Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 54
New Jersey, and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. The arrests occurred
two weeks after a series of 13 arrests of individuals allegedly affiliated with the al-Qaeda
network.xlv The members arrested included Dhiren Barot (aka ―Moussa al-Hindi― and Abu
Esa al-Britani‖), head of the al-Qaeda in Britain, ―who gets his orders directly from Osama
bin Laden,‖ and Muhammed Naeem Noor Khan of Pakistan, ―an alleged al-Qaeda operative‖
whose computer proved instrumental in the case.xlvi
In the three examples presented, we find certain common themes. First, the majority of
the targets were selected for their symbolic value. In particular, the plot in Amman, which
involved martyrdom/suicide attacks, was a strategic choice to gain maximum effect against
targets associated with Jordan‘s relationship with the United States. Second, in each case
members had either trained with or received financial assistance from al-Qaeda. Third,
each assault was planned with the intent of having multiple simultaneous attacks. Finally,
as demonstrated in the case of the terrorist plot in Amman, Jordan, small groups may use
conventional materials to achieve an unconventional, yet highly lethal, effect.xlvii Thus,
despite the appeal of WMD to al Qaeda, the organization and its affiliates and allies have
made pragmatic, strategic choices to—so far—stick with the well-tested and effective
asymmetric weapon of suicide terrorism.
Robert Pape discusses how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of suicide
attacks and the limits of their coercive ability. First, he states that suicide terrorism is
strategic. He asserts that the majority of suicide attacks occur as part of an organized
group‘s activities in support of a broader strategic framework to support a particular goal.
Second, suicide terrorism aims at forcing democracies to give ground on nationalistic
causes. Third, he states that ―during the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily
rising because terrorists have learned that it pays.‖ Suicide terrorists, for example,
compelled American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces
to leave Lebanon in 1985, and Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in
1994 and 1995. Similarly, the Madrid Bombings, which occurred three days before a
nationwide general election and killed 192 civilians, had an immediate impact on the
Spanish elections and subsequent withdrawal of Spain‘s troops in Iraq. Published reports
would later reveal the al Qaeda had identified Spain as a key target in their overall strategic
plan. They saw Spain as ―very vulnerable to attacks, primarily because public opposition to
the war is total, and the government is virtually alone on this issue.‖xlviii
Pape believes, however, that ―although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate
concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still
greater gains and may well fail completely.‖ Although states may choose to abandon or
concede short-term goals in response to terrorist attacks, concessions that would have long-
term implications, such as compromising the state‘s overall security, surrendering
significant amounts of territory, or submitting to economic deprivation, would be less likely.
Thus, terrorists resort to suicide terrorism because on some level it works, although its
effectiveness may have limits. Hence, Pape says that the ―most promising way to contain
suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists‘ confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks
on the target society‖l and/or, I would add, to reduce their confidence in the capacity of
such attacks to effect desired policy changes in the target country. Instead of focusing
solely on the prevention of an attack similar to the last one, we should also try to
understand the strategic motives behind all attacks so as to figure out how we might be
able to alter the terrorists‘ cost-benefit calculations in our favor.
Al-Qaeda‘s influence today appears to be more inspirational than tactical. Nevertheless, the
capacity of other, related groups to pull off successful terrorist attacks should not be
discounted. As John Parachini, a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, points out,
terrorist cells will exploit permissive environments that give them an opportunity to access
and, in some cases, develop their own chemical weapons. States should become more
New Jersey, and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. The arrests occurred
two weeks after a series of 13 arrests of individuals allegedly affiliated with the al-Qaeda
network.xlv The members arrested included Dhiren Barot (aka ―Moussa al-Hindi― and Abu
Esa al-Britani‖), head of the al-Qaeda in Britain, ―who gets his orders directly from Osama
bin Laden,‖ and Muhammed Naeem Noor Khan of Pakistan, ―an alleged al-Qaeda operative‖
whose computer proved instrumental in the case.xlvi
In the three examples presented, we find certain common themes. First, the majority of
the targets were selected for their symbolic value. In particular, the plot in Amman, which
involved martyrdom/suicide attacks, was a strategic choice to gain maximum effect against
targets associated with Jordan‘s relationship with the United States. Second, in each case
members had either trained with or received financial assistance from al-Qaeda. Third,
each assault was planned with the intent of having multiple simultaneous attacks. Finally,
as demonstrated in the case of the terrorist plot in Amman, Jordan, small groups may use
conventional materials to achieve an unconventional, yet highly lethal, effect.xlvii Thus,
despite the appeal of WMD to al Qaeda, the organization and its affiliates and allies have
made pragmatic, strategic choices to—so far—stick with the well-tested and effective
asymmetric weapon of suicide terrorism.
Robert Pape discusses how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of suicide
attacks and the limits of their coercive ability. First, he states that suicide terrorism is
strategic. He asserts that the majority of suicide attacks occur as part of an organized
group‘s activities in support of a broader strategic framework to support a particular goal.
Second, suicide terrorism aims at forcing democracies to give ground on nationalistic
causes. Third, he states that ―during the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily
rising because terrorists have learned that it pays.‖ Suicide terrorists, for example,
compelled American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces
to leave Lebanon in 1985, and Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in
1994 and 1995. Similarly, the Madrid Bombings, which occurred three days before a
nationwide general election and killed 192 civilians, had an immediate impact on the
Spanish elections and subsequent withdrawal of Spain‘s troops in Iraq. Published reports
would later reveal the al Qaeda had identified Spain as a key target in their overall strategic
plan. They saw Spain as ―very vulnerable to attacks, primarily because public opposition to
the war is total, and the government is virtually alone on this issue.‖xlviii
Pape believes, however, that ―although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate
concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still
greater gains and may well fail completely.‖ Although states may choose to abandon or
concede short-term goals in response to terrorist attacks, concessions that would have long-
term implications, such as compromising the state‘s overall security, surrendering
significant amounts of territory, or submitting to economic deprivation, would be less likely.
Thus, terrorists resort to suicide terrorism because on some level it works, although its
effectiveness may have limits. Hence, Pape says that the ―most promising way to contain
suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists‘ confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks
on the target society‖l and/or, I would add, to reduce their confidence in the capacity of
such attacks to effect desired policy changes in the target country. Instead of focusing
solely on the prevention of an attack similar to the last one, we should also try to
understand the strategic motives behind all attacks so as to figure out how we might be
able to alter the terrorists‘ cost-benefit calculations in our favor.
Al-Qaeda‘s influence today appears to be more inspirational than tactical. Nevertheless, the
capacity of other, related groups to pull off successful terrorist attacks should not be
discounted. As John Parachini, a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, points out,
terrorist cells will exploit permissive environments that give them an opportunity to access
and, in some cases, develop their own chemical weapons. States should become more
