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Worthwhile intelligence flows naturally (and without financial cost) from those who are
eager to provide it to those they are willing to trust. Alliances should be forged and
information pathways strengthened with those within the Muslim community who are
concerned about extremist, cultic elements seducing their youth.
It is argued that cult-watch groups, in particular those affiliated with the anti- or counter-
cult movement, along with scholars who have been associated with cult-watch groups and
study the accounts of leavers, are well positioned to receive the type of information that
governments are anxious to extract from target communities.
It is also vital for authorities to keep in mind that terrorist violence is not limited to Muslim
groups. Aum Shinrikyo was a syncretistic, Japanese Buddhist cult that employed a weapon
of mass destruction, sarin gas, in its attack on the Tokyo subway. A narrow focus on Muslim
groups might blind us to potential problems in cultic groups around the world most often the
subject of query or complaint to the cult-watch network.
Background
The problem of individuals caught in the grip of destructive cults has been historically an
―insignificant‖ public policy concern because of the relatively small number of people
involved, and because catastrophic events involving cults usually occurred ―somewhere
else‖ and didn‘t involve large numbers of the general public. Episodes involving cults only
intermittently crossed the radar of public policy makers and were of temporary concern—
despite the profound consequences for individuals and families involved. The apocalyptic
events of 9/11 have energised politicians as never before because public officials were
themselves targeted by members of a religious cultic terrorist group, and because this time
large numbers of the general public (who were not in any way involved with the group)
were tragically affected by the loss of family members and friends in the most visibly
horrifying way.
In other tragedies associated with religious cultic groups, such as Jonestown and Waco, the
majority of casualties were connected with the groups. The perception of policy makers and
the public was clouded by the unarticulated thought that there had to be something a bit
strange about these people to get caught up in such groups (notwithstanding the innocence
of the children and vulnerable others involved). In the case of the 1994 Matsumoto and
1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks, in which innocent members of the general public
were killed, the number of deaths was low compared to 9/11. Nevertheless, in Japan the
attacks resulted in a profound shift in public attitudes to the way religious groups are
regarded and dealt with although tellingly, this shift occurred only after members of the
general public (and, I might emphasise, voting public) became victims.
Before that, the horrific murder of investigating attorney Tatsuhiko Sakamoto and his young
family in 1989 and the murder of cult researcher Tadahito Hamaguchi in 1994 did not
provoke as strong an official action against the organisation of Aum Shinrikyo as these
events might have warranted. Apart from the usual view that the constitutional protection
for religion inhibited inquiry, I suspect that many in officialdom harboured the thought that
people who investigate or criticise intolerant religious groups are asking for trouble—or are
even responsible for stirring it up. Indeed, this idea is sometimes echoed by those
sociologists who have an unsophisticated understanding of the concept of deviance
amplification—a genuine insight often used as a blunt instrument to blame the victims or to
shoot the messengers.
Cultism and Terrorism
Nice academic distinctions have been drawn between a religious terrorist group such as Al
Qaeda and other religious cults, but from the information-gathering perspective, a broad
understanding of the phenomenon is efficacious. Indeed, cult-watch organizations of every

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kind receive complaints about groups that fit the definition on the basis of self-selection by
defectors and complainants. Finer distinctions are left to the connoisseurs. Professor Ian
Freckelton has noted that the term ―cult‖ has ―taken on pejorative connotations‖ and ―for at
least three decades has generally been employed judgementally, signifying little more than
that the group concerned is said to be dominated by an influential figure and is dangerous
or ideologically distasteful.‖i Adopting that popular line, we can easily regard 9/11 as
another catastrophic event involving suicide and mass murder perpetrated by a privately
funded, religious cultic terrorist group but if you want to call it a cult-like group, then that
is your choice.
In Al Qaeda we have a charismatic, self-appointed religious leader with political or
ideological ambitions who borrows from other ideologues to promote an intoxicating
worldview. We also have indoctrinated followers who eschew their personal ambitions and
family obligations to dedicate themselves, without material or tangible reward, to the
leader‘s cause. Not an army in the modern sense, and certainly not a mercenary brigade.
What more do you need to call this thing a cult? You can call it a heretical sect if you like,ii
or even a new religious movement. It makes no sense to say that a group cannot be
designated a new religious movement or a cult because it also happens to be catalogued as
a terrorist group. Perhaps we could call Al Qaeda a vanity cult or sect because it is largely
self-funded by a man who inherited an unusual amount of wealth (and who was able to
hook into and channel money from or launder money through largely inattentive religious
charities). Al Qaeda is a leech on the body of Islam that has become bloated with success,
arguably inadvertently nourished by the propaganda and some of the policies of Western
governments.
The 9/11 catastrophe (and previous cultic atrocities) requires us to take a longer-term think
about the way we regulate, and both directly and indirectly monitor religious groups—a
more sophisticated public policy response based on some understanding of the dynamics of
high-demand groups and the way in which religion is often used as a motivator for deviant
religious objectives, or sometimes just as a convenient vehicle for very venal objectives. An
integrated, structural approach to the problem has been slow in forthcoming from
governments, who treated the long list of religious cult atrocities prior to 9/11 as
intermittent, generally self-contained events that came to notice from time to time and then
lapsed as concerns of public policy.
This time, however, a sub-state cultic religious terrorist group with limited resources was
able to provoke Western leaders into a massive use of state power—using a sledge hammer
to crack a nut. This response fulfilled all the dreams the cult leader ever had in terms of
personal aggrandisement. Unfortunately, I don‘t think political leaders anywhere in the
world at the time of 9/11 had an understanding of the types of groups the International
Cultic Studies Association has been grappling with for years. Indeed, the penny is only now
starting to drop,iii so we must seize the day in terms of educating policy makers about what
we have learned about cultic behaviour and the type of integrated public-policy response
that might help us to address the problem in the longer term.
Those charged with the responsibility of giving advice to governments on security matters
do not seem to want to characterise Al Qaeda as a cult, although interestingly they have no
difficulty in seeing Aum Shinrikyo as both a cult and a terrorist group. Advisers stick to the
view that cults are essentially inward-looking groups that isolate their members physically
from society so that the cult leader can manipulate his followers for money and power over
them, which often involves sexual gratification. To the contrary, terrorist organisations are
seen as having an outward-looking political agenda that is a real threat to state sovereignty.
But if you scratch the surface of many of the groups viewed as inward-looking religious
cults, you will find attempts to promote political goals and invariably a sense of world