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recognize and live within the strategic limitations of reality. Like Aum, al Qaeda expressed a
strong interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In fact, bin Laden has called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a ―religious duty.‖xxxiv Ayman al
Zawahiri, a senior leader in al Qaeda and leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), expands
bin Laden‘s views by stating that the objective of the global jihad against the United States
and its allies is to:
1. To inflict maximum casualties against the opponent.
2. To concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way
of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the Mujahedin in
terms of casualties.
3. Targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an
impact on the structure of the enemy.
4. To reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this
stage.xxxv
Like Aum, Al Qaeda demonstrated its intent and at least limited capacity to self-develop a
WMD capability. In fact, al-Qaeda devoted an entire volume of their 5,000-page
Encyclopedia of Jihad to methods by which chemical and biological weapons may be
developed and constructed.xxxvi During operations in Afghanistan in August 2002, US led
coalition forces discovered traces of ricin and anthrax at five or six sites.xxxvii Additionally,
evidence and videotapes were discovered demonstrating the group‘s interest in bubonic
plague, cyanide, and botulinum toxin. The tapes included video-training manuals for
terrorists instructing them on how to assemble explosive devices. The tapes also showed
chemical tests being performed on three dogs. In one scene, a group of unidentified men
are seen leaving an enclosure in which the dogs are penned. A few moments later, a white
gas appears to seep in from the left, when, after a few seconds, the dogs begin to display
physical reactions.xxxviii
According to a report prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on January 5,
2003, seven men were arrested in London, UK for producing ricin in an apartment. British
authorities indicated that at least one of the individuals arrested had attended an al-Qaeda
training camp in Afghanistan. It was later discovered that the remaining individuals had
undergone similar training in Chechnya and Georgia. Within a week, five more men and one
woman were taken into custody for involvement in the plot.xxxix Additionally, Abu Khabab
who was a known al-Qaeda operative was identified as the man responsible for training
members of the plot in London.xl
In April 2004, Jordanian authorities arrested six individuals and killed four in a raid to pre-
empt a pending attack by a small cell linked to Abu Musa al-Zarqawi, who allegedly
provided $170,000 through messengers from Syria.xli According to a witness‘s testimony,
suspects were found with instructions on preparing germ and conventional weapons.xlii The
cell‘s plan was to conduct a suicide attack using trucks filled with 20 tons of industrial
chemicals and explosives to crash into the Jordanian intelligence agency headquarters in the
country‘s capital of Amman. The original plan called for simultaneous attacks against the
U.S. Embassy as well as the prime minister‘s office. The estimated number of casualties
were anywhere from as low as 20,000 up to 80,000 lives.xliii
Finally, in August 2004, eight men were arrested in the UK and charged with ―conspiracy to
use weapons of mass destruction, providing material support and resources to terrorists,
and conspiracy to damage and destroy buildings used in interstate and foreign
commerce.‖xliv They were discovered with information on chemicals, explosives, and
radiological materials. Their plans were to target U.S. financial institutions, including the
Citigroup Building in New York, the New York Stock Exchange, the Prudential Building in

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New Jersey, and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. The arrests occurred
two weeks after a series of 13 arrests of individuals allegedly affiliated with the al-Qaeda
network.xlv The members arrested included Dhiren Barot (aka ―Moussa al-Hindi― and Abu
Esa al-Britani‖), head of the al-Qaeda in Britain, ―who gets his orders directly from Osama
bin Laden,‖ and Muhammed Naeem Noor Khan of Pakistan, ―an alleged al-Qaeda operative‖
whose computer proved instrumental in the case.xlvi
In the three examples presented, we find certain common themes. First, the majority of
the targets were selected for their symbolic value. In particular, the plot in Amman, which
involved martyrdom/suicide attacks, was a strategic choice to gain maximum effect against
targets associated with Jordan‘s relationship with the United States. Second, in each case
members had either trained with or received financial assistance from al-Qaeda. Third,
each assault was planned with the intent of having multiple simultaneous attacks. Finally,
as demonstrated in the case of the terrorist plot in Amman, Jordan, small groups may use
conventional materials to achieve an unconventional, yet highly lethal, effect.xlvii Thus,
despite the appeal of WMD to al Qaeda, the organization and its affiliates and allies have
made pragmatic, strategic choices to—so far—stick with the well-tested and effective
asymmetric weapon of suicide terrorism.
Robert Pape discusses how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of suicide
attacks and the limits of their coercive ability. First, he states that suicide terrorism is
strategic. He asserts that the majority of suicide attacks occur as part of an organized
group‘s activities in support of a broader strategic framework to support a particular goal.
Second, suicide terrorism aims at forcing democracies to give ground on nationalistic
causes. Third, he states that ―during the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily
rising because terrorists have learned that it pays.‖ Suicide terrorists, for example,
compelled American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces
to leave Lebanon in 1985, and Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in
1994 and 1995. Similarly, the Madrid Bombings, which occurred three days before a
nationwide general election and killed 192 civilians, had an immediate impact on the
Spanish elections and subsequent withdrawal of Spain‘s troops in Iraq. Published reports
would later reveal the al Qaeda had identified Spain as a key target in their overall strategic
plan. They saw Spain as ―very vulnerable to attacks, primarily because public opposition to
the war is total, and the government is virtually alone on this issue.‖xlviii
Pape believes, however, that ―although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate
concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still
greater gains and may well fail completely.‖ Although states may choose to abandon or
concede short-term goals in response to terrorist attacks, concessions that would have long-
term implications, such as compromising the state‘s overall security, surrendering
significant amounts of territory, or submitting to economic deprivation, would be less likely.
Thus, terrorists resort to suicide terrorism because on some level it works, although its
effectiveness may have limits. Hence, Pape says that the ―most promising way to contain
suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists‘ confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks
on the target society‖l and/or, I would add, to reduce their confidence in the capacity of
such attacks to effect desired policy changes in the target country. Instead of focusing
solely on the prevention of an attack similar to the last one, we should also try to
understand the strategic motives behind all attacks so as to figure out how we might be
able to alter the terrorists‘ cost-benefit calculations in our favor.
Al-Qaeda‘s influence today appears to be more inspirational than tactical. Nevertheless, the
capacity of other, related groups to pull off successful terrorist attacks should not be
discounted. As John Parachini, a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, points out,
terrorist cells will exploit permissive environments that give them an opportunity to access
and, in some cases, develop their own chemical weapons. States should become more