Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 42
differing perspectives do not mean that there is not a common base, a common recognition
that certain groups do things to some people that seriously diminish their informed consent
and seriously violate a number of generally accepted ethical precepts.
The second point the Passantinos make, however, is way off the mark. They say:
A definition of mind-control that removes its involuntary component is
intrinsically at odds with the prevailing teachings of Singer, Hassan, Martin,
and others that cult victims are unable to think for themselves or make
decisions. Instead, it is more in agreement with the case we have been
arguing --that cult members are capable of independent thought and rational
choice-making, but because of factual and spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, and improper religious commitments,
they make unwise choices and adopt false beliefs instead (p. 34).
Again, there is a little truth with error here. We reiterate: we do not believe Singer, Hassan,
and others hold this robotic view of mind-control that the Passantinos attribute to them.
Certainly, we do not. Further, the Passantinos‘ description of cult dynamics in the above
quote fails to recognize that through deception and seductive, specious reasoning cult
members have been taught that ―independent thought and rational choice‖ are ―rebellious,‖
―factious,‖ ―divisive,‖ and/or ―of the devil.‖ This is not to say that cult members are totally
incapable of independent thought. On the contrary, in many areas, most members are still
able to make their own decisions but typically these are areas in which the cult has not
made rules or pronouncements. We would also expand the Passantinos‘ description of cult
dynamics to be more specifically applicable to spiritually legalistic or restrictive cults. Such
groups present a form of religious legalism (rule keeping) which, through cunning and
clever reasoning, a ―spiritual leader‖ is able to persuade his followers is the will of God. The
cult member, convinced that this is ―of God,‖ may be driven by guilt and fear to the point of
exhaustion. Such an environment can lead to severe depression, anxiety, or even, in some
cases, nervous breakdown and attempted or successful suicide.6
In addition, how do the Passantinos know that solely spiritual deception, faulty
presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, improper religious commitments, and unwise choices
cause cultists‘ problems? If a person joins a cult, according to the Passantinos, he has been
spiritually deceived and has made an improper religious decision. Well, how do the authors
know? Have they talked to him? The Passantinos may respond, ―Well, yeah, we did, but he
denies he‘s deceived.‖ So, the Passantinos could end up in circular reasoning themselves. If
the ex-cult member admits he was spiritually deceived, then the Passantinos are right. But
if he denies he was spiritually deceived, he does so, according to the Passantinos, because
he is spiritually deceived.
Objection: The Brainwashing Evidence
In the section on brainwashing, the authors argue that all the relevant literature shows that
brainwashing is not particularly effective. This is very odd. Are the Passantinos saying there
is no such thing as brainwashing? Are they saying there is brainwashing, but it does not
work very well? Or are they saying, ―Brainwashing does work, but only on a few people‖? It
seems that the Passantinos are suddenly jumping from presuppositional arguments against
brainwashing of any kind to admission on empirical grounds that there is brainwashing of an
involuntary, robotic, Manchurian-Candidate type, but that it doesn‘t happen very often.
Which way do they want it? Do they discount brainwashing on biblical and other
presuppositions? If so, then they can‘t allow for even rare cases of brainwashing on the
basis of empirical evidence.
They go on to state that a lot of the Koreans and Chinese used extreme forms of physically
coercive persuasion, but very few individuals changed their basic worldviews and
Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, page 43
commitments. However, the footnote attached to this remark (n. 36) quotes psychologist
Gary Collins as writing,
Fewer than 15% of the prisoners in Korean detention camps collaborated with
the enemy. When the war was over and prisoners were given their freedom,
only a few chose to remain in Communist China. Of these, several later
rejected the Communist way of life and returned home (Collins, 1969, p.
148).
The figure of 15% seems to us, however, to be quite high, especially when the standard is
collaboration. Apparently, the U.S. military was sufficiently impressed by these results that
soldiers in Vietnam were warned not to resist, but instead were told to do whatever it took
to stay alive.7 Moreover, others report much higher figures related to collaboration.
In addition to Segal‘s (1957) assertion above that ―70 percent of all the repatriated Army
PW‘s [sic]‖ collaborated in some way with the enemy, Hinkle and Wolff, in their testimony at
hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Operations of the U. S. Senate (1956), when asked, ―What percentage [of
POWs] confess in some manner?‖ agreed that the figure would be ―well over 90 percent‖
and that ―it would be a very small group who do not sign some form of protocol, which is
called a confession ...‖ (1956, p.20).
Further, what about the huge numbers who were radically transformed in the Chinese
revolutionary colleges mentioned earlier? What about the large segments of the Chinese
Christian community that succumbed to Mao? What about the classified military
experiments that were discontinued because those conducting them could not devise
effective means to resist brainwashing?8
Why would mothers in Iran during the Ayatollah Khomeini‘s regime send their young
children into the minefields to explode mines so that the soldiers could then cross the fields?
History is replete with examples of horrendously irrational behavior that people engage in
when under the influence of mind-control. We have talked to many women who, while
members of the Children of God, willingly engaged in ―flirty fishing‖ (using sex to recruit
new members) at the urging of their leaders. When they came out of the group‘s mind-set
they said, ―I just can‘t believe I did that. I wasn‘t in my right mind.‖ Any historian can
document that some of the most radical things that have ever been done in history,
especially current history, had been done by men who had put masses of people under their
control. We only have to look at Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Khomeini. The senior author of this
article has had hundreds of desperate parents tell him, ―Our son isn‘t the person we once
knew. We don‘t know what has happened to him.‖ If mind-control does not exist or is
ineffective, we would hate to see something that is effective.
The Passantinos state further that the Korean and Chinese ―techniques of torture, beatings,
and group dynamics,‖ and the CIA experiments with drugs, all failed to produce even one
potential Manchurian Candidate, and that the CIA program was finally abandoned. The
Passantinos have chosen the most infamous examples of failed attempts of using mind-
control, and then try to use them to debunk the effectiveness of all methods of mind-
control. This seems like another instance of the Passantinos‘ violating one of their own
cautions from their book --Witch Hunt, namely, ―Similar Does Not Prove Same‖ (Passantino
&Passantino, 1991). They have failed to take account of the GAP study (Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, 1957, pp. 272-274) of downed American pilots in Korea and
how many of those were led to believe that the US was engaging in germ warfare-well over
50% of the American pilots not only signed statements that America was engaging in germ
warfare over Korea, but they believed it. We do not consider a 50+% success rate
ineffective. If the Passantinos are going to cite the brainwashing literature, they should cite
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