Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 47
13. Hoffman, Op. Cit., 19. The principle to carry out attacks against only ―the guilty‖ was still
observed by the terrorists of the early twentieth century. An example is the assault on the
Russian Sovereign Prince Sergej Alexandrowitsch, perpetrated by a successor organization to the
Narodnaja Wolja in 1905. Once the terrorist tasked to carry out the deed observed that children
of the prince were traveling with their father in the carriage, he immediately broke off the attack
in order not to impose any damage on the family of the sovereign.
14. Ibid., 26.
15. This attitude entered into humanitarian international law regulations in 1977 in the First
Amendment Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949.
16. Cited from Hoffmann, "Op. Cit., 30-31.
17. Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism. How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and
International Terrorist? (New York: Farrar, Straus &Giroux, 1995), 12.
18. Robert Spaemann, "Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde," in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde/Robert
Spaemann, Hg., Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde. Historische Voraussetzungen—säkulare
Gestalt—christliches Verständnis (P.: Reclam Stuttgart, 1987), 295-313.
19. André Glucksmann in: Karl-Ludwig Bayer, Wer Freiheit und Leistung sichern will, muss die
Ungleichheit der Menschen bejahen.
20. Aristotle, Nikomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), translated by David
Ross, 1109b-1110b.
21. Edwin R. Micewski, Grenzen der Gewalt—Grenzen der Gewaltlosigkeit (Limits of Violence—Limits of
Non-Violence) (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang Publishers House, 1998), 103.
22. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 24,
[230], translated and edited by Mary Gregor.
23. The cause of a cause is at the same time the cause of its effect.
24. Franz Böckle, Fundamentalmoral (Munich, 1978), 259ff.
25. Wolfgang Kersting, "Probleme der politischen Philosophie der internationalen Beziehungen," in
Christina Chwaszcza and Wolfgang Kersting, eds., Politische Philosophie der internationalen
Beziehungen (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), 36ff.
26. Micewski, "Grenzen der Gewalt," Op. Cit., 165.
27. Helmuth von Glasenapp, Glaube und Ritus der Hochreligionen(Hamburg: Fischer, 1960), 120.
28. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), Preface.
Acknowledgment
This article was originally published in the August 2005 (Vol. 4, No. 8) issue of Strategic
Insights (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/), a monthly electronic journal produced by the
Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
It is reprinted with permission.
Brigadier General Edwin R. Micewski, Ph.D., specializes in political theory and social
philosophy, particularly the philosophy of law and state, moral questions especially
regarding the use of force, and the ethics of the military. He has lectured widely at the
National Defense Academy, Vienna, and at the University of Linz, and has served as a
research fellow and guest professor with the Department of National Security Affairs at the
Naval Postgraduate School. As the Austrian representative he is carrying out Mobile
Education Programs mainly in Europe in cooperation with the Center for Civil-Military
Relations. Most recent publications include Military Ethics in Professional Military Education –
Revisited Social-political challenges to Postmodern Armed Forces Business Ethics –
Deontologically Revisited Asymmetry and Western Society – Culture-Critical Reflections,
and many more. To contact the author or to find out about the publications go to
www.micewski.com.
This article is an electronic version of an article originally published in Cultic Studies Review, 2006, Volume 5, Number 2,
pages 219-243. Please keep in mind that the pagination of this electronic reprint differs from that of the bound volume.
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Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 48
Terrorist Motivations, Extreme Violence, and the Pursuit of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Jaime Gomez, Jr.
Abstract
This essay examines the rationale behind terrorists‘ attempts to use weapons
of mass destruction. The essay explores this theme by comparing Aum
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda in order to assess the extent to which their actions
were the result of strategic choice or the expression of internal group
dynamics. Groups such as al Qaeda, which are motivated by strategic
choice, are more predictable, if their goals are properly understood, and
more likely to respond rationally than are groups such as Aum, which can
reflect the idiosyncratic psychopathology of the leader. However, since both
types of groups can pursue weapons of mass destruction, the most important
goal in counterterrorism should be to make WMD technology and existing
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons more difficult to obtain.
Succeeding in this goal will reduce the probability of a catastrophe however,
it will not eliminate the lesser but nonetheless horrific destruction achievable
through conventional weapons, especially when creatively used as on 9/11.
To make progress on this front, we must continue to increase our
understanding of how the varieties of terrorist and other destructive groups
operate, psychologically as well as politically and strategically.
Mohammed Hafez cautions that ―Western responses to Islamist violence must be measured
and well thought out. Misconstruing the underlying causes of Islamist rage or overacting to
Islamist violence may only intensify militancy, not temperate it.‖i For policy-makers,
understanding the source or cause of discontent serves as the best hope to remedy the ills
that lie beneath what some refer to as ―sacred‖ terrorism or religious terrorism. Basic
questions arise: What would extremists hope to achieve by resorting to such violent acts?
Is terrorism ever rational? Can terrorism be deterred? All too often, our analysis of
extremist motives begins with our reaction to the terrorist act itself. However, for certain
extremist organizations, successful efforts to identify and isolate the root cause of such
events rests on a deeper understanding of the subtle processes that foment such profound
actions, in particular suicide terrorism and the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
In a recent review of Jessica Stern‘s Terror in the Name of God, Jeff Goodwin stated that
few studies probe deeply into the cause of terrorism and, as a result,
...it remains a mystery. A contributing factor is that social movement
scholars with very few exceptions have said little about terrorism. Nor have
they paid sustained attention to the more general question of how movement
organizations make strategic choices, of which terrorism is one.ii
To resolve group level problems we need to view them from a group level or movement
level perspective. At that point we can craft more tailored solutions to counter the
extremist threat. The central theme of this essay is to examine the rationale behind
terrorists‘ attempts to use weapons of mass destruction. I explore this theme by comparing
Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda in order to assess the extent to which their actions were the
result of strategic choice or the expression of internal group dynamics.
In brief, Aum Shinrikyo‘s decision to attack civilians on a Japanese subway reflects an
organization in a desperate fight for survival. According to Martha Crenshaw‘s
organizational perspective, ―terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and