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aware that law enforcement regulations used to protect individual rights may also be
exploited by unscrupulous individuals.li Fortunately, terrorists still have to overcome
daunting technical challenges to develop nuclear or chemical weapons.lii Since the
crackdown on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 2002 by Pakistani authorities, none of al-
Qaeda‘s associated groups appears to be developing chemical and biological weapons.liii In
order to survive, terrorist groups will have to be more independent and less command-
driven, a change influenced more by need than strategic preference.liv
Strategic Choice or Group Behavior
Martha Crenshaw emphasizes the importance of analyzing terrorist groups in order to
develop effective policy recommendations.lv She describes two approaches to better
understand terrorism and its consequences. The first approach argues that terrorism
represents a strategic choice from a set of possible alternatives by a political actor.
Behaving according to a set of collective values, an organization may choose terrorism to
achieve radical political and social change. This instrumental approach views terrorism as a
response to government behavior and actions. As the cost for conducting such activity
increases or as the reward for such actions decreases, violence will be less likely to occur.
The instrumental perspective, then, analyzes terrorism according to a rational cost/benefit
calculus.
Table 1: Similarities of Aum and Al Qaeda
 Amassed a great deal of wealth and financial
resources
 Global reach and access to external funds &support
 Pursued efforts to purchase nuclear weapons and
radiological materials
 Strong interest and pursuit of WMD: well
resourced/strong desires
 Self-developed and experimented with chemical
weapons
 Expressed political objectives and a call for change
 Followers influenced by charismatic leadership
 Discouraged by the state apparatus and desire for
radical change
 Operated within ―permissive‖ environments
 Followers were not of one specific class or social
strata
 Displayed ability to adapt and leverage existing
technology
The second approach emphasizes the internal organizational processes within a particular
group or across similar groups that have common objectives. The actions of these groups
may be inconsistent with the organization‘s stated objectives because the leaders‘ focus is
to foster intense loyalty and discourage dissent and defection. In such groups, typified by
cults such as Aum Shinrikyo or David Koresh‘s Branch Davidians, the psychopathology of
the leader can trump the strategic logic implied in the group‘s objectives, resulting in erratic
and sometimes unpredictable behavior.
How then would this formulation apply to Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda? We shall first
compare the similarities of both organizations.

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 56
Table 2: Differences Between Aum and Al Qaeda
Aum Shinrikyo Al Qaeda
Manufactured/synthetic belief
system
Utilized pre-existing cultural
and religious frames
Used chemical/biological
weapons
Achieved an effect similar to
a WMD
Concentrated on WMD
despite failures
Abandoned WMD &adopted
a modified approach of
proven tactics in a highly
effective way
Attacked from within Attacked from afar
Reacted to pending strike Planned offensive strike in
detail
Remained in country of origin
primarily
Comprised of members from
an exiled community (Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, etc.)
Relied on internal technical
knowledge &expertise for
WMD programs
Relied on networked strategy
to achieve effect
Sought to mine &
manufacture fissile material
Sought external support for
nuclear weapon
Ran for political office and
lost
Demands on revamping the
political system and secular
construct
With regards to weapons of mass destruction, the most telling similarity is the desire and
financial resources to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Both
organizations believed that violence can achieve political change and both believed in the
possibility that terrorism was an effective means to that end. However, as we compare the
differences between both organizations, Crenshaw‘s distinction between instrumental and
organizational approaches becomes quite apparent.
While Aum expressed political change as its ultimate desire, its decision-making reflected
more of an organizational survivalist construct in achieving its ends. Unlike al Qaeda, Aum
became focused on using a weapon of terror to achieve its objectives. This obsessive
fixation continues despite numerous experimental attempts and failures. Aum‘s leaders
appeared almost unconstrained by their own ego and driven to validate the organization‘s
extensive investment in research and equipment by using chemical weapons. In contrast,
al Qaeda abandoned its effort after repeated attempts failed to achieve desired outcomes,
leading the group to modify known capabilities, bombing and hijacking, so as to improve
their chances of success. In keeping with a more instrumental approach, al Qaeda has
maintained its focus on accomplishing its operational objectives while altering the specific
tactical means of doing so. Although al Qaeda had the wealth, resources, and contacts
necessary for a WMD venture, its leaders decided to pursue other alternatives to achieve
the desired effect. However, both examples show that, despite wealth and connections,
problems still exist in pursuing weapons of mass destruction.
Also noteworthy are the different ways in which each organization framed its cause. Al
Qaeda leveraged existing sentiments and feelings shared by a large majority of the Muslim
world. The leadership within al Qaeda capitalized upon widely shared beliefs that the
Muslim world‘s problems stem from the continuing influence of the West in Islamic affairs.
Al Qaeda‘s message has a broad appeal because it resonates with existing cultural,
religious, and societal beliefs, which were hijacked to advance ideological objectives. In
contrast, Aum‘s belief core is wholly manufactured, i.e., synthetic in its origins. First, while
Asahara dabbled in the practices of Hinduism, his syncretistic belief structure was pieced