his followers is the will of God. The
cult member, convinced that this is ―of God,‖ may be driven by guilt and fear to the point of
exhaustion. Such an environment can lead to severe depression, anxiety, or even, in some
cases, nervous breakdown and attempted or successful suicide.6
In addition, how do the Passantinos know that solely spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, improper religious commitments, and unwise choices
cause cultists‘ problems? If a person joins a cult, according to the Passantinos, he has been
spiritually deceived and has made an improper religious decision. Well, how do the authors
know? Have they talked to him? The Passantinos may respond, ―Well, yeah, we did, but he
denies he‘s deceived.‖ So, the Passantinos could end up in circular reasoning themselves. If
the ex-cult member admits he was spiritually deceived, then the Passantinos are right. But
if he denies he was spiritually deceived, he does so, according to the Passantinos, because
he is spiritually deceived.
Objection: The Brainwashing Evidence
In the section on brainwashing, the authors argue that all the relevant literature shows that
brainwashing is not particularly effective. This is very odd. Are the Passantinos saying there
is no such thing as brainwashing? Are they saying there is brainwashing, but it does not
work very well? Or are they saying, ―Brainwashing does work, but only on a few people‖? It
seems that the Passantinos are suddenly jumping from presuppositional arguments against
brainwashing of any kind to admission on empirical grounds that there is brainwashing of an
involuntary, robotic, Manchurian-Candidate type, but that it doesn‘t happen very often.
Which way do they want it? Do they discount brainwashing on biblical and other
presuppositions? If so, then they can‘t allow for even rare cases of brainwashing on the
basis of empirical evidence.
They go on to state that a lot of the Koreans and Chinese used extreme forms of physically
coercive persuasion, but very few individuals changed their basic worldviews and
