Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 73
 The largest group (38 percent) of mosque participants prefers a flexible approach to
understanding Islam. Only 8 percent of participants follow the Salafi approach, which
can be described as very conservative. About 50 percent of participants follow various
classical schools.
Obviously, the residents of Muslim nations may hold very different views from Muslims
living in Detroit. Because some of these nations are authoritarian, the reliability of surveys,
if they even exist, might be called into question. However, there are indications that
extremism is not as popular as the clash-of-civilizations question in the Pew survey might
lead one to believe. A Pew Global Attitudes Project report (2005, July 14), for example,
found the following percentages of respondents affirming that Islamic extremism was a
threat to their country: Morocco, 73% Pakistan, 52% Turkey, 45% Indonesia, 45%
Lebanon, 26% (53% among Christians, 4% among Muslims), Jordan, 10%. Although the
lower figures among Jordanian and Lebanese Muslims might indicate that their populations
are more radicalized or, conversely, that they feel more confident in the stability of their
countries, the fact remains that residents in major Muslim countries share Westerners‘
concerns about extremism and, consequently, shouldn‘t be viewed as supporting it.
This survey also found that support for suicide bombing is not high. The disparity in the
percentages of respondents saying that suicide bombing is never justified reveals major
differences among Muslim nations: Jordan, 11% Lebanon, 33% Pakistan, 47% Indonesia,
66% Turkey, 66% Morocco, 79%.
High percentages of respondents also believed that democracy could work in their countries
and was not only for the West: Turkey, 48% Pakistan, 43% Lebanon, 80% Jordan, 80%
Morocco, 83% Indonesia, 77%. These figures are supported by another survey, conducted
by the Institute for Social Research, which found that Muslims and Westerners differed more
on their attitudes toward sex than toward democracy (Swanbrow, 2003, March 10). This
survey found that
68 percent in both the West and Islamic nations strongly disagree that
democracies are indecisive and have trouble keeping order, and 61 percent
in both societies strongly disagree that it's best for a country to have a
powerful leader who decides what to do without bothering about elections
and government procedures. Fully 86 percent of those surveyed in the West,
and 87 percent of those in Muslim nations, strongly agree that democracy
may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.
Walker (2006), in an essay that challenges alarming portrayals of the Muslim threat to
Europe (e.g., Fallaci, 2004 Bawer, 2006), says an
opinion poll conducted in Britain for the BBC after the London bombings
found that almost nine in 10 of the more than 1,000 Muslims surveyed said
they would and should help the police tackle extremists in Britain‘s Muslim
communities. More than half wanted foreign Muslim clerics barred or expelled
from Britain. Fifty-six percent said they were optimistic about their children‘s
future in Britain. And only one in five said that Muslim communities had
already integrated too much with British society, while 40 percent wanted
more integration.
The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2005, July 14) also found that residents of some Muslim
nations tended to have favorable attitudes toward Christians (Indonesia, 58% Lebanon,
91% Jordan, 58%), although in other nations the favorability ratings were low (Morocco,
33% Turkey, 21% Pakistan, 22%). Unfortunately, the favorability ratings of Jews in all
Muslim nations in the survey were dismal (Turkey, 18% Pakistan, 5% Indonesia, 13%
Lebanon, 0% Jordan, 0% Morocco, 8%).

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 74
It appears, then, that survey data do not support the notion that Islam and the West are
headed toward an inevitable war of civilizations. This does not mean that frightening
problems do not exist in the relationship of Islam and the West or, more specifically,
between certain Muslim nations and the West or between certain radicalized movements or
mosques and the West. We should be careful, however, not to overgeneralize these
problems, for doing so can contribute to a self-fulfilling alarmism that could precipitate an
avoidable clash of civilizations. Unfortunately, the Jihadists, at least some of whom may
welcome a clash of civilizations, probably realize that more 9/11-scale attacks on the United
States could move U.S. public opinion toward this self-fulfilling alarmism. That is why the
first priority of all Western and Islamic nations should be to prevent such attacks from
occurring.
Those of us outside the security arena can also contribute to the reduction of self-fulfilling
alarmism. All who communicate to the public—Western and Islamic—need to be precise
about the sources of conflict. So much of what we think we know about the world rests
upon the media‘s focus on emotion and conflict. The journalistic cliché, ―if it bleeds, it
leads,‖ implies that violent extremists will get much more attention than peaceful
moderates. We must all, then, constantly remind ourselves about how the media can
mislead as well as inform. If, for example, certain Jihadists use an extremist interpretation
of the Koran to justify their well publicized terrorism, moderate Muslims should openly
challenge that interpretation and Westerners should not construe it as ―the‖ Muslim view of
what the Koran says.
Western and Islamic journalists should make an extra effort to pay more attention to these
moderate Muslim voices. The ―if-it-bleeds-it-leads‖ mentality causes journalists to become
part of the causal nexus that gives rise to the phenomena they observe and on which they
report. Because in free societies journalists have special status and privileges, they also
ought to have, it seems to me, a special ethical obligation to resist the bottom line of
ratings when rating-friendly sensationalism, simplification, or selectivity can have
deleterious effects on the body politic or when journalists are obviously used by publicity-
hungry extremists.
Recommendation One
More high-quality survey research should be conducted so as to provide reliable data
on the attitudes of Muslims and Westerners in various countries. Given the
importance of the issues related to the clash of civilizations, the research database
appears to be very inadequate.
Recommendation Two
Muslim and Western journalists, policy makers, and others should examine media
reports with a critical eye for self-fulfilling alarmism and inaccuracies.
Understanding Other Worldviews: Methodological Self-Doubt
The fundamental assumptions that underlie our worldview can bias us to perceive another
according to how his or her actions make sense in our, but not the other person‘s, view of
the world. This bias manifests whenever we take in information about the world outside
ourselves, whether through interaction with others, reading, observations, or other means.
Once we become aware of the unavoidability of personal bias, the question arises: ―How do
I find out if what I believe to be true is indeed true?‖
The answer to this question is to follow an epistemology of methodological self-doubt (or, in
religious terms, humility in the arena of belief and faith, not merely the arena of lifestyle,
with which most religions associate ―humility‖). Methodological self-doubt does not mean
that one rejects one‘s own worldview. Within philosophy, for example, a distinction is often