Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 30
Total GPA Scores
Exhibit C
Dole’s Ratings on Total GPA for Two Terrorist and Two Cultic
Groups Compared to 51 Cultic Groups
Psy Abuse
Rating
Iraqi
Rulers
Insurg
ents
Al Qaeda Heaven’s
Gate
51 Cultic
Groups
5 very
characteristic 4.4
4.1 4.0
4 characteristic 3.6
3.8
3 can‘t say
2 not
characteristic
1 not at all
characteristic
My ratings (mean of all means) as shown on Exhibit C for the four groups were: Iraqi Rulers
=3.6, somewhat less than characteristic of a psychologically abusive group Iraqi
Insurgents =3.8 Afghan Al Qaeda =4.4 and Heaven's Gate =4.1, all characteristic of a
psychologically abusive group. Note that my ratings may be compared with those of the
members of 51 groups in the Chambers et al. (1994) study, who averaged 4.0,
characteristic.
In my eyes, then, Bin Laden and his followers, like the suicidal supporters of Ti and Do,
overall were decidedly cult-like the Iraqi militants headed by Zarqawi, including some who
were recruited by fundamentalist immams, shared with the Iraqi rulers before Gulf War I
some cultic features.
Implications
Research on the GPA suggests that the 51 groups reported by Chambers et al. (1994)
ranged widely—2.5 to 4.96—and exhibited a variety of patterns on the individual items and
on the four Sub Scales. When I tried to apply what I knew about four selected groups,
variation, not uniformity, again was evident, However, I also noted some overlap. Saddam,
Zarqawi, Bin Laden, and Ti and Do all manipulated the thoughts and emotions of their
members.
What possible actions might be effective for coalition forces in countering enemy
psychological abuse? I'd suggest first of all that the military, diplomatic corps, and the
public learn to better distinguish among their opponents on the basis of their various
religions, histories, customs, and missions. Islam, for instance, includes several sects. This
sort of discrimination requires that intelligence about a variety of opponents be collected
and analyzed independent of political agendas. Findings need then to be circulated through

Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 31
education and public relations. Finally, some methods of interrogating prisoners, consistent
with the Geneva Convention and basic human rights, might be adapted from effective exit
consultation or other methods of behavioral change with former cult members. For example,
mainstream Islamic interrogators carefully selected from neutral Arab counties might be
coached in "soft" interviewing. .Thus, according to James Brandon in the Christian Science
Monitor (2005), Islamic scholars successfully challenged the theology of five Al Qaeda
prisoners in Yemen.
What do my exploratory findings mean for counter cultists? Of the many groups that use
power, psychological control, and compliance to exploit their members, very few murder
innocent outsiders. Aum Shinrikyo and Timothy McVeigh are exceptions. Cultic groups differ
in their dynamics and their harmfulness
To cope with physically abusive groups, soft power and constructive action, more electricity
and water in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, plus careful consideration of their particular
grievances, may help to resolve conflicts. To cope with psychologically abusive groups,
success may depend in part on continued research on intensive case studies like those of
Heaven‘s Gate, the development and application of measures like the GPA, and studies of
effective interventions. Multidisciplinary investigations of group dynamics especially are
needed. For example, we need to expand our knowledge of revenge and conflict resolution.
In conclusion: Are terrorists cultists? In my opinion some, like Al Qaeda, certainly are.
Others, like the Iraqi Rulers and Iraqi Insurgents, are in some respects victims of
psychological abuse that fuels their extreme physical abuse of others.
Or are cultists terrorists? Many, like Heaven‘s Gate, definitely are not.
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