Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 4
Cultism, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
Stephen Bruce Mutch, Ph.D., LL.B. (UNSW)
Department of Politics and International Relations
Macquarie University
Sydney, Australia
Abstract
There have been renewed efforts since 9/11 to improve the human
intelligence aspect of policing in response to terrorism. It is also now often
observed that there are striking similarities (and overlap) between terrorist
groups and cultic groups that are the focus of research conducted under the
umbrella of the International Cultic Studies Association, Inc. (formerly
American Family Foundation, Inc.). However, public policy makers have been
slow to appreciate the currently available resource and potential asset
provided by the cult-watch movement in general and by scholars who are
prepared to undertake apostate studies in particular. Cult-watch groups are
generally unsupported by government, and scholars brave enough to study
leaver accounts often live a hand-to-mouth existence, with negligible
financial support from academe and little moral support from their academic
peers. This paper argues for a profound change in this attitude and provides
suggestions for a framework in which academic groups (in particular, the
ICSA), can make a significant contribution to contemporary public policy.
The London bombings in 2005 (featuring home-grown terrorists operating under the radar
of intelligence agencies) marked a turning point in popular and official perceptions of the
terrorist threat. The penny started to drop that better community policing (along with
interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural understanding) might provide a fruitful avenue on
which to direct government resources. Nevertheless, while some efforts are made to
reassure, placate and co-opt selected community leaders, real resources seem primarily
directed to expanding empires within intelligence bureaucracies, where recruits are being
enlisted at great pace—most likely in a long term effort to better liaise with (as well as
infiltrate) ethnic/religious communities and to beef up long-neglected human intelligence.
Preventative detention and sedition laws can send a message to Muslim communities that
they are mistrusted and targeted for special attention such laws engender suspicion,
heighten paranoia, and possibly run the risk of amplifying deviance in those pockets where
it might exist. While limited preventative detention might be justified with adequate judicial
safeguards, governments, in treading a delicate path, should err in favour of free speech,
which is not only a fundamental freedom at the heart of the society we are trying to protect,
but a useful ally in the so-called ―war on terror.‖ Legislation that restricts free speech can
certainly engender suspicion, induce non-cooperation, and destroy the credibility of
community leaders seen to be in collaboration with governments that are running
apparently contradictory policies.
Furthermore, the record thus far of dealings with those apostates (or informants) who have
provided valuable intelligence to the police has conveyed the wrong message. Generous
support and protection should be given to those technically in breach of counter-terrorism
laws but who have recanted before they engage in acts of violence. If the ―war on terror‖ is
to be with us as long as governments predict, the strategy must be to attract future
defectors—not deter them by providing lengthy jail terms to those who have already come
forward.

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 5
Worthwhile intelligence flows naturally (and without financial cost) from those who are
eager to provide it to those they are willing to trust. Alliances should be forged and
information pathways strengthened with those within the Muslim community who are
concerned about extremist, cultic elements seducing their youth.
It is argued that cult-watch groups, in particular those affiliated with the anti- or counter-
cult movement, along with scholars who have been associated with cult-watch groups and
study the accounts of leavers, are well positioned to receive the type of information that
governments are anxious to extract from target communities.
It is also vital for authorities to keep in mind that terrorist violence is not limited to Muslim
groups. Aum Shinrikyo was a syncretistic, Japanese Buddhist cult that employed a weapon
of mass destruction, sarin gas, in its attack on the Tokyo subway. A narrow focus on Muslim
groups might blind us to potential problems in cultic groups around the world most often the
subject of query or complaint to the cult-watch network.
Background
The problem of individuals caught in the grip of destructive cults has been historically an
―insignificant‖ public policy concern because of the relatively small number of people
involved, and because catastrophic events involving cults usually occurred ―somewhere
else‖ and didn‘t involve large numbers of the general public. Episodes involving cults only
intermittently crossed the radar of public policy makers and were of temporary concern—
despite the profound consequences for individuals and families involved. The apocalyptic
events of 9/11 have energised politicians as never before because public officials were
themselves targeted by members of a religious cultic terrorist group, and because this time
large numbers of the general public (who were not in any way involved with the group)
were tragically affected by the loss of family members and friends in the most visibly
horrifying way.
In other tragedies associated with religious cultic groups, such as Jonestown and Waco, the
majority of casualties were connected with the groups. The perception of policy makers and
the public was clouded by the unarticulated thought that there had to be something a bit
strange about these people to get caught up in such groups (notwithstanding the innocence
of the children and vulnerable others involved). In the case of the 1994 Matsumoto and
1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks, in which innocent members of the general public
were killed, the number of deaths was low compared to 9/11. Nevertheless, in Japan the
attacks resulted in a profound shift in public attitudes to the way religious groups are
regarded and dealt with although tellingly, this shift occurred only after members of the
general public (and, I might emphasise, voting public) became victims.
Before that, the horrific murder of investigating attorney Tatsuhiko Sakamoto and his young
family in 1989 and the murder of cult researcher Tadahito Hamaguchi in 1994 did not
provoke as strong an official action against the organisation of Aum Shinrikyo as these
events might have warranted. Apart from the usual view that the constitutional protection
for religion inhibited inquiry, I suspect that many in officialdom harboured the thought that
people who investigate or criticise intolerant religious groups are asking for trouble—or are
even responsible for stirring it up. Indeed, this idea is sometimes echoed by those
sociologists who have an unsophisticated understanding of the concept of deviance
amplification—a genuine insight often used as a blunt instrument to blame the victims or to
shoot the messengers.
Cultism and Terrorism
Nice academic distinctions have been drawn between a religious terrorist group such as Al
Qaeda and other religious cults, but from the information-gathering perspective, a broad
understanding of the phenomenon is efficacious. Indeed, cult-watch organizations of every