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In still other cases, I suspect, a seeker‘s psychological needs and pre-existing belief system
may so well mesh with a particular violent group that the brainwashing process is not
necessary for leaders to have deployable agents. All the leader needs to do is make sure
that he has a large enough supply of recruits to enable him to select those who would be
willing to kill for the cause. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, for example,
advertise themselves on the Internet and use the Internet to screen recruits:
The SITE Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism research group that
monitors al Qaeda‘s Internet communications, has provided chilling details of
a high-tech recruitment drive launched in 2003 to recruit fighters to travel to
Iraq and attack U.S. and coalition forces there. Potential recruits are
bombarded with religious decrees and anti-American propaganda, provided
with training manuals on how to be a terrorist, and—as they are led through a
maze of secret chat rooms—given specific instructions on how to make the
journey to Iraq. (Weimann, 2004)
So long as an organization such as Al Qaeda can engage in media campaigns that bring a
large flow of ―applicants‖ to the group, it can find, select, and train those people who will be
useful to the organization, including those who will kill for it. If, for some reason, the flow of
―applicants‖ subsided significantly, the group‘s leadership might then find it necessary to
implement a brainwashing program to produce enough deployable agents to meet its needs.
Of course, the leader might also implement a brainwashing program to enhance control over
members who are favorably predisposed to the group‘s violent goals.
Although there are surely a variety of pathways to violence, I believe that the flexible model
described in this paper has practical utility in planning programs of prevention. It can be
summarized as follows:
1. Cultural trends will influence the kinds and quantities of groups that are most likely
to get a seeker‘s attention.
2. Personal psychological predispositions and values will narrow the range of groups
that have the potential of gaining a person‘s attention and interest.
3. Something causes a person to become dissatisfied with life in some way and opens
him or her to other perspectives and worldviews—that is, to become a seeker.
4. Chance factors—e.g., street recruitment, friendship networks—may determine which
groups of potential interest the seeker examines.
5. Since most groups present a benign face to the world, chance factors may determine
whether or not the group the seeker examines is violent or destructive.
6. If in the early stages of exploring a particular group a seeker has a powerful inner
experience or series of experiences the seeker perceives to be consistent with the
group‘s ideology, he or she may be more likely to make an initial commitment to the
group—that is, to convert to the group‘s belief system, to adopt the group‘s
worldview.
7. Whether a group is destructive or benign (generally unknown to a seeker in the early
stages of group exploration), seekers during the first two or three years after initial
commitment may tend to lose interest in and disconnect from the group in question.
They might do so because, for example, information from outside the group causes
them to reevaluate aspects of its ideology, interpersonal conflicts within the group
reduce its attractiveness, or they begin to question the sincerity of leaders or the
adequacy of certain doctrines.

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8. Those who remain and continue with the process of commitment building, whether
they do so because of a manipulative environment, a good fit between the member‘s
needs and the group, or both, become acculturated to the group. Although attrition
might still occur for a variety of reasons, the rate of attrition among committed
members decreases substantially.
9. Some members may be subjected to the intense commitment-building process of
brainwashing if the leader decides that the benefits of producing members who are
deployable agents outweigh the costs of implementing a brainwashing program.
10. Some from among the group of deployable agents may be selected and further
indoctrinated and/or trained to ensure that they will commit violent acts at the
behest of the leader, should the leader deem such acts desirable.
11. Some members‘ pre-existing belief systems and psychological needs may so mesh
with the leader‘s violent goals that they might do his bidding without having to go
through the intense indoctrination process of brainwashing, although this process
might enhance their loyalty to the group.
How can a cultic studies perspective contribute to attempts to counter violent
Jihadism?
Other surveys have found lower favorability ratings (ABC News Poll, 2006, September 5–7
CBS News Poll, 2006, April 6–9) for all religions, not just Islam. These discrepant findings
could be due to methodological issues, such as giving respondents an ―unsure‖ option.
The Pew survey‘s results for the following questions, however, were disturbing: ―Do you
think that the terrorist attacks over the past few years are a part of a major conflict
between the people of America and Europe versus the people of Islam, or is it only a conflict
with a small, radical group? Do you think this conflict is going to grow into a major world
conflict, or do you think it will remain limited to a small, radical group?‖ Twenty-nine
percent saw it as a major conflict, and another 26 percent from among the 60 percent who
saw it as a limited conflict believe that it will grow into a major conflict. Hence, according to
this survey, 55 percent of the U.S. population expects the current conflict with Jihadists to
turn into a violent clash of civilizations. Given the common human tendency toward
confirmatory bias (Baron, 1992), these findings are troubling because they suggest that one
or two major terrorist attacks in the United States could substantially strengthen the belief
that we are heading toward a violent clash of civilizations, when in reality we are not. Other
survey data suggest that the violence of Jihadists has only a limited appeal among the
Muslim masses and may have significant appeal within only a small number of Muslim
nations.
A survey of 1,276 Muslims attending Friday service at 12 mosques (out of 33) in Detroit
(Bagby, 2004) reported the following findings relevant to this discussion:
 ―‗Mosqued‘ Muslims constitute one-third of all Muslims (a percentage similar to that of
church-going Christians (Csillag, 2005, January), which perhaps indicates that most
American Muslims are relatively integrated into American culture).
 Mosque participants in the study came from 42 countries.
 Almost two-thirds of mosque participants are first-generation immigrants. (This suggests
that Muslim assimilation to the secular culture is following trends of other immigrant
groups.)
 The average mosque participant is 34 years old, married with children, has at least a
bachelor‘s degree, and makes about $75,000 annually.