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―The relational aspect of charisma is the hook that links a follower or devotee to a leader
and/or his or her ideas‖ (Lalich, 2004, p. 17). The transcendental belief system ―binds
adherents to the group and keeps them behaving according to the group‘s rules and norms‖
(p. 17). Systems of control are ―overt rules, regulations, and procedures that guide and
control group members‘ behavior‖ (p. 17), while the systems of influence reside in the
group culture ―from which members learn to adapt their thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors
in relation to their new beliefs‖ (p. 17). These four factors working together can lead to a
―self-sealing system that exacts a high degree of commitment (as well as expressions of
that commitment) from its core members‖ (p. 17) and that is ―closed in on itself, allowing
no consideration of disconfirming evidence or alternative points of view‖ (p. 17). The self-
sealing system forms a bounded reality. Within that frame of mind the person's choices
become constrained because of the external sanctions of the social system and the person's
own internalized sanctions. This places members in ―a narrow realm of constraint and
control, of dedication and duty‖—what Lalich appropriately calls ―bounded choice.‖
The notion of bounded choice is consistent with this essay‘s depiction of a conversion
pathway of ever narrowing options. The elucidation of the brainwashing process can help
explain how a formerly nonviolent person can become committed to a group that
perpetrates violence. If individuals do not see the end to which they will be led, and if they
do not drop out of the group‘s system before the commitment process gathers steam, they
may reach a point where, as Zablocki puts it, the exit costs become so great that conformity
and even identification with a system that might have once been viewed as repugnant
become less difficult than departure from the system. Brainwashing, then, is not an ―either-
or‖ concept. It is a process that might have varying degrees of success. Although the
―Manchurian-Candidate‖ level of control may be mythical, astounding levels of control can
be achieved. Nevertheless, a leader‘s control is never absolute, so leaders must always
factor members‘ individual psychologies into their plans.
In some cases, the violence at the end of the road might be radically out of (pre-group)
character for particular members. It seems beyond coincidence, for example, that nearly
1,000 suicidal/homicidal people just happened to come together in the jungles of
Jonestown, Guyana in 1978. A powerful process of influence and control that took place
over a period of years steered the majority of followers to a collective suicide and directed
others to follow Jones‘s command to murder those who resisted the suicide order. Like Jim
Jones, Shoko Asahara, head of Aum Shinrikyo, enhanced the brainwashing process by
carefully selecting from the membership individuals who would be least likely to resist his
demands for violence, specifically the murder of opponents and the release of lethal gas in
the Tokyo subway. It seems unlikely to me that either he or Jones chose their killers at
random, nor did they need ―born killers.‖ Because their members had gone through a
process of intense socialization into a totalistic system, the leaders might have been able to
push selected members above a critical threshold of killing potential, a threshold that the
members would never have even approached in ordinary life had they not committed
themselves to the group.
In other cases, as noted earlier, an individual‘s psychological needs might incline him or her
toward violence even before the person encounters a group that advocates violence
indeed, the preexisting inclination toward violence may cause a person to seek out or at
least to choose a violent group from among those available to him or her. However, even in
these situations, some process of influence and control will usually operate. When the
violently inclined gather in a group, somebody comes to be in charge. A leader who
understands the art of brainwashing may be more successful in directing his violent
followers toward the fulfillment of the leader‘s goals than one who lacks that understanding.
Some youth gangs and some terrorist groups might fall in this category.

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In still other cases, I suspect, a seeker‘s psychological needs and pre-existing belief system
may so well mesh with a particular violent group that the brainwashing process is not
necessary for leaders to have deployable agents. All the leader needs to do is make sure
that he has a large enough supply of recruits to enable him to select those who would be
willing to kill for the cause. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, for example,
advertise themselves on the Internet and use the Internet to screen recruits:
The SITE Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism research group that
monitors al Qaeda‘s Internet communications, has provided chilling details of
a high-tech recruitment drive launched in 2003 to recruit fighters to travel to
Iraq and attack U.S. and coalition forces there. Potential recruits are
bombarded with religious decrees and anti-American propaganda, provided
with training manuals on how to be a terrorist, and—as they are led through a
maze of secret chat rooms—given specific instructions on how to make the
journey to Iraq. (Weimann, 2004)
So long as an organization such as Al Qaeda can engage in media campaigns that bring a
large flow of ―applicants‖ to the group, it can find, select, and train those people who will be
useful to the organization, including those who will kill for it. If, for some reason, the flow of
―applicants‖ subsided significantly, the group‘s leadership might then find it necessary to
implement a brainwashing program to produce enough deployable agents to meet its needs.
Of course, the leader might also implement a brainwashing program to enhance control over
members who are favorably predisposed to the group‘s violent goals.
Although there are surely a variety of pathways to violence, I believe that the flexible model
described in this paper has practical utility in planning programs of prevention. It can be
summarized as follows:
1. Cultural trends will influence the kinds and quantities of groups that are most likely
to get a seeker‘s attention.
2. Personal psychological predispositions and values will narrow the range of groups
that have the potential of gaining a person‘s attention and interest.
3. Something causes a person to become dissatisfied with life in some way and opens
him or her to other perspectives and worldviews—that is, to become a seeker.
4. Chance factors—e.g., street recruitment, friendship networks—may determine which
groups of potential interest the seeker examines.
5. Since most groups present a benign face to the world, chance factors may determine
whether or not the group the seeker examines is violent or destructive.
6. If in the early stages of exploring a particular group a seeker has a powerful inner
experience or series of experiences the seeker perceives to be consistent with the
group‘s ideology, he or she may be more likely to make an initial commitment to the
group—that is, to convert to the group‘s belief system, to adopt the group‘s
worldview.
7. Whether a group is destructive or benign (generally unknown to a seeker in the early
stages of group exploration), seekers during the first two or three years after initial
commitment may tend to lose interest in and disconnect from the group in question.
They might do so because, for example, information from outside the group causes
them to reevaluate aspects of its ideology, interpersonal conflicts within the group
reduce its attractiveness, or they begin to question the sincerity of leaders or the
adequacy of certain doctrines.