Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, Page 6
kind receive complaints about groups that fit the definition on the basis of self-selection by
defectors and complainants. Finer distinctions are left to the connoisseurs. Professor Ian
Freckelton has noted that the term ―cult‖ has ―taken on pejorative connotations‖ and ―for at
least three decades has generally been employed judgementally, signifying little more than
that the group concerned is said to be dominated by an influential figure and is dangerous
or ideologically distasteful.‖i Adopting that popular line, we can easily regard 9/11 as
another catastrophic event involving suicide and mass murder perpetrated by a privately
funded, religious cultic terrorist group but if you want to call it a cult-like group, then that
is your choice.
In Al Qaeda we have a charismatic, self-appointed religious leader with political or
ideological ambitions who borrows from other ideologues to promote an intoxicating
worldview. We also have indoctrinated followers who eschew their personal ambitions and
family obligations to dedicate themselves, without material or tangible reward, to the
leader‘s cause. Not an army in the modern sense, and certainly not a mercenary brigade.
What more do you need to call this thing a cult? You can call it a heretical sect if you like,ii
or even a new religious movement. It makes no sense to say that a group cannot be
designated a new religious movement or a cult because it also happens to be catalogued as
a terrorist group. Perhaps we could call Al Qaeda a vanity cult or sect because it is largely
self-funded by a man who inherited an unusual amount of wealth (and who was able to
hook into and channel money from or launder money through largely inattentive religious
charities). Al Qaeda is a leech on the body of Islam that has become bloated with success,
arguably inadvertently nourished by the propaganda and some of the policies of Western
governments.
The 9/11 catastrophe (and previous cultic atrocities) requires us to take a longer-term think
about the way we regulate, and both directly and indirectly monitor religious groups—a
more sophisticated public policy response based on some understanding of the dynamics of
high-demand groups and the way in which religion is often used as a motivator for deviant
religious objectives, or sometimes just as a convenient vehicle for very venal objectives. An
integrated, structural approach to the problem has been slow in forthcoming from
governments, who treated the long list of religious cult atrocities prior to 9/11 as
intermittent, generally self-contained events that came to notice from time to time and then
lapsed as concerns of public policy.
This time, however, a sub-state cultic religious terrorist group with limited resources was
able to provoke Western leaders into a massive use of state power—using a sledge hammer
to crack a nut. This response fulfilled all the dreams the cult leader ever had in terms of
personal aggrandisement. Unfortunately, I don‘t think political leaders anywhere in the
world at the time of 9/11 had an understanding of the types of groups the International
Cultic Studies Association has been grappling with for years. Indeed, the penny is only now
starting to drop,iii so we must seize the day in terms of educating policy makers about what
we have learned about cultic behaviour and the type of integrated public-policy response
that might help us to address the problem in the longer term.
Those charged with the responsibility of giving advice to governments on security matters
do not seem to want to characterise Al Qaeda as a cult, although interestingly they have no
difficulty in seeing Aum Shinrikyo as both a cult and a terrorist group. Advisers stick to the
view that cults are essentially inward-looking groups that isolate their members physically
from society so that the cult leader can manipulate his followers for money and power over
them, which often involves sexual gratification. To the contrary, terrorist organisations are
seen as having an outward-looking political agenda that is a real threat to state sovereignty.
But if you scratch the surface of many of the groups viewed as inward-looking religious
cults, you will find attempts to promote political goals and invariably a sense of world
kind receive complaints about groups that fit the definition on the basis of self-selection by
defectors and complainants. Finer distinctions are left to the connoisseurs. Professor Ian
Freckelton has noted that the term ―cult‖ has ―taken on pejorative connotations‖ and ―for at
least three decades has generally been employed judgementally, signifying little more than
that the group concerned is said to be dominated by an influential figure and is dangerous
or ideologically distasteful.‖i Adopting that popular line, we can easily regard 9/11 as
another catastrophic event involving suicide and mass murder perpetrated by a privately
funded, religious cultic terrorist group but if you want to call it a cult-like group, then that
is your choice.
In Al Qaeda we have a charismatic, self-appointed religious leader with political or
ideological ambitions who borrows from other ideologues to promote an intoxicating
worldview. We also have indoctrinated followers who eschew their personal ambitions and
family obligations to dedicate themselves, without material or tangible reward, to the
leader‘s cause. Not an army in the modern sense, and certainly not a mercenary brigade.
What more do you need to call this thing a cult? You can call it a heretical sect if you like,ii
or even a new religious movement. It makes no sense to say that a group cannot be
designated a new religious movement or a cult because it also happens to be catalogued as
a terrorist group. Perhaps we could call Al Qaeda a vanity cult or sect because it is largely
self-funded by a man who inherited an unusual amount of wealth (and who was able to
hook into and channel money from or launder money through largely inattentive religious
charities). Al Qaeda is a leech on the body of Islam that has become bloated with success,
arguably inadvertently nourished by the propaganda and some of the policies of Western
governments.
The 9/11 catastrophe (and previous cultic atrocities) requires us to take a longer-term think
about the way we regulate, and both directly and indirectly monitor religious groups—a
more sophisticated public policy response based on some understanding of the dynamics of
high-demand groups and the way in which religion is often used as a motivator for deviant
religious objectives, or sometimes just as a convenient vehicle for very venal objectives. An
integrated, structural approach to the problem has been slow in forthcoming from
governments, who treated the long list of religious cult atrocities prior to 9/11 as
intermittent, generally self-contained events that came to notice from time to time and then
lapsed as concerns of public policy.
This time, however, a sub-state cultic religious terrorist group with limited resources was
able to provoke Western leaders into a massive use of state power—using a sledge hammer
to crack a nut. This response fulfilled all the dreams the cult leader ever had in terms of
personal aggrandisement. Unfortunately, I don‘t think political leaders anywhere in the
world at the time of 9/11 had an understanding of the types of groups the International
Cultic Studies Association has been grappling with for years. Indeed, the penny is only now
starting to drop,iii so we must seize the day in terms of educating policy makers about what
we have learned about cultic behaviour and the type of integrated public-policy response
that might help us to address the problem in the longer term.
Those charged with the responsibility of giving advice to governments on security matters
do not seem to want to characterise Al Qaeda as a cult, although interestingly they have no
difficulty in seeing Aum Shinrikyo as both a cult and a terrorist group. Advisers stick to the
view that cults are essentially inward-looking groups that isolate their members physically
from society so that the cult leader can manipulate his followers for money and power over
them, which often involves sexual gratification. To the contrary, terrorist organisations are
seen as having an outward-looking political agenda that is a real threat to state sovereignty.
But if you scratch the surface of many of the groups viewed as inward-looking religious
cults, you will find attempts to promote political goals and invariably a sense of world
